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The puzzle is yet to be solved whether gender differences exist in behavioral biases and investment 
preferences of highly skilled and experienced professionals. Subsequently, this thesis consists of three 
related essays on investment decisions by gender of professionals in the field of finance. The first essay 
shows that prospect theory value influences insider trading decisions, and the impact is stronger among 
female executives’ trades. Female insiders tend to carry more biased trades and suffer significantly 
higher resultant losses, as compared to their male counterparts. Female insiders who buy (sell) when 
their company's prospect theory value is above (below) other firms’ prospect theory values, lose 47 
basis points over the next month. While the findings contradict the overconfidence hypothesis that 
predicts poor trading decisions by male insiders, the results are consistent with the male insiders’ 
superior information access hypothesis, suggesting that informational disadvantage serves as a possible 
channel of higher behavioral biases in female insiders’ trading. The second essay demonstrates that the 
gender of mutual fund managers affects the liquidity of a portfolio. Female managers prefer higher 
portfolio liquidity than their male counterparts. Funds managed by single female managers are 8-25% 
more liquid than single male managed funds. Contrary to the excessive trading hypothesis that expects 
a higher liquidity preference by overconfident male fund managers, the findings support inclination of 
female fund managers for the price efficiency hypothesis. Funds experience an increased liquidity when 
they transition to a female manager. The third essay documents that collective self-construal of female 
fund managers explains their tendency to invest less actively as compared to their male counterparts. 
Funds with a higher proportion of female managers in management team closely track multifactor 
benchmark. For the funds managed by more female managers than males, the economic benefits of 
diversification are 1.86% lower than other funds. Consistent with the literature, female fund managers 
herd more, take less risk, and are less overconfident than males. These investment behaviors are likely 
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This chapter provides a brief introduction of the thesis. Section 1.1 outlines the motivation, aim, and 
contribution to the literature to explore gender differences in investment decisions of professionals in 
the field of finance. Section 1.2 presents a brief overview of the findings of three empirical studies. 
Section 1.3 lists research outputs from the thesis. Finally, Section 1.4 provides the structure of the 





1.1 Motivation, Objective, and Contribution to the Literature 
In the past few years, there has been a rise in the number of women holding top positions in companies. 
However, women continue to be underrepresented in top leadership roles. In the U.S., in companies’ 
executive-level positions, 1 in 5 executives are female (Huang et al., 2019). Within S&P 500 indexed 
companies, which are the largest and most well-known companies in the U.S., only 5.8% of the Chief 
Executive Officers (CEOs) are female (Catalyst, 2020a). Globally, women account for less than 29% 
of senior positions and nearly 20% of board of director positions (Catalyst, 2020b). Men also outnumber 
women managers in the fund industry. Across 56 countries, about 1 in 5 funds has at least one female 
manager, and this trend is unchanged since the 2008 financial crisis (Sargis & Lutton, 2016). A detailed 
study of fund managers by gender shows that only 9.4% of fund managers in the U.S. fund industry are 
women (Lutton & Davis, 2015). Moreover, from 1990 to 2017, the U.S. active equity and fixed income 
funds have grown in number from 1,900 to 8,500, indicating more jobs for portfolio managers. 
However, men have obtained 85 to 90% of these new roles, and women have failed to take significant 
advantage of the growth in positions (Sargis & Wing, 2018). 
Even though the number of females with the autonomy for strategic decision making is small, 
their attitudes and behaviors are important predictors of investment outcomes. Hence, this thesis 
explores the personality attributes, investment behaviors, and preferences of female professionals in 
decision making roles, and their impact on investment choices. When women climb to the top of the 
corporate ladder, are their investment decisions similar to those of their male counterparts? Do 
behavioral disparities among gender affect the investment style of professional females? Furthermore, 
are there some channels that contribute to the investment choices of females? We answer these questions 
with the help of three research studies. Considering gender, our one study examines insider trading 
decisions of top executives, while two of the studies investigate the investment preferences of mutual 
fund managers. The essays of this thesis provide empirical evidence that differences in investment 
decisions exist between male and female professionals. In addition to personality attributes, some 




Although a gender gap exists within leadership positions, there is a continuous emphasis on the 
need to improve female participation in corporate decision making. Various studies have shown that 
firms with gender diverse top management teams perform better than firms with less diversity (Dezsö 
& Ross, 2012; Hoobler et al., 2018). Nevertheless, in psychology, management, and various other fields 
of study, the findings are mixed regarding fundamental differences among males and females in top 
positions. One strand of literature argues that females are passive, sensitive, and do not possess the 
required skills to lead, whereas evidence also exists which indicates that females’ unique cognitive skills 
help them to excel in leadership roles (Carli & Eagly, 2016; Eagly, 2016).  
Similarly, in the field of finance, there has been a continuous debate focused on solving the 
puzzle of gender differences in investment decisions. Numerous studies have described that female 
investors are conservative in their investments (Sunden & Surette, 1998), and female executives opt for 
less risky corporate policies compared to male executives (Faccio, Marchica, & Mura, 2016). Ho et al. 
(2015) demonstrate a positive association between female executives and accounting conservatism. 
Contrary to this view, Doan and Iskandar-Datta (2020) provide evidence that female chief financial 
officers are more ethical in their decisions, but not more risk averse, than their male counterparts. 
Female directors are highly likely to take more risks than male directors (Adams & Funk, 2012). The 
literature documents that male investors trade more aggressively and earn smaller net returns than 
female investors (Barber & Odean, 2001). Huang and Kisgen (2013) conclude that female executives 
are less overconfident, inclined to make less significant acquisitions, and reduce the debt level of firms. 
However, Atkinson, Baird, and Frye (2003) find no disparity among male and female fund managers in 
terms of fund performance, risk taking, and other fund characteristics. Liu, Wei, and Xie (2014) show 
a positive association between a higher proportion of female executives and firm performance in China. 
On the other hand, Adams and Ferreira (2009) document that while female directors are more effective 
monitors than male directors, their impact on firm performance and value is negative. 
We contribute to this contradictory issue by analyzing risk preferences of female executives, 




personality attributes of women have not been studied in detail in the existing literature. Moreover, we 
find limited literature exploring gender differences in investment decisions, as opposed to corporate 
decisions, of professionals. Essay one (Chapter 2) shows that trading decisions of insiders are subject 
to risk preferences. The literature on insider trading reports that insiders earn abnormal profits on their 
trades because they are well informed about their firm’s fundamentals (Lakonishok & Lee, 2001; Rozeff 
& Zaman, 1998). In contrast, our study provides empirical evidence that insiders earn losses from the 
trades induced by the prospect theory value and that the prospect theory value bias is stronger among 
female executives’ trades. We measure bias according to the cumulative prospect theory. The 
motivation of the study relates to the findings of Inci, Narayanan, and Seyhun (2017) that access to 
information for female insiders is limited in comparison to their male counterparts. The results suggest 
that the availability of asymmetric information possibly explains the tendency of less-informed female 
insiders to carry more prospect theory value induces trades. Kumar (2009b) argues that investors exhibit 
stronger behavioral biases in valuing stocks for which information is scarce and uncertainty is high.  
We show that situational attributes, as opposed to personality traits, influence biased trade 
losses of female executives. Male dominance at top corporate levels remains a barrier that presents a 
“glass ceiling”, hindering females' progress to the top echelons of power (Athey, Avery, & Zemsky, 
2000). Even after achieving an elite corporate position, females remain excluded from the informal 
networks with male peers where critical information is shared (Davies-Netzley, 1998; Lyness & 
Thompson, 2000). Hence, to provide support to the argument that female insiders face limited access 
to information which might be one of the determinants of their higher biased trade losses, we test our 
main results in two settings. First, we run analysis for the trades where information is expected to be 
equally dispersed among all executives. Examining gender differences in losses from prospect theory 
value trades within executives’ formal titles, trade size, routine trades, and macro-level market 
uncertainty, the findings indicate higher biased trade losses among female insiders, compared to males. 
It indicates unequal access to information for female insiders, which possibly contributes to higher 
biased trade losses.  Second, we explore the settings where insider trades are carried only when superior 




future returns (Lakonishok & Lee, 2001). Considering buy transactions and firms with higher 
proportion of female trades, our results report a decrease in female insiders’ losses from biased trades. 
To the best of our knowledge, this study provides the first empirical evidence of gender 
differences in prospect theory value bias, specifically, for insider trading. Our findings support the 
argument that female insiders’ disadvantage in access to information (Inci, Narayanan, & Seyhun, 2017) 
is one of the contributors to the association between female insiders and losses from biased trades. The 
existing literature argues that lack of knowledge and higher uncertainty lead to behavioral biases (e.g., 
Feng & Seasholes, 2005; Kumar, 2009b). The analysis of insiders’ gender disparity in behavioral bias 
is a contribution to the existing literature on decision making by professional males and females (e.g., 
Hibbert, Lawrence, & Prakash, 2016; Huang & Kisgen, 2013; Niessen-Ruenzi & Ruenzi, 2019). Our 
results are consistent with the line of literature describing that insider trades are prone to behavioral 
biases (e.g., Hillier, Korczak, & Korczak, 2015; Kallunki, Nilsson, & Hellström, 2009). 
Essay two (Chapter 3) focuses on fund managers’ preference for liquidity and examines the 
role of gender in selecting liquidity-preferred portfolios. The importance of holding a liquid portfolio 
motivates this study because holding liquid securities provides a safety cushion to mutual funds to 
manage liquidity risk in the event of crisis (e.g., Huang, 2015; Scholes, 2000). The study documents 
that liquidity preference differs among male and female fund managers. Consistent with the literature, 
we find that male fund managers are involved in aggressive trading. However, female fund managers 
significantly prefer portfolio liquidity as compared to their male counterparts. We examine why female 
managed funds hold more liquid stocks. The findings indicate that female fund managers prefer to hold 
liquid stocks for which prices adjust to information in a timely manner. Subsequently, female fund 
managers’ inclination towards price efficient stocks is a potential channel to a higher portfolio liquidity. 
To measure the price efficiency of stocks, we use the price delay measure introduced by Hou and 
Moskowitz (2005). 
We investigate the validity of the association between female fund managers and portfolio 




models. However, it is important to address the endogeneity concern in more detail. We use different 
techniques to deal with the issues of omitted variables, reverse causality, and selection bias. We apply 
the propensity score matching approach on the full sample as well as on a subsample of funds which 
experience a transition from one manager to another. We compare the liquidity preference of funds 
managed by female managers to a matched sample of peers run by male managers that are 
indistinguishable in terms of investment objective, time, fund, and manager level characteristics. 
Second, we compare the portfolio liquidity preference of the same funds managed by managers of a 
different gender. In addition to panel regressions with fund and time fixed effects, we use the difference-
in-differences approach on transition funds to compare fund liquidity before and after transitions from 
male to female managers with a control sample of male to male transition funds. We conduct an 
additional test to rule out any endogeneity concerns. The test relies on an instrumental variable 
approach. Our findings are consistent and significant for all the tests. 
The main contribution of the second essay is to examine the difference in preference for 
portfolio liquidity among male and female mutual fund managers. Our study further contributes to the 
existing literature that reports liquidity as one of the important characteristics of stockholdings preferred 
by institutional investors (e.g., Falkenstein, 1996; Gompers & Metrick, 2001). The results are consistent 
with the notion that behavioral disparities among gender exist even in professional settings (e.g., Faccio, 
Marchica, & Mura, 2016; Ho et al., 2015; Huang & Kisgen, 2013; Niessen-Ruenzi & Ruenzi, 2019). 
Our findings also contribute to the literature on females’ inclination towards informationally transparent 
stocks, and the positive association between stock price efficiency and liquidity (e.g., Abad et al., 2017; 
Gul, Srinidhi, & Ng, 2011; Lang, Lins, & Maffett, 2012). 
The third essay (Chapter 4) aims to examine whether female fund managers invest less or more 
actively. Highly active fund managers utilize their skills and abilities to outperform their fund’s 
benchmark. We document that the returns of funds managed by a high proportion of female managers 
closely track the benchmark, thereby showing that females manage funds less actively. These results 




demographics like age, education, and tenure. The psychology literature on self-construal of gender 
motivates our study. It describes that collective self-construal is one of the important female self-
attributes, which makes women to be more social and interdependent than men (Cross & Madson, 1997; 
Kashima et al., 1995). Compared to men, women are less likely to make unique decisions which are 
against the common beliefs of the group. Hence, the results of our study provide evidence that the 
tendency of funds to deviate from the multifactor benchmark decreases when a high proportion of 
females are present in the fund management team. 
Additionally, we test the impact of a high proportion of female fund managers in management 
team on the fund’s economic benefit of diversification. Using the mean-variance spanning test, the 
findings show that collective self-construal of female fund managers reduces the benefits of 
diversification. This indicates that investors are less likely to enjoy diversification gains by investing in 
funds managed by more female managers than males. In this study, we analyze the impact of investment 
behaviors related to a manager’s gender, i.e., herding, risk taking, and overconfidence, on the co-
movement of fund returns with market returns. Considering the interdependent self-construal of female 
fund managers, we expect that they herd the common and acceptable investment strategies of the 
market, instead of making bold decisions. The literature suggests that herding behavior leads to an 
increase in co-movement with the market (Eun, Wang, & Xiao, 2015). Considering females to be more 
risk averse (Faccio, Marchica, & Mura, 2016) and less overconfident (Barber & Odean, 2001) than 
males, we indicate a positive impact of these behaviors on the co-movement between fund and 
benchmark returns.  Finally, we test the investment style of female fund managers and its impact on 
fund activity. 
The findings of study three indicate that, in addition to self-construal, investment behaviors of 
female fund managers are highly likely to explain less active fund management by female managers. 
Our findings contribute to the psychology literature of collective self-construal of women (e.g., 
Kashima et al., 1995; Markus & Kitayama, 1991). To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study 




the activity measure of R2. Moreover, this research study is an addition to the mutual fund literature on 
gender diversity of fund managers and team managed funds (e.g. Atkinson, Baird, & Frye, 2003; Bär, 
Kempf, & Ruenzi, 2010; Bär, Niessen-Ruenzi, & Ruenzi, 2009; Niessen & Ruenzi, 2006). The finding 
of reduced economic benefits of diversification contributes to the literature, which suggests lower 
performance of female professionals as compared to males (e.g., Adams & Ferreira, 2009). 
 
1.2 Main Findings 
This section highlights the main findings of the three studies. In the first study, we develop a measure 
of behavioral bias according to the measure of prospect theory value introduced by Barberis, Mukherjee, 
and Wang (2016). We find that 14.01% of our sample trades are behaviorally biased insider 
transactions, induced by prospect theory value. Considering all the control variables and the firm fixed 
effect, our regression results describe that risk preferences of insiders affect their trading decisions. The 
trading decisions tempted by prospect theory value make insider stocks overvalued (undervalued) and 
the subsequent future returns of such trades are negatively impacted. The findings indicate that 20.02% 
(13.86%) of the trades made by female (male) insiders are biased. Furthermore, the losses from these 
biased trades of female insiders are 47 basis points higher than that of their male counterparts. The 
coefficient of a higher loss from biased trades by female insiders is economically and statistically 
significant at the 1% level. Hence, we provide empirical evidence that gender differences exist in insider 
trading decisions and that female insiders show a stronger tendency to carry out biased trades and suffer 
higher losses compared to male insiders. 
To propose a possible channel contributing to the main findings, we run some additional tests. 
Considering underrepresentation of females at top positions, and the fact that male professionals gain 
more benefits from information channels (social connections) than do females (Fang & Huang, 2017), 
we analyze settings where information is expected to be equally spread among all insiders, irrespective 
of the gender. Higher trade biases in these settings might be explained by the unequal availability of 




disadvantage even within the same executive position. Hence, we examine gender differences in losses 
from prospect theory value biased trades within similar executive titles (i.e., chairperson, chief officer, 
and director). Consistent with the literature that uncertainty leads to higher biases, it is evident that in 
all executive positions female insiders suffer more losses from prospect theory value biased trades, than 
males. Informed traders carry trades of large size and earn more profits (Easley & O'hara, 1987). In a 
given trade size, we expect the availability of information to be the same for all traders. However, we 
find positive association between female insiders and losses from the biased trades. We find similar 
results under the setting of routine trades and market-level uncertainty, which indicates limited 
availability or existence of noisy information for all investors (Kumar, 2009b). In these settings, higher 
losses of female insider trading depict that tendency of females to be influenced by their heuristics is 
higher than males. 
 As highlighted in the literature that male dominance and lack of connections become a hurdle 
for females to collect material information (Lyness & Thompson, 2000). Subsequently, we run a test 
for a sub-sample of firms where female representation is high. The regression results show that when 
we limit our sample to the firms in which the proportion of female insider trading is at the 95th percentile 
and above, no significant positive relation exists between female insider trades and the biases losses. 
Considering that buy transactions carry superior material information coupled with strict monitoring 
risk, the results describe that when female insiders buy, the prospect theory value bias does not influence 
their decisions and, consequently, losses diminish. Hence, access to information factor potentially 
explains our results. 
In the second study, we use a sample of 1,932 U.S. domestic open-end single managed active 
equity funds from January 2000 to December 2017. The study concludes that the gender of mutual fund 
managers does affect the choice of portfolio liquidity, and female fund managers prefer liquidity more 
than male managers. We use three proxies to measure portfolio liquidity; (i) the Portfolio liquidity 
measure developed by Pastor, Stambaugh, and Taylor (2020), (ii) Amihud (2002) portfolio liquidity, 




managers are 8% to 25% more liquid than single male managed funds. The coefficients of all three 
measures of portfolio liquidity exhibit a significantly positive relationship with female managed funds, 
even after controlling for fund and manager-specific characteristics, and including year and fund fixed 
effects. The results also demonstrate that funds with more liquid portfolios are larger and cheaper. 
Moreover, the study suggests that the investment styles of funds play a significant role in either 
strengthening or weakening the association between portfolio liquidity and female managed funds. The 
literature shows that female representation at top level positions improves stock price informativeness 
and reduces information asymmetry in the market (Gul, Srinidhi, & Ng, 2011). We test the conjecture 
and provide empirical evidence that females’ preference for information transparency serves as a 
potential explanation of the higher portfolio liquidity preference of female fund managers.  
By applying propensity scores, the results show that the average portfolio liquidity of funds 
managed by female managers is higher than the portfolio liquidity of male managed funds, even when 
other relevant characteristics between the fund pairs are virtually equal. The findings of univariate 
regressions on the matched sample of transition funds indicate the higher liquidity preference of female 
managers. Following Huang and Kisgen (2013), we apply a difference-in-differences approach for 
comparing portfolio liquidity before and after transitions from a male to female fund manager with a 
control sample of male to male transition funds. The outcome documents that a fund’s portfolio liquidity 
increases after a transition from a male to female fund manager, as compared to a male to male 
transition. Finally, using the U.S. state’s level gender equality index (Di Noia, 2002) as an instrumental 
variable, we find consistent results that female fund managers prefer higher portfolio liquidity in 
comparison to male fund managers. 
Amihud and Goyenko (2013) present R2 as a measure of a fund’s strategy or selectivity, which 
is the proportion of fund return variance that is explained by the variation in multifactor benchmark 
factors. Higher R2 indicates that fund tracks the benchmark closely. Using a sample of 1,565 U.S. 
domestic open-end actively managed equity funds (including single as well as team managed funds) 




with a higher fraction of female managers in the fund management team. This indicates that female 
fund managers tend to make decisions in accordance with market opinions, and the trends of benchmark 
indexes influence their portfolio management. The study reports that the diversification gains of funds 
managed by a higher fraction of female fund managers are 1.86% lower than other funds. Hence, we 
conclude that less actively managed funds pay a price in the form of reduced diversification benefits. 
Our results show that funds herd more with a higher female proportion in the management team and 
there exists a positive relation between herding and fund returns’ tracking of the benchmark returns. 
The findings also show that female fund managers manage a portfolio of less risky stocks and have a 
long-term perspective to investment with a buy and hold strategy. Hence, more risk averse and less 
overconfidence behaviors may explain the tendency of females to invest less actively.  
 
1.3 Research Output 
Essay one, titled “Gender and Prospect Theory Value Bias: Evidence from Insider Trading,” has been 
presented at the following forums: 
• PhD symposium of Massey Business School (Albany) on November 28th, 2017. 
• Main session of 22nd Annual New Zealand Finance Colloquium (NZFC) at Massey University, 
Palmerston North, New Zealand on 8th – 9th February 2018. 
• Main session of 30th Asian Finance Association (Asian FA) Annual Meeting at Hitotshubashi 
Hall, Tokyo, Japan on 25th – 27th June 2018. 
• Main session of 2018 New Zealand Finance Meeting (NZFM) at Crowne Plaza, Queenstown, 
New Zealand on 17th – 19th December 2018. 
Essay three, titled “Female Fund Managers and Collectivism,” has been presented at the following 
forums: 




• PhD symposium of 21st Annual New Zealand Finance Colloquium (NZFC) at University of 
Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand on 8th – 9th February 2017. 
• PhD symposium of 9th Financial Markets and Corporate Governance (FMCG) Conference at 
La Trobe University, Melbourne, Australia on 4th – 7th April 2018. 
• Main session of 2018 Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand 
(AFAANZ) at Cordis, Auckland, New Zealand on 2nd – 3rd July 2018. 
 
1.4 Structure of the Thesis 
The remainder of the thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 2 comprises of the first essay which 
examines bias in insider trading according to the gender of top executives. Chapter 3 includes the second 
empirical study which analyzes liquidity preference of male and female mutual fund managers. The 
third research study which tests the effect of collectivism of female fund managers on fund activity is 
presented in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 provides the conclusions of the three essays.1 
  
 
1 The studies presented in Chapter 2, 3, and 4 will be submitted to journals as co-authored work with my two 





GENDER AND PROSPECT THEORY VALUE BIAS: EVIDENCE 
FROM INSIDER TRADING 
 
This chapter documents the first essay of the thesis, which tests insider trading decisions by male and 
female top executives. We obtain insider trading data of U.S. firms from the comprehensive source of 
2iQ Research - Global Insider Transaction Data. We use the FactSet database to identify the gender of 
the executives, from 2000 to 2016. Our findings show that insider trades are subject to behavioral biases. 
Biased trade losses of female insiders are higher than the losses of male insiders. The study argues that 
an informational disadvantage of female insiders possibly explains their higher biased trade losses. 
Section 2.1 presents the research question and motivation of the study. Section 2.2 provides the 
literature review while Section 2.3 establishes the research methodology and specifies the details of our 
data. Section 2.4 discusses the applications of diagnostic tests, analysis, and discussion of results, along 
with several additional tests. Section 2.5 concludes. An appendix to this chapter and the relevant 









This study shows that prospect theory value influences insider trading decisions, and that the 
impact is stronger among female, rather than male, executives’ trades. Insiders who buy (sell) 
when their company's prospect theory value is above (below) other firms’ prospect theory 
values, lose 34 (12) basis points over the next month. Female insiders, compared to their male 
counterparts, make higher number of prospect theory value biased trades and suffer 
significantly higher resultant losses (i.e. 47 basis points). While the findings contradict the 
overconfidence hypothesis that predicts poor trading decisions by male insiders, the results are 
consistent with the male insiders’ superior information access hypothesis, suggesting that 











Corporate insiders possess superior private information about their firm’s fundamentals; thus, insider 
trades are generally profitable.2 However, this study shows that trading decisions of insiders are subject 
to biases. We investigate whether gender difference exists in biased insider trades of the executives. 
Our study examines behavioral bias according to the cumulative prospect theory, which defines risk 
preferences as a function of “decision weights” that tend to overweight small probabilities and 
underweight high probabilities of gains and losses (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). Additionally, we 
explore possible explanations of biased trading decisions of male and female insiders. Insider trading 
provides a perfect setting to explore the existence of behavioral biases in the environment where trading 
decisions are based on the company’s material information. The extant literature highlights the 
contribution of insiders’ behavioral biases and motives to their trading decisions (Kallunki, Nilsson, & 
Hellstrom, 2009; Lee & Piqueira, 2019). Nevertheless, these studies do not separately examine biases 
and resultant losses in the trading decisions of male and female executives. 
The issue of behavioral disparities among gender, specifically in a professional setting, is 
controversial. Based on the existing literature, we develop two competing hypotheses: the 
overconfidence hypothesis and the information access hypothesis. The overconfidence hypothesis 
expects that male insiders make more biased trades than their female counterparts. The overconfidence 
of male insiders may offset their advantage of access to superior information.  The overconfident male 
insiders trade more aggressively (Kallunki, Nilsson, & Hellstrom, 2009), and earn lower returns than 
females (Barber & Odean, 2001). Therefore, aggressive and frequent trading may explain higher biased 
trading by male insiders than their female counterparts. 
In contrast to the above conjecture, the information access hypothesis expects that female 
insiders make higher biased trading decisions, compared to the ones made by male insiders. Male 
dominance at top corporate levels remains a barrier that presents a “glass ceiling”, hindering females' 
 
2 See for example, Seyhun (1986); Rozeff and Zaman (1998); Lakonishok and Lee (2001); Jeng, Metrick, and 




progress to the top echelons of power (Athey, Avery, & Zemsky, 2000). Even after achieving an elite 
corporate position, females remain excluded from the informal networks with male peers where critical 
information is shared (Davies-Netzley, 1998; Lyness & Thompson, 2000). These information channels 
(social connections) improve the job performance of both genders but men gain more benefits from the 
connections than do women (Fang & Huang, 2017). Particularly, Inci, Narayanan, and Seyhun (2017) 
provide empirical evidence that female insiders are disadvantaged in accessing the informal channels 
of information and their insider trades’ profitability is lower than their male counterparts. There exists 
a line of literature which suggests the uncertainty and poor information availability are positively 
associated with behavioral biases (Kumar, 2009b; Zhang, 2006). Furthermore, the literature indicates 
that market experience and knowledge tend to diminish the impact of behavioral biases on trading 
decisions (Feng & Seasholes, 2005; List, 2003). Following this stance of the literature, we expect that 
female insiders may have limited access to information, which possibly explains their tendency to carry 
higher biased trades. 
We develop the measure of bias by using the prospect theory value measure of Barberis, 
Mukherjee, and Wang (2016). They indicate that, in the cross-section, subsequent returns are low for 
stocks whose past return distributions have a high prospect theory value because investors overvalue 
stocks with a positively skewed distribution of past returns. This measure shows the risk preferences of 
investors who involve in narrow framing and consider that past return distribution is representative of 
stock’s riskiness. Subsequently, we consider that an insider trade is biased if insider stock’s prospect 
theory value is greater (lower) than prospect theory value of the benchmark, the insider times a buy 
(sell) trade, and earns lower (greater) return over the next month. The resultant return from this trade is 
referred to a loss from the biased trade. To select a benchmark for comparison, we measure cross-
sectional average prospect theory value of other stocks in the market (benchmark) at a particular time. 
We obtain insider trading data for the United States (U.S.) firms from the comprehensive source 
of 2iQ Research - Global Insider Transaction Data. We include transactions of only top insiders who 




membership on the executive board, chairpersons, and the top 5% beneficial owners of the company’s 
stock. The findings show that insider trading decisions induced by the prospect theory value of their 
stocks negatively affect future returns. Hence, the results are consistent with the literature that prospect 
theory value explains future returns of a stock (Barberis, Mukherjee, & Wang, 2016). Considering male 
and female insider trades, we notice that number of male insider transactions is higher than female ones. 
However, overconfident male insiders are less likely to make behaviorally biased trades as compared 
to females. We find that female insiders carry a higher number of biased trades and suffer with higher 
losses, compared to their male counterparts, even after controlling for firm and insider level 
characteristics. Subsequently, we rule out the hypothesis that the overconfidence behavior of male 
insiders contributes to their higher biased trades than females. 
We conduct additional tests to explore whether informational disadvantage to female insiders 
possibly explains their higher biased trading decisions and resultant losses. We run the analyses in two 
settings; first, where level of information is expected to be equal among all the executives, irrespective 
of their gender, second, where trades are made when superior or high-quality information is available. 
We expect that in the first setting, if information is equally dispersed, there ought to be no gender 
difference in losses from biased insider trades. For the second setting, higher losses from female 
insiders’ biased trades are expected to diminish because the trades are influenced by superior 
information. For the first setting, we examine the association between female insiders and losses from 
biased trades under executives’ similar formal titles, trade size, routine trades, and macro-level market 
uncertainty. Whereas, sub-sample of buy trades and firms with high proportion of female insider 
transactions is used for the second setting. 
One may argue that the difference in informational quality between insiders’ gender might be 
driven by their executive positions or formal titles. The extant literature documents that chief financial 
officers (CFO) incorporate better quality information about their future earnings and make more 
profitable trades than chief executive officers (CEO) (Wang, Shin, & Francis, 2012). Knewtson and 




scrutiny risk of their insider trades, compared to CFOs’ trades. The access to information ought to be 
equal within each formal title; therefore, we assume that the difference in losses from biased trades 
among male and female insiders is likely to attenuate within a similar executive position. We group 
insiders into three executive positions, i.e., chairperson, chief officer, and director. The results show 
that, within each title category, female insiders earn higher biased trade losses than male insiders. These 
findings are in line with the argument that female insiders may struggle to access better information 
even within formal channels of information (Inci, Narayanan, & Seyhun, 2017). 
Trade size is a proxy for level of information of the traders. It is evident in the literature that 
highly informed investors choose to trade in large size to earn greater trading profits (Dufour & Engle, 
2000; Easley & O’hara, 1987). Literature provides theoretical argument that trade size is associated 
with higher confidence of traders with high precision of information quality, and they earn abnormal 
profits (Grossman & Stiglitz, 1980). Subsequently, we run our analysis conditioned on trade size. We 
divide our sample in trade terciles and examine the association between female insiders and prospect 
theory value biased trade losses. We expect that gender difference in losses may reduce in a given trade 
size, if all executives possess the same access to information. The findings exhibit that, even controlling 
for trade size, females suffer with higher biased trade losses than male insiders. Hence, females’ limited 
access to private information may serve as a channel for their higher losses. 
We categorize insider trading into (i) routine, (ii) opportunistic, and (iii) non-classified trades, 
following the methodology of Cohen, Malloy, and Pomorski (2012). Opportunistic trades exploit 
superior non-public information and result in abnormal returns. Whereas, routine trades are unlikely to 
incorporate better quality information about their future earnings. These trades are made on the same 
dates and in a regular pattern, demonstrating no information superiority. Hence, we expect to observe 
no gender difference in biased trade losses in routine trades’ category. Similarly, we run our analysis 
under uncertain market situation. Following Kumar (2009b), our study considers four proxies to 
measure macro-level market uncertainty: (i) market volatility; (ii) the Chicago Board Options Exchange 




Sentiment Data; and (iv) the U.S. national unemployment rate. There are various macro-level 
uncertainty variables, however, we focus on the factors which influence investment behaviors of 
investors and market participants. When uncertainty is high for investors, the signals conveyed from 
insider trading might be received differently from market participants. Hence, we expect that under 
uncertain market situation, insiders ought to trade on equal informational level and convey similar 
signals. In these settings, our outcomes of higher losses of female insiders’ biased trading, compared to 
males, indicate that tendency of females to be influenced by their heuristics is higher than males and 
poor information availability potentially contribute to this association. 
It is evident in the literature that insiders may sell due to reasons other than profit maximization, 
such as diversification or rebalancing of portfolio, liquidity, wealth, income, or tax-loss selling (Huddart 
& Ke, 2007). Buy trades, on the other hand, possess private information and insiders earn abnormal 
returns (Lakonishok & Lee, 2001). We argue that if access to information explains our results, then a 
reduction in losses of female insiders biased trades is expected for superior information-based buy 
trades. Our results are consistent with this argument. Furthermore, we follow the argument of Inci, 
Narayanan, and Seyhun (2017) that informational advantage from informal networks is reduced for 
male insiders in firms where the number of males is lesser than females. We use the proportion of 
female trading as a proxy for the proportion of female executives in a firm. We analyze a setting where 
the proportion of female trading is higher than male trading (95th percentile and above) and find that the 
results of higher losses from biased female trades do not persist.3 These findings provide evidence that 
biased insider trades and the resultant losses of female insiders are highly likely to diminish for the 
trades induced by superior material information. 
To the best of our knowledge, this study provides the first empirical evidence of gender 
differences in prospect theory value bias, specifically for insider trading. Our results are consistent with 
the line of literature describing that insider trades are prone to behavioral biases (e.g., Hillier, Korczak, 
 
3 This result supports the findings of Mobbs, Tan, and Zhang (2018) that in firms with only one female director, 
female outside directors earn lower abnormal returns than males when buying their company stocks. The gender 




& Korczak, 2015; Kallunki, Nilsson, & Hellstrom, 2009; Lee & Piqueira, 2019). The analysis of 
insiders’ gender disparity in behavioral bias is a contribution to the existing literature on decision 
making by professional male and female executives (e.g., Hibbert, Lawrence, & Prakash, 2016; Huang 
& Kisgen, 2013; Niessen-Ruenzi & Ruenzi, 2019). Our findings are in line with the argument that 
females, at corporate positions, are excluded from formal and informal channels of information and 
these networks are more beneficial for males (e.g., Davies-Netzley, 1998; Fang & Huang, 2017; Inci, 
Narayanan, & Seyhun, 2017; Lyness & Thompson, 2000; Mobbs, Tan, & Zhang, 2018).  These findings 
support the literature that limited availability of information may explain behavioral biases (e.g., 
Kumar, 2009b; Zhang, 2006). Moreover, this study provides an insight to the limited literature of gender 
differences in loss aversion and probability-weighting preferences under prospect theory (e.g., Fehr-
Duda, De Gennaro, & Schubert, 2006; Hibbert, Lawrence, & Prakash, 2016; Schmidt & Traub, 2002). 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 provides the literature review while 
Section 2.3 establishes the research methodology and specifies the details of our data. Section 2.4 
presents the applications of diagnostic tests, analysis, and discussion of results, along with several 
additional tests. Section 2.5 provides the conclusions. 
 
2.2 Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
2.2.1 Insider Trading, Information Advantage, and Behavioral Biases 
The literature on insider trading highlights several firm and market-related components that may affect 
buying and selling decisions and profitability of insider trading. The purchase of stock by insiders is 
based on superior information and insiders possess predictive ability to forecast cross-sectional stock 
returns (Jiang & Zaman, 2010; Lakonishok & Lee, 2001). Access to information about a firm’s 
prospects motivates insiders to earn abnormal profits (Rozeff & Zaman, 1998; Seyhun, 1986). Market 
participants also believe that insiders possess superior information about cash-flow realization and 
future earnings (Piotroski & Roulstone, 2005); hence, an average investor can possibly make profitable 




possess weak information. It is evident in the literature that insiders may sell due to reasons other than 
profit maximization, such as diversification or rebalancing of portfolio, liquidity, wealth, income, or 
tax-loss selling (Huddart & Ke, 2007; Lakonishok & Lee, 2001). 
The literature sheds light on the existence of information differences among various categories 
of inside executives and their trades. Cohen, Malloy, and Pomorski (2012) categorize insiders into 
routine and opportunistic groups based on the information content and abnormal returns earned by their 
trading patterns. Ali and Hirshleifer (2017) introduce another methodology to identify routine and 
opportunistic trades, finding that opportunistic trades earn abnormal profits by exploiting private 
information. By examining the information hierarchy hypothesis, it is reported that executives at the 
top level of the formal hierarchy (e.g., CEO and executive chairperson) have higher predictive power 
and earn greater abnormal returns than other executive officers do (Seyhun, 1986; Tavakoli, McMillan, 
& McKnight, 2012). Similarly, it is found that insider purchases by independent directors and CFOs 
incorporate better information about future earnings and earn positive abnormal returns, compared with 
officers and CEOs (Ravina & Sapienza, 2009; Wang, Shin, & Francis, 2012). 
The existing literature describes the effects of behavioral biases and personality traits on insider 
trading. Terpstra, Rozell, and Robinson (1993) highlight that, in addition to personality and 
demographic variables, a trader’s gender may influence the ethical decisions related to insider trading, 
where men are more likely to be involved in insider trading than women. Using Swedish market data, 
Kallunki, Nilsson, and Hellstrom (2009) examine behavioral biases, along with situational motives, and 
conclude that portfolio rebalancing, tax strategies, and disposition effect play the most important roles 
in insider trades. Moreover, male insiders trade more aggressively than females (overconfidence). 
Hillier, Korczak, and Korczak (2015) provide evidence that personal attributes such as year of birth, 
education, and gender explain up to a third of the variability in insider trading performance. Using a 
stock’s 52-week high, Lee and Piqueira (2019) show that insider trading is affected by behavioral biases 





2.2.2 Prospect Theory, Probability Weighting, and Behavior Toward Prior Gains and Losses 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Tversky and Kahneman (1992) develop and use prospect theory to 
describe investors’ attitude toward risky choices. According to the theory, in uncertain situations, 
individuals underweight uncertain outcomes compared to those that can be obtained with certainty. 
Thus, they become risk averse when facing potential gains and risk seeking when facing possible losses. 
When probability weights are applied to the value function, given the concavity across gains and 
convexity across losses, results show that the weighting function generally places more weight on the 
tails of the distribution. Thus, it reveals a common preference for lottery-like gains and a dis-preference 
for low probability extreme losses. 
Barberis and Huang (2008) test the asset-pricing implication of the cumulative prospect theory 
by focusing on the probability-weighting component. Their results shed light on the theory’s novel 
prediction that a security’s own skewness can be priced. To the extent that preferences for stocks with 
a positively skewed return distribution are strong, assets tend to be overpriced and subsequently 
underperform. Barberis and Xiong (2009) argue that differences in evaluation period, expected level of 
return, and shape of the value function are most likely to cause variation in the prediction of subsequent 
risk-taking attitudes. They assume that prospect theory predicts a disposition effect only when investors 
derive utility from realizing gains and losses on some assets. Without this assumption, the change in 
the value function’s curvature might contribute to risk-taking after prior gains instead of losses. 
Barberis, Mukherjee, and Wang (2016) indicate that in the cross section, subsequent returns are 
low for stocks whose past return distributions have a high prospect theory value. Investors overvalue 
stocks with a high positively skewed distribution of past returns, resulting in the overvalued stock 
having low subsequent returns. Their study shows that the probability-weighting component of the 
cumulative prospect theory enhances the prospect theory value (PTV)’s predictive power for returns. 
The literature on return skewness highlights the importance of the probability-weighting 
function. Kumar (2009a) classifies lottery stocks as those with the highest idiosyncratic skewness, the 
highest idiosyncratic volatility, and the lowest share prices. He shows that lottery stocks typically 




stocks generate negative alpha that is both statistically significant and economically meaningful. Boyer, 
Mitton, and Vorkink (2010) estimate the expected idiosyncratic skewness and show that stocks with the 
highest expected idiosyncratic skewness underperform other stocks. The relationship between lagged 
extreme positive returns and future returns is reported to be significant by Bali, Cakici, and Whitelaw 
(2011). They show that the expected returns on stocks that exhibit extreme positive returns are low; 
however, controlling for this effect, the expected returns on stocks with high idiosyncratic risk are high. 
Advances in the literature have been made to understand how risk attitudes of professional 
investors are affected based on prior gains and losses. O’Connell and Teo (2009) analyze the effect of 
trading gains and losses on the risk-taking attitude of institutional managers. Using a proprietary 
currency trades’ database, their study reports that institutional investors are not prone to disposition 
effects; rather, they aggressively reduce risk following losses and mildly increase risk following gains. 
Haigh and List (2005) compare behavioral differences among undergraduate students, and professional 
options and futures traders from the CBOT. They conclude that professional traders, despite having vast 
trading experience, tend to show greater myopic loss aversion than students. 
 
2.2.3 Gender Differences in Behavioral Biases and Access to Information 
The literature on gender differences suggests that systematic dispositional disparities exist between 
males and females. Investigating a preference condition for loss aversion in the framework of 
cumulative prospect theory, Schmidt and Traub (2002) show that female subjects contribute over-
proportionally to the set of strictly loss-averse choices. They demonstrate a higher degree of loss 
aversion than their male counterparts do. In experiments on binary choices among lotteries involving 
small-scale real gains and losses, Brooks and Zank (2005) describe that relatively more women are loss-
averse than men. Exploring the sensitivity of women in assessing probabilities, Fehr-Duda, De Gennaro, 
and Schubert (2006) find women to be more risk-averse than men when facing investment choices. This 
laboratory experiment reveals that women tend to underweight larger probabilities than do men, and 




With an experimental betting game, Lam and Ozorio (2013) examine gender differences in the 
effect of prior gains or losses on risk-taking behavior. The study finds that women are more likely to 
take greater risks after a loss, whereas men tend to take greater risks after a gain. In a survey on finance 
professors, Hibbert, Lawrence, and Prakash (2016) report that women are more loss-averse and more 
likely to expect unfavorable market conditions than men, irrespective of whether they have made gains 
or incurred losses in their recent past investments. 
The dissimilarities in risk-related behavior between the genders have been tested in multiple 
settings. Croson and Gneezy (2009) review the economics literature on gender differences in risk 
preferences, social preferences, and reaction to competition. The evidence provides substantial support 
that women are more risk-averse than men are. Beckmann and Menkhoff (2008) conduct a survey 
among professional fund managers and conclude: “fund-managing women will be women in their 
profession;” they are more risk-averse, shy from competition, and are less over-confident than men are. 
Huang and Kisgen (2013) provide evidence that female executives are more risk-averse in investment 
and capital structure decisions as they are more likely to exercise deep-in-the-money options early. 
Faccio, Marchica, and Mura (2016) evaluate whether corporate risk-taking is affected by CEO gender. 
They observe a subsequent decrease in risk-taking of a given firm around the transition from a male to 
a female CEO. Moreover, firms with a female CEO make less risky financing and investment choices. 
Niessen-Ruenzi and Ruenzi (2019) report that female equity fund managers are more risk-averse, follow 
a less extreme investment style, invest more consistently, and trade less than their male counterparts do. 
Although empirical evidence supports less risk-taking behavior among women, we find 
controversies in the related literature. Atkinson, Baird, and Frye (2003) find that fixed income mutual 
funds managed by male and female managers do not differ in terms of performance, risk, and other fund 
characteristics. Berger, Kick, and Schaeck (2014) show that three years following an increase in female 
board representation, portfolio risk increases marginally.  
Another prominent and extensively tested behavioral bias among genders that affects 




male and female investors and find that men trade more frequently and earn annual risk-adjusted net 
returns that are smaller than those earned by women. They conclude that “men being more 
overconfident than women” drives their results. It is observed that women in general shy away from 
competition (Niederle & Vesterlund, 2007). Huang and Kisgen (2013) find that female executives make 
more value-enhancing decisions for their shareholders as they are involved in less frequent acquisitions 
and debt issuance. On the contrary, Nekby, Thoursie, and Vahtrik (2008) show that women selected to 
participate in male-dominated environments are likely to be highly competitive. Deaves, Lüders, and 
Luo (2009) do not find any gender differences regarding overconfidence or trading activity. They 
propose that women who are attracted to “male” disciplines may be different from the overall female 
population. Following the literature of aggressive trading by overconfident men, we expect that male 
insiders are more likely to carry out biased trades and suffer higher losses than female insiders. 
H1a: Biased trade losses are higher among male than female insiders. 
 
It is argued that male dominance at top corporate levels remains a barrier, hindering females' 
progress to the top echelons of power (Athey, Avery, & Zemsky, 2000). Human capital theory 
developed by Becker (1964) recognizes the importance of an individual’s cumulative stocks of 
education, experiences, and skills in enhancing cognitive and productive capabilities. Tharenou, 
Latimer, and Conroy (1994) document that women have traditionally made fewer investments in 
education and work experience as reflected by lower pay and promotion. As a result, a commonly held 
assumption is that women possess inadequate human capital for board and top executive positions 
(Burke & Mattis, 2000). In addition, Oakley (2000) suggests that the gatekeepers, dominated by male, 
do not offer women same opportunities, such as training and development, pay and promotion. 
Therefore, women executives must possess substantial human capital stocks in order to be considered 
and bring the unique characteristics to the board (Kesner, 1988). 
In addition to the assumption of females having insufficient human capital stocks, their 




Kobrynowicz (1997), that standards of ability set are higher for low-status groups, i.e. women, 
compared to high-status groups, i.e. men. Thus, women are forced to provide more evidence to be 
perceived as being of high ability. Subsequently, women are underrepresented at top executive 
positions. Even reaching at the top position, they suffer from their limited connection with formal and 
informal networks. Ibarra (1992) describes that, compared to females, males use their network ties quite 
effectively to improve their position in the firm. Lyness and Thompson (2000) report that women are 
excluded from informal networks, and their information disadvantage is stronger in firms where they 
are underrepresented. Moreover, due to better connections, the effect of forecasting accuracy and 
recommendation impact is twice as large for male analysts than that of their female counterparts (Fang 
& Huang, 2017). 
Inci, Narayanan, and Seyhun (2017) analyze gender differences in insider trading profitability 
among different executive positions. They report that limited access to informal networks might be the 
possible explanation that female insiders tend to possess less material information, earn less abnormal 
profits, and trade less than their male counterparts. Mobbs, Tan, and Zhang (2018) report that, when 
female outside directors buy their company stocks, their informational disadvantage is largely driven 
by geographic distance, unrelated work experience, and lack of firm-specific board experience. This 
partially explains why they earn lower abnormal returns than male outside directors. Following this line 
of literature, we hypothesize that limited connections and information disadvantage of female insiders 
are highly likely to explain their higher biased trades and resultant losses, than male insiders. 
H1b: Biased trade losses are higher among female than male insiders. 
 
Based on the literature reviewed, we test gender differences in prospect theory value biased 






2.3 Data and Methodology 
2.3.1 Data 
We obtain insider trading data for the United States (U.S.) firms from the comprehensive source of 2iQ 
Research - Global Insider Transaction Data. To avoid survivorship or selection bias, 2iQ Research uses 
Standard and Poor Broad Market Index (S&P BMI) benchmark for orientation. 2iQ Research consists 
of all listed stocks that have at least USD 100 million in float-adjusted market capitalization and value 
traded of at least USD 50 million for the past 12 months. Our sample contains all regular open market 
“equity” transactions (i.e., buy and sell transactions of top executives of firms). We include transactions 
of only top insiders who are classified “A” in the insider-level category by 2iQ Research. “A” insiders 
include those with membership on the executive board, chairpersons, and the top 5% beneficial owners 
of the company’s stock.4 The study ignores transactions of insiders with indirect connections (e.g., 
immediate family member or controlled corporations). Option exercises, subscription to new shares, 
stock awards, transactions by beneficial owners, and private transactions are excluded from the data set. 
In the sample, we include only common and ordinary shares. It contains the unique transaction ID, 
company name, insider ID, insider name, insider relation to the company, number of shares traded, 
price, value of shares traded, trade date, input/reporting date to the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC), holdings, and the exchange on which the company is listed. By applying an initial 
filter, we have 307,516 observations of insider trades of publicly traded firms from January 1, 2000 to 
December 31, 2016. 
Data on stock market returns and prices for firms with insider trading and have share codes 10 
and 11 are retrieved from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). The sample comprises of 
279,278 insider trades by 15,599 top executives of 5,920 firms. To deal with potential outliers and 
 
4 Insiders’ category “B” of 2iQ Research consists of upper level management (e.g., executive committee and the 
top 20% beneficial owners of the company. In this category, the number of insider trades is 201,000, carried out 
by 29,942 insiders (with initial filters). Insiders’ category “C” contains non-executives, supervisory board, and 
board of directors. The number of insider transactions is 294,556 in this category, carried out by 39,218 insiders 
(with initial filters). We describe that top “A” insiders are smaller in number, but they more frequently involved 




misreporting, we follow the recommendations of Inci, Narayanan, and Seyhun (2017). We exclude 
insider transactions when on the trade date: (i) the insider transaction price is higher than twice the 
closing price of the stock; (ii) the number of shares of the insider transaction is higher than the daily 
volume of trade of the stock; and (iii) the number of shares of the insider transaction is higher than the 
outstanding number of shares for the stock. The final sample consists of 223,755 insider transactions 
by 11,488 top executives in 4,198 publicly listed firms from 2000 to 2016.5 
To identify the gender of executives, we use the FactSet database. FactSet maintains a wide 
range of personal-level data including gender, education, date-of-birth, employment history, existing 
job’s address, email address, and others. We manually match the names of our sample executives with 
FactSet individuals’ names by verifying their employment history and insider trading information as 
available in the FactSet database. We identify and allocate the FactSet identifier to each executive in 
our sample and retrieve the required data points, including gender. We identify the gender of executives, 
without an appropriate match on FactSet, by exploring their profile and biography on Bloomberg, 
LinkedIn, or Google’s database. 
For firm-specific control variables, we obtain the monthly trading volume, shares outstanding, 
and market capitalization data from the CRSP database. Data on annual book-to-market ratio is obtained 
from Compustat. To measure excess returns, we use data retrieved from Kenneth French’s data library.6 
Several websites are used to obtain data on the macro-level market factors. Data on CBOE VIX is 
obtained from Global Financial Data7 and investors’ sentiments data, from the AAII.8 The monthly 




5 We consider an insider who works for more than one firm during our sample period as more than one observation. 
6 Available at http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/ 
7 Available at https://www.globalfinancialdata.com/ 
8 Available at http://www.aaii.com/ 




2.3.2 Variables Definition and Model Development 
In this section, we describe our main variables, along with the model used to measure losses from biased 
trades. 
2.3.2.1 Prospect Theory Value (PTV) 
Barberis, Mukherjee, and Wang (2016) report that individual investors form a mental representation 
regarding a stock’s riskiness by observing its past returns distribution and evaluate outcomes according 
to cumulative prospect theory. The main effect of the probability-weighting function of the cumulative 
prospect theory is to overweight the tail events of any distribution. Their model describes that, in the 
cross section, investors are attracted to a stock with a high PTV, which results from very positively 
skewed past returns. Such an overvalued stock earns lower subsequent returns. 
In this study, we expect that PTV of insiders’ stocks is likely to influence their trading decisions. 
Following Barberis, Mukherjee, and Wang (2016), the PTV is measured by allocating probability 
weights to the past five years’ (60 months) return distribution of the insider’s stock: 
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where 𝑃𝑇𝑉𝑖,𝑡 is the prospect theory value of every i
th stock traded by the insider at any point in time t, 
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑖 is the excess monthly return of the stock relative to the market, 𝑚 is the maximum number of 
losses when 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑖<0, and 𝑛 is the maximum number of gains when 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑖≥0 in the distribution of 
the past 60 months of excess returns on the ith stock. Hence, 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑥−𝑚 through 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑛 is a distribution 
from the most negative return to the most positive. The distribution assigns an equal probability to each 
of the 60 historical excess returns of the stock, that is, (1/60). 𝜐(𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑖) is the value function, while 
𝑤−(.) and 𝑤+(.) are the probability-weighting functions for losses and gains, respectively. 𝑤−(.) and 
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The degree to which an individual overweight tail is governed by the parameters γ and δ. Lower 
values of these parameters imply more overweighting of tails (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). Based on 
the above expression, if the probabilities of extreme loss (𝑝−𝑚) and extreme gain (𝑝𝑛) are small, then 
𝑤−(𝑝−𝑚)>𝑝−𝑚 and 𝑤
+(𝑝𝑛)>𝑝𝑛, so that the most extreme outcomes (outcomes in the tails) are 
overweighed. Following the value function of Tversky and Kahneman (1992), we use the following:10 
 𝜐(𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑖) =  {
 −𝜆(−𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑖)
𝛼           𝑓𝑜𝑟        𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑖 < 0
(𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑖)
𝛼                     𝑓𝑜𝑟          𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑖 ≥ 0
 (3) 
The PTV is calculated for each stock on a monthly basis. Trade dates are converted to calendar 
months so that the PTV of each stock can be allocated to every insider trade. We measure the PTV for 
each insider stock (starting from January 1, 2000) by extracting its prior 60 months’ (past five years) 
monthly returns.11 For each stock i at any month t, this window keeps rolling for every month until the 
last month in 2016.12 We then sort each window of these past 60 monthly returns in increasing order, 
starting with the most negative to the most positive. In Equation (1), m is the number of negative and n 
is the number of positive past monthly returns in each window of the ith stock.13 We consider i as a 
simple counter element with values ranging from 1 to 60 for each window of the sorted past 60 returns. 
Following Barberis, Mukherjee, and Wang (2016), we denote i to the counter element to show that it 
belongs to the window of past 60 returns of the ith stock. 
  
 
10 Tversky and Kahneman (1992) estimate γ=0.61, δ=0.69, and λ=2.25 for their median subject. Using 
experimental data, they estimate α=0.88. 
11 The reason for starting the measurement of PTV from year 2000 is to match the insider transaction sample 
(available from 2000 to 2016). 
12 For example, for a particular stock, with reference to January 1, 2000, the selected past 60 monthly returns’ 
window is from January 1, 1995 till December 31, 1999. 




2.3.2.2 Measurement of Biased Trade Loss 
We develop a measure of behavioral bias according to the PTV. We describe that a trade is biased if 
insider stock’s prospect theory value is greater (lower) than prospect theory value of the benchmark, 
the insider times a buy (sell) trade, and earns lower (greater) return over the next month. To select a 
benchmark for comparison, we assume that insiders time their buy or sell trade by comparing the PTV 
of their stock with a cross-sectional average PTV of other stocks in the market (benchmark).14 . The 
next month’s return from this trade (in absolute terms) is referred to as loss from the biased trade and 
is measured as follows: 
 
𝐵𝑖𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑_𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒_𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑡 =  |𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑖,𝑡+1|  
=  {
𝑃𝑇𝑉𝑖,𝑡 > 𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑃𝑇𝑉𝑡  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐵𝑢𝑦 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑖,𝑡+1 < 0  
𝑂𝑅
 𝑃𝑇𝑉𝑖,𝑡 < 𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑃𝑇𝑉𝑡  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑖,𝑡+1 > 0  
 
(4) 
where 𝐵𝑖𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑_𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒_𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑡 is the absolute excess return of insider stock i at time t+1 (i.e., the 
subsequent month of the insider trade), when any one of the mentioned conditions of biased trade is 
met, and “0” if otherwise. Time t is the calendar month of the insider trade. 𝑃𝑇𝑉𝑖,𝑡 is the prospect theory 
value of insider stock i at time t. 𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑃𝑇𝑉𝑡 is the cross-sectional average prospect theory value of other 
stocks in the market at time t. 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑖,𝑡 is the type of transaction (buy or sell) of insider stock i at time 
t. 
Giving the title of “Bias” to prospect theory value induced trades is our subjective 
interpretation. The loss from such a trade is affected by the prospect theory value of the stock, instead 
of information. Therefore, we consider it as a mistake or error in trading decision and refer to it as loss. 
We develop the following model to test whether gender differences exist in the losses of prospect theory 
value-based trading decisions: 
 






=    𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑥_𝑚𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑥_𝑦𝑖,(𝑡−12,𝑡−2)
+ 𝛽4 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽5 𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘_𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1  
+ 𝛽7 𝐴𝑔𝑒_𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8 𝑃ℎ𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡  + 𝛽10 𝑀𝐵𝐴𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽11𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡  + 𝑖,𝑡  
(5) 
where 𝐵𝑖𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑_𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒_𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑡 is the absolute excess return of insider stock i at time t+1. 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡  is 
a dummy variable, which is equal to “1” if insider trade is made by a female executive, and “0” if it is 
made by a male executive at time t. 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑥_𝑚𝑖,𝑡−1 is the monthly return in excess of the market return 
of insider stock i at time t-1. 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑥_𝑦𝑖,(𝑡−12,𝑡−2) is the cumulative past monthly returns in excess of the 
market returns of insider stock i from t-12 to t-2. 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 is the log of the monthly market capitalization 
of insider firm at time t-1. 𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1 is the monthly volume turnover of insider stock i at time t-1; 
it is equal to the number of shares traded divided by the number of shares outstanding. 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘_𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 
is the book-to-market ratio of insider stock i at time t-1. 𝐴𝑔𝑒_𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡  is the insider’s age at the time 
of transaction, t. 𝑃ℎ𝐷𝑖,𝑡, 𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡, 𝑀𝐵𝐴𝑖,𝑡, and 𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡  are dummy variables, where one of them 
is equal to “1” depending upon the  highest degree earned by the insider, and the rest are equal to “0”. 
 
2.3.3 Summary Statistics 
Figure 2.1 depicts the total number of male and female insider trades in each year, from January 2003 
to December 2016 (we do not plot year 2000, 2001, and 2002 due to the unavailability of female insider 
trades). It also plots the proportion of prospect theory value biased trades by female and male insiders 
over our sample time period.15 We observe that, in most of the years, the proportion of biased trades by 
female insiders is higher than the proportion of biased trades by male insiders.16 
 
 
15 See the numbers in the Appendix (Table A2). 
16 See a pattern of average prospect theory value biased trades and insider trades by female executives over time 




Figure 2.1. Comparison of Biased Insider Trades by Executive Gender 
Figure 2.1 shows the total number of trades by male and female insiders, and the proportion of prospect theory value biased 
trades by male and female insiders in our sample from January 2003 – December 2016. 
 
 
Table 2.1 provides detailed summary statistics of the insiders and their trades in the sample. 
Panel A of the table provides information about gender differences in the total number of insider 
transactions, number of executives, number of biased transactions and earned losses, number of buy 
and sell trades, average number of shares traded, and the dollar value of the trades. There are more firms 
with insider trading by males than those with insider trading by females. Firms with female insider 
trades represent only 14.41% of the sample firms. The limited number of women working at the 
corporate level is a prominent issue in terms of gender gap: only 5.71% of top executives in the sample 
are female. Moreover, this percentage goes down further when we observe that only 2.56% of the insider 
trades are made by female top executives. This supports Inci, Narayanan, and Seyhun’s (2017) finding 
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the total transactions are prospect theory value biased. Moreover, we show that 20.02% (13.86%) of the 
total trades made by female (male) insiders are biased. Furthermore, average loss from these biased 
trades of female insiders (1.78%) is higher than that of their male counterparts (1.24%). This suggests 
that female insiders are more likely to make behaviorally biased trades and suffer more losses than 
males. 
Panel A of Table 2.1 also reveals that top executives frequently make more sale transactions 
than purchases. However, female executives buy more insider stock (29.56%) than their male 
counterparts (22.08%) during the sample period. This suggests that male insiders, on average, not only 
trade (buy/sell) more shares but also trade at a higher dollar value than female insiders. The average 
dollar value of purchases by males (females) is $84,182 (54,962) and of sales is $302,742 (199,404). 
Panel B of Table 2.1 provides in-depth descriptive statistics of male and female insiders in the 
three formal executive types: Chairperson, Chief_Officer, and Director (considered to be in decreasing 
order of seniority). We observe that the Chief_Officer category has the largest number of insiders of 
both genders (i.e., 8,929), with females representing 6.35% of the total Chief_Officer category. There 
is a larger percentage of female directors (7.14%) than female chairpersons or chief officers. Our results, 
in the context of a declining number of female insiders as seniority increases, are consistent with those 
of Inci, Narayanan, and Seyhun (2017). We note that there are only 2.39% of female insiders belonging 






Table 2.1. Summary Statistics 
This table presents insider trading statistics of male and female executives in our sample for year 2000 to 2016. Panel A 
provides detailed characteristics of insider transactions, categorized by executives’ gender. The last column of Panel A 
describes statistics for female insiders as a percentage of the total. We consider an insider who works for more than one firm 
during our sample period as more than one observation. Panel B provides statistics of the number of male and female insiders 
in three executive types, in decreasing order of seniority. We consider an insider who works for more than one firm or holds 
more than one position in the same firm during our sample period as more than one observation. Panel C provides descriptive 
statistics of all variables by grouping them based on the executives’ gender. Biased_Trade_Loss is a measure of loss from 
prospect theory value biased trades and is equal to |𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑡+1 | if either of the two conditions mentioned in Equation (4) is met 
at time t and 0 otherwise. 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑡+1 is a measure of the monthly return in excess of the market return at time t+1. Retex_m is 
the monthly return in excess of the market return at time t-1. Retex_y is the cumulative past monthly returns in excess of the 
market returns from t-12 to t-2. Size is the log of the monthly market capitalization at time t-1. Turnover is the monthly volume 
turnover at time t-1; it is equal to the number of shares traded divided by the number of shares outstanding. Book_Mkt is the 
book-to-market ratio at time t-1, measured as (total assets - total liabilities) divided by (closing price*number of shares 
outstanding). Age_insider is the insider’s age at the time of transaction t. PhD equals 1 if the insider has doctoral degree and 
0 otherwise. Grad equals 1 if the insider has a graduate degree and 0 otherwise. MBA equals 1 if the insider has a Master of 
Business Administration degree and 0 otherwise. Undergrad equals 1 if the insider has an undergraduate degree and 0 
otherwise. The insiders and their trades are grouped in three categories of executive positions based on seniority (i.e., 
Chairperson, Chief_Officer and Director).  
Panel A. Characteristics of Insider Transactions by Executive Gender 
 Total Trades by Males 
Trades by 
Females 
Female as a percentage 
of total (%) 
Number of Firms 4,198 4,131 605 14.41% 
Number of Executives 11,488 10,832 656 5.71% 
Number of Transactions 223,755 218,017 5,738 2.56% 
Number of Biased Transactions 31,359 30,210 1,149 3.66% 
Percentage of Biased Transactions 14.01% 13.86% 20.02% - 
Average Loss from Biased Transactions 1.25% 1.24% 1.78% - 
Number of Transactions - Buy 49,828 48,132 1,696 3.40% 
Percentage of Buy Transactions 22.27% 22.08% 29.56% - 
Number of Transactions - Sell 173,927 169,885 4,042 2.32% 
Percentage of Sell Transactions 77.73% 77.92% 70.44% - 
Average Number of Shares Traded - Buy 8,032 8,051 7,470 - 
Average Number of Shares Traded - Sell 9,834 9,916 6,418 - 
Average Value($) of Shares Traded - Buy 83,188 84,182 54,962 - 
Average Value($) of Shares Traded - Sell 300,340 302,742 199,404 - 
Panel B. Number of Male and Female Insiders by Executive Type 
Position Total Male Female Female (%) 
Chairperson 2,464 2,405 59 2.39% 
Chief_Officer 8,929 8,362 567 6.35% 




Table 2.1. (continued) 
Panel C. Descriptive Statistics of Variables by Executive Gender 
Gender Variable Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
Male Biased_Trade_Loss 218,017 0.012 0 0.061 0 1.949 
Male Retex_m 218,017 0.014 0.005 0.137 -0.798 6.893 
Male Retex_y 218,017 0.074 0.059 0.413 -3.873 2.942 
Male Size 218,017 14.152 14.170 2.153 8.062 17.702 
Male Turnover 218,005 2.108 1.725 1.811 0.020 9.819 
Male Book_Mkt 211,070 0.545 0.389 0.538 0.033 4.351 
Male Age_insider 212,361 56.852 57 9.208 20 91 
Male PhD 218,017 0.002 0 0.044 0 1 
Male Grad 218,017 0.023 0 0.149 0 1 
Male MBA 218,017 0.007 0 0.082 0 1 
Male UnderGrad 218,017 0.713 1 0.452 0 1 
Male Chairperson 218,017 0.522 1 0.499 0 1 
Male Chief_Officer 218,017 0.431 0 0.495 0 1 
Male Director 218,017 0.046 0 0.210 0 1 
Female Biased_Trade_Loss 5,738 0.018 0 0.049 0 0.529 
Female Retex_m 5,738 0.013 -0.001 0.151 -0.732 2.042 
Female Retex_y 5,738 0.018 0.054 0.377 -2.759 1.714 
Female Size 5,738 13.306 13.276 2.072 8.601 17.702 
Female Turnover 5,737 1.766 1.280 1.815 0.020 9.819 
Female Book_Mkt 5,446 0.624 0.484 0.630 0.033 4.351 
Female Age_insider 5,033 51.860 51 9.409 25 81 
Female PhD 5,738 0.027 0 0.163 0 1 
Female Grad 5,738 0.009 0 0.095 0 1 
Female MBA 5,738 0.012 0 0.107 0 1 
Female UnderGrad 5,738 0.594 1 0.491 0 1 
Female Chairperson 5,738 0.206 0 0.405 0 1 
Female Chief_Officer 5,738 0.696 1 0.460 0 1 





Panel C of Table 2.1 provides the descriptive statistics of our main variables for both genders. 
It is evident that on average, the biased trade loss of females is higher (1.8%) than that of males (1.2%). 
We observe no gender difference in the past one-month’s excess return. However, male insiders earn a 
larger past 12-months’ cumulative excess return (7.4%) than female insiders (1.8%). Females and males 
are associated with similarly sized firms. Shares traded by male insiders have a higher turnover volume 
(Turnover) (2.11 times) compared with those of females (1.77 times). This result is consistent with the 
existing literature of overconfidence (e.g., Barber & Odean, 2001). On average, a higher book-to-market 
ratio of stocks traded by female insiders (0.62) compared with male insiders’ traded stocks (0.55) 
depicts that females prefer to trade value stocks. Panel C shows that female insiders are younger than 
males, with an average age of 52, while for males, the average age is 57. Among male (female) insiders, 
0.2% (2.7%) hold a doctoral degree, 2.3% (0.9%) have a graduate degree, 0.7% (1.2%) are MBAs, and 
71.3% (59.4%) hold undergraduate degree as their highest earned degree. Panel C also provides 
information about gender difference in insider trading among three formal executive positions. Out of 
the 218,017 male transactions in the sample, 52% of the trades are made by those in the Chairperson 
category, whereas 43% and 4.6% of transactions belong to the Chief_Officer and Director categories, 
respectively. Conversely, out of the 5,738 total female transactions, 21% of the trades come from the 
Chairperson position, 70% from Chief_Officer, and 9.8% from the Director category. 
Table 2.2 presents the correlation matrix of the key variables used in the study. We find that 
insider trades by female executives, last month’s excess return, traded shares with high book-to-market 
ratio, senior insiders (in terms of their age), and insiders holding a Ph.D., Graduate, or Undergraduate 
degrees are positively and significantly correlated with biased trade losses. Meanwhile, the past 12-
months’ cumulative excess return and firm size are negatively and significantly correlated with the 
losses. Two of the variables, volume turnover and trades by insiders holding an MBA degree, are 
negatively but insignificantly correlated with the losses. Moreover, we observe that trades by female 
insiders are correlated positively and significantly with stocks that have high book-to-market ratio and 




Table 2.2. Correlation Matrix 
This table presents a correlation matrix for the main variables of insider transactions from year 2000 to 2016. Biased_Trade_Loss is a measure of loss from prospect theory value biased trades and 
is equal to |𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑡+1 | if either of the two conditions mentioned in Equation (4) is met at time t and 0 otherwise. 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑡+1 is a measure of the monthly return in excess of the market return at time 
t+1. Female is a measure of trade by a female insider that is equal to 1 if the insider trading is carried out by the female at time t and 0 otherwise. Retex_m is the monthly return in excess of the 
market return at time t-1. Retex_y is the cumulative past monthly returns in excess of the market returns from t-12 to t-2. Size is the log of the monthly market capitalization at time t-1. Turnover 
is the monthly volume turnover at time t-1; it is equal to the number of shares traded divided by the number of shares outstanding. Book_Mkt is the book-to-market ratio at time t-1, measured as 
(total assets - total liabilities) divided by (closing price*number of shares outstanding). Age_insider is the insider’s age at the time of transaction t. PhD equals 1 if the insider has doctoral degree 
and 0 otherwise. Grad equals 1 if the insider has a graduate degree and 0 otherwise. MBA equals 1 if the insider has a Master of Business Administration degree and 0 otherwise. Undergrad equals 
1 if the insider has an undergraduate degree and 0 otherwise. 
Variable Biased_Trade_Loss Female Retex_m Retex_y Size Turnover Book_Mkt Age_insider PhD Grad MBA 
Female 0.014a           
Retex_m 0.037a -0.001          
Retex_y -0.042a -0.022a 0.042a         
Size -0.118a -0.062a 0.041a 0.211a        
Turnover -0.002 -0.030a 0.104a 0.246a 0.174a       
Book_Mkt 0.069a 0.023a 0.0000 -0.154a -0.443a -0.073a      
Age_insider 0.011a -0.081a 0.003 -0.022a 0.030a -0.035a 0.049a     
PhD 0.023a 0.079a -0.007a -0.013a -0.011a 0.047a -0.020a 0.013a    
Grad 0.023a -0.015a 0.021a 0.018a -0.051a -0.039a 0.020a 0.039a -0.008a   
MBA -0.003 0.009a -0.006a -0.014a -0.051a -0.027a 0.043a -0.024a -0.004b -0.013a  
UnderGrad 0.006a -0.042a -0.038a 0.001 0.225a 0.021a -0.066a -0.141a -0.080a -0.237a -0.130a 




2.4 Empirical Results and Discussion 
2.4.1 Effect of Prospect Theory Value on Future Returns of Insider Trades 
Before moving to the analysis of gender of executives and their losses from prospect theory value biased 
trades, we examine whether prospect theory value of insider stock influences the future returns of 
insider trades. In the cross section of stock returns, Barberis, Mukherjee, and Wang (2016) provide 
empirical evidence that a stock whose past return distribution has a high (low) prospect theory value 
earns a low (high) subsequent return, on average. We examine this association in our setting of insider 
trading, where insiders decide to time their buy or sell transactions. 
Table 2.3 shows the effect of the PTV on subsequent future returns (next month of the trade) 
of insider trades when they choose to buy or sell their company’s stock. In Panel A, we categorize buy 
and sell transactions based on high (PTV of insider stock is greater than the benchmark PTV) or low 
(PTV of insider stock is smaller than the benchmark PTV) PTV of the stocks. The results show that on 
average, when insiders buy stocks having a high PTV, their subsequent future returns are lower by 
0.34% than the future returns of buy trades of low PTV stocks. The finding is significant at the 5% level 
under the assumption of equal, as well as unequal, population variances. Likewise, on average, when 
insiders sell low PTV stocks, they lose 0.12% of future returns as compared with selling high PTV 
stocks. However, the higher future returns of low PTV stocks represent an opportunity loss for the 
insiders as they had already sold off their stocks. Assuming both equal and unequal population 
variances, the mean difference of this finding is significant at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
Panel B of Table 2.3 shows the regression results of the association between the PTV of insider 
stocks and the subsequent future returns earned by them. Ex_PTV is the variable of excess PTV. It 
represents the difference between the insider stock’s PTV and the cross-sectional average PTV of other 
stocks in the market (benchmark) on the same day of trade (calendar month). A positive (negative) 
number represents a high- (low-) PTV insider stock. Column (1) presents results of the main model and 
shows a significantly negative relation between the dependent and independent variables. To give 




presented in Column (2) of the table. While Column (3) exhibits the results considering all the control 
variables and firm fixed effect. The findings show that, when insiders time to buy or sell their stocks, 
the PTV negatively impacts subsequent future returns of such trades. These results are significant at the 
1% level for all the regressions. After considering several firm level control variables, we find that firm 
size is negatively associated, whereas turnover and book-to-market ratio are positively associated with 
future returns. We also control for several insider level variables and find that insider age and 
undergraduate education are negatively associated, whereas graduation is positively related to future 
returns. All the findings are significant at the 1% level; the goodness of fit of the model in Column (3) 
is 24.28%. 
Our findings are consistent with Barberis, Mukherjee, and Wang (2016). In the setting of the 
present study, insiders consider when to buy/sell their company’s stock in order to make abnormal 
profits. However, it is evident that prospect theory value induced trades contribute negatively to the 
subsequent future returns. Hence, the results of Table 2.3 are consistent with the literature and provide 
support to our developed measure of prospect theory value biased trades and resultant losses. As, 
prospect theory value induced trades reduce subsequent returns, therefore, we consider these returns as 





Table 2.3. Prospect Theory Value and Future Returns 
Panel A presents the mean differences of insider trades’ subsequent future returns based on high or low PTV of an insider 
stock. High (low) PTV means that the PTV of an insider stock is greater (smaller) than the cross-sectional average PTV of 
other stocks in the market at time t. Panel B presents the findings of regression of insider trades’ future returns on excess PTV 
(Ex_PTV) without, as well as with, firm- and insider-specific controls. The dependent variable is insider trades’ return at time 
t+1. Ex_PTV is the difference between the PTV of the insider stock and the cross-sectional average PTV of other stocks in the 
market at time t. Retex_m is the monthly return in excess of the market return at time t-1. Retex_y is the cumulative past 
monthly returns in excess of the market returns from t-12 to t-2. Size is the log of the monthly market capitalization at time t-
1. Turnover is the monthly volume turnover at time t-1; it is equal to the number of shares traded divided by the number of 
shares outstanding. Book_Mkt is the book-to-market ratio at time t-1, measured as (total assets - total liabilities) divided by 
(closing price*number of shares outstanding). Age_insider is the insider’s age at the time of transaction t. PhD equals 1 if the 
insider has doctoral degree and 0 otherwise. Grad equals 1 if the insider has a graduate degree and 0 otherwise. MBA equals 
1 if the insider has a Master of Business Administration degree and 0 otherwise. Undergrad equals 1 if the insider has an 
undergraduate degree and 0 otherwise. To ensure that extreme values are not affecting the results, all variables are winsorized 
at their 1 and 99 percentile levels. The t-statistics based on White robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, 
and * denote 99%, 95%, and 90% significance levels. 
Panel A. Mean Difference   
 Insiders’ Future Returns from Buy Trades Insiders’ Future Returns from Sell Trades 
 N Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. 
High PTV 22,313 0.0084 0.1350 129,688 0.0043 0.0915 
Low PTV 27,515 0.0118 0.1817 44,239 0.0055 0.1466 
Difference - -0.0034** 0.1625 - -0.0012* 0.1082 
Panel B. Regression of Insider Trades’ Future Returns 
 
No controls and no fixed 
effect 
All controls but no fixed 
effect 
All controls and fixed effect 


























































Firm-fixed Effect NO NO YES 
No. of Obs. 223,755 210,675 210,675 




2.4.2 Effect of Female Insider Trading on Losses from Prospect Theory Value Biased Trades 
We analyze insider trading by female and male executives to examine whether gender differences exist 
in the biased trade losses. Table 2.4 shows the regression results. To address the concern of any impact 
of firm related fixed factors on the results, we include a firm fixed effect model, where there are 4,198 
firms in our sample. The regression results in Column (1) indicate that female insiders tend to suffer 
more losses (i.e. 0.65% or 65 basis points) from prospect theory value biased trades than male insiders 
do. 
Hillier, Korczak, and Korczak (2015) provide evidence that not only firm- or trade-specific 
characteristics affect the performance of insider trading, but corporate insiders’ attributes also have a 
strong influence in explaining a significant proportion of the variability in insider trading performance. 
Considering this view, we control for firm-specific characteristics (last month’s excess return, 
cumulative past monthly excess returns from t-12 to t-2, firm size, turnover volume, and book-to-market 
ratio) and insider-specific characteristics (age and education). Controlling for firm-specific 
characteristics and insiders’ demographics, along with firm fixed effects, Columns (2), (3), and (4) show 
a positive and significant relation between biased trade loss and female insider trading. The findings 
provide evidence that female insider trading is subject to higher bias and suffers more losses as 
compared with male insider trading. 
In Column (4), we observe that the loss from biased trading is significantly higher for stocks 
that have a high excess return in the previous month, high cumulative excess returns in past months 
from t-12 to t-2, a high turnover volume, and a high book-to-market ratio. Moreover, higher prospect 
theory value loss is associated with stocks traded by senior insiders in terms of age and those holding 
an undergraduate degree. Meanwhile, the relation is significantly negative with firm size and trades by 
insiders with graduate degrees. It is observed that the control variables have a significant impact on the 
dependent variable. However, the coefficient of a higher loss of 0.47% (47 basis points) from biased 




It is expected that certain firms may endogenously pair with female insiders. Stocks traded by 
female insiders may thus be systematically different from those traded by male insiders. We explore 
whether this phenomenon explains the results of the study by considering a sub-sample of firms with 
insider trading by both female and male executives. We consider an insider who is affiliated with more 
than one firm during the sample period as more than one observation. There are 538 firms in our sample 
with 5,344 transactions by female insiders and 34,434 trades by male insiders. We observe a higher 
percentage of insider trades by female executives (i.e., 13.43% in our sub-sample of firms as compared 
with the full sample). This indicates that within mixed-gender firms, female executives have a higher 
tendency to carry insider trading as compared with firms that have single-gender executives. The total 
number of inside executives in these firms is 2,097; among them, 1,512 are males and 585 are females, 
depicting a higher proportion of female executives in such firms (i.e., 27.9% as compared with the full 
sample). Similarly, we report a higher number of biased transactions and resulting losses from female 
insider trading, compared with male insider trading. The percentage of number of biased transactions 
by female (male) executives is 20.32% (12.70%), and the average loss is 1.81% (1.07%). 
Column (5) of Table 2.4 shows the results of the sub-sample of firms with insider trading by 
both genders. It reports that the trading losses increase by 0.41% (41 basis points) when female insiders 
carry out biased transactions compared to their male counterparts. This result is significant at the 1% 
level. There are changes in the signs of some control variables’ coefficients; however, the results remain 





Table 2.4. Biased Trade Loss and Female Insider Trading 
This table presents the findings of the regression of biased trade loss on female insider trades with firm- and insider-specific 
controls. The dependent variable, Biased_Trade_Loss (B_T_Loss), is a measure of loss from prospect theory value biased 
trades and is equal to |𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑡+1 | if either of the two conditions mentioned in Equation (4) is met at time t and 0 otherwise. 
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑡+1 is a measure of the monthly return in excess of the market return at time t+1. Female is a measure of trade by a 
female insider that is equal to 1 if the insider trading is carried out by the female at time t and 0 otherwise. Retex_m is the 
monthly return in excess of the market return at time t-1. Retex_y is the cumulative past monthly returns in excess of the 
market returns from t-12 to t-2. Size is the log of the monthly market capitalization at time t-1. Turnover is the monthly volume 
turnover at time t-1; it is equal to the number of shares traded divided by the number of shares outstanding. Book_Mkt is the 
book-to-market ratio at time t-1, measured as (total assets - total liabilities) divided by (closing price*number of shares 
outstanding). Age_insider is the insider’s age at the time of transaction t. PhD equals 1 if the insider has doctoral degree and 
0 otherwise. Grad equals 1 if the insider has a graduate degree and 0 otherwise. MBA equals 1 if the insider has a Master of 
Business Administration degree and 0 otherwise. Undergrad equals 1 if the insider has an undergraduate degree and 0 
otherwise. To ensure that extreme values are not affecting the results, all variables are winsorized at their 1 and 99 percentile 
levels. The results are reported for the full sample, as well as for the subsample of firms with trades by both genders. The 
results are presented with firm-fixed effects. The t-statistics based on White robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
***, **, and * denote 99%, 95%, and 90% significance levels. 
𝐵_𝑇_𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑥_𝑚𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑥_𝑦𝑖,(𝑡−12,𝑡−2) + 𝛽4 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽5 𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽6𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘_𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1  + 𝛽7 𝐴𝑔𝑒_𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8 𝑃ℎ𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡  + 𝛽10 𝑀𝐵𝐴𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽11𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡  + 𝑖,𝑡 
 Full Sample 
Trades by both 
gender 
 Fixed effect but 
no controls 
Firm controls and 
fixed effect 
Insider controls 
and fixed effect 
All controls and 
fixed effect 
All controls and 
fixed effect 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Female 0.0065*** 0.0044*** 0.0071*** 0.0047*** 0.0041*** 
 (6.15) (6.21) (6.05) (6.10) (5.33) 
Retex_m - 0.0011* - 0.0016** 0.0191*** 
  (1.68)  (2.37) (11.78) 
Retex_y - 0.0012*** - 0.0017*** 0.0098*** 
  (4.19)  (5.84) (14.28) 
Size - -0.0086*** - -0.0090*** -0.0141*** 
  (-36.16)  (-36.86) (-27.72) 
Turnover - 0.0003*** - 0.0003*** -0.0006*** 
  (3.24)  (3.73) (-3.03) 
Book_Mkt - 0.0016*** - 0.0015*** -0.0118*** 
  (5.76)  (5.31) (-17.20) 
Age_insider - - 0.0002*** 0.0001*** -0.0001** 
   (8.29) (8.33) (-2.19) 
PhD - - -0.0017 -0.0038 0.0024 
   (-0.42) (-1.34) (0.63) 
Grad - - -0.0074*** -0.0073*** -0.0197*** 
   (-4.43) (-6.45) (-11.05) 
MBA - - -0.0020 -0.0026 0.0022 
   (-0.81) (-1.58) (0.70) 
UnderGrad - - 0.0019*** 0.0018*** 0.0056*** 
   (3.18) (4.68) (6.17) 
Firm-fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES 
No. of Obs. 223,755 216,503 217,394 210,675 36,449 




The findings provide empirical evidence that gender differences exist in prospect theory value 
biased insider trading and that female insiders suffer higher losses compared to male insiders. We may 
not exclusively explain these results by the overconfidence hypothesis, which expects less profitable 
outcomes of trading by males due to their aggressive decisions. However, we can describe the 
consistency of our results with the information access hypothesis, which assumes that limited access to 
information may provide possible explanation of females’ biased decisions and higher resultant losses. 
The literature provides evidence that uncertainty and lack of information contribute to higher behavioral 
bias.17 There might be several factors influencing the association between female insiders and losses 
from biased trades, however, we propose that scarcity of information may serve as a possible 
explanation of our results. Consequently, we conduct additional tests to explore the role of access to 
information. We run the analyses in two settings, based on the level of information.  
 
2.4.3 Equal Level of Information and Female Insiders’ Losses from Prospect Theory Value Biased 
Trades 
In this setting, the level of information is expected to be equal among all the executives, irrespective of 
their gender. We expect that in this setting, if information is equally dispersed, there ought to be no 
gender difference in losses from biased insider trades. We examine the association between female 
insiders and losses from biased trades under executives’ similar formal titles, trade size, routine trades, 
and macro-level market uncertainty. 
2.4.3.1 Female Insider Trading and Biased Trade Losses under Executives’ Position 
It is well documented that informativeness and abnormal future returns earned by insiders vary at 
different levels of the formal hierarchy.18 The extant literature documents that chief financial officers 
(CFO) incorporate better quality information about their future earnings and make more profitable 
 
17 See for example, Feng and Seasholes (2005); Kumar (2009b); Fang and Huang (2017); Inci, Narayanan, and 
Seyhun (2017). 




trades than chief executive officers (CEO) (Wang, Shin, & Francis, 2012). The access to information 
ought to be equal within each formal title; therefore, we assume that the difference in losses from biased 
trades among male and female insiders is likely to attenuate within a similar executive position. 
However, Inci, Narayanan, and Seyhun (2017) conclude that female insiders face an informational 
disadvantage even within the same executive position, contributing to their lower abnormal returns than 
males. Consequently, we run our analysis under executives’ positions to examine gender differences in 
biased trade losses. 
We split our sample according to three executive positions: Chairperson, Chief_Officer, and 
Director (considered to be in decreasing order of seniority). We perform a regression of prospect theory 
value biased trade losses as the dependent variable against the cross products of gender (Male or 
Female) and the executive’s position (Chairperson, Chief_Officer, or Director) as the independent 
variables. Male×Director is assigned as the benchmark category. The results are provided with firm 
fixed effect. Table 2.5 Column (1) shows the regression results of the full sample of insider trading. It 
is evident that under all executive positions, female insiders suffer more biased trade losses than males 
do. The coefficients of the cross product of Female×Director and Female×Chairperson are positive 
and significant at the 10% level, whereas the positive coefficient of Female×Chief_Officer is significant 
at the 1% level. Table 2.5 indicates the significance of the differences among the coefficients of male 
and female insiders under each executive position. It is noticeable that the biased trades’ loss is 
significantly higher among female than those among male insiders under the Chief_Officer (0.9%) and 
Director (0.7%) positions. These differences are significant at the 1% and 10% levels, respectively. At 
the top executive level of Chairperson, we do not find any significant gender differences in biased 
trades. This is consistent with the notion that the most senior executives are highly informed (Tavakoli, 
McMillan, & McKnight, 2012). 
In Table 2.5 Column (2), we present the results of a sub-sample of firms with insider trades by 
both genders. The findings are consistent with our full sample. We report higher biased trade losses for 




level in the Chairperson and Chief_Officer positions, and at the 10% level in the Director position. Our 
results suggest that higher biased trade losses of female insiders might be explain by the argument of 
Inci, Narayanan, and Seyhun (2017), that females have limited access to information even within a 
similar executive position. 
Table 2.5. Biased Trade Loss and Female Insider Trading under Executives’ Position 
This table presents the findings of the regression of biased trade loss on female insider trades under three executive positions. 
The dependent variable, Biased_Trade_Loss (B_T_Loss), is a measure of loss from prospect theory value biased trades and is 
equal to |𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑡+1 | if either of the two conditions mentioned in Equation (4) is met at time t and 0 otherwise. The independent 
variables are the cross products of gender (Female or Male) and executive positions (Chairperson, Chief_Officer, and 
Director). Male×Director is considered as the benchmark category. Column (1) shows findings of the full sample of insider 
trades, whereas in Column (2) the results are for the sub-sample of firms with trades by both genders. The results are presented 
with firm fixed effects. In the bottom of the table, the significance of the difference in the female and male coefficients for 
three executive positions is tested with F-test. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote 99%, 95%, 
and 90% significance levels. 
𝐵_𝑇_𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑀𝑎𝑙𝑒 × 𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 × 𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 × 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽4 𝑀𝑎𝑙𝑒 × 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 × 𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑒𝑓_𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡  + 𝛽6 𝑀𝑎𝑙𝑒 × 𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑒𝑓_𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑡 
 Full Sample Trades by both gender 
 (1) (2) 
Constant -0.0066 -0.0048 
 (-0.12) (-0.33) 
Female×Director 0.0070* 0.0051* 
 (1.69) (1.81) 
Female×Chairperson 0.0047* 0.0047** 
 (1.89) (2.51) 
Male×Chairperson 0.0066*** -0.0029** 
 (8.24) (-2.45) 
Female×Chief_Officer 0.0118*** 0.0103*** 
 (8.39) (7.88) 
Male×Chief_Officer 0.0029*** 0.0048*** 
 (3.58) (4.12) 
Firm-fixed Effect YES YES 
No. of Obs. 223,755 39,778 
R-squared 0.1673 0.2816 
   
Significance of (Female-Male) coefficient differences with t-value in brackets 
Chairperson -0.0019 0.0076*** 
 (-0.80) (4.66) 
Chief_Officer 0.0090*** 0.0055*** 
 (7.37) (6.77) 
Director 0.0070* 0.0051* 





2.4.3.2 Female Insider Trading and Biased Trade Losses Conditional on Trade Size 
In the studies on asset pricing, it is argued that trade size itself is unlikely to influence security prices, 
as every market participant is considered to possess the same access to information. Nevertheless, if 
some market participants are more informed than others, the uninformed ones may make adverse 
trading decisions (Glosten & Milgrom, 1985). It is evident in the literature that large trades are more 
informative than small trades. Highly informed investors choose to trade in large size to earn greater 
trading profits (Easley & O’hara, 1987). There is an extensive literature on the association between 
trade size and investors’ information (Chakravarty, 2001; Dufour & Engle, 2000; Easley, Kiefer, & 
O'Hara, 1997). Literature provides theoretical argument that trade size is associated with higher 
confidence of traders with high precision of information quality, and they earn abnormal profits 
(Grossman & Stiglitz, 1980). 
Subsequently, we run our analysis conditioned on trade size. We divide our sample in trade 
terciles and examine the association between female insiders and prospect theory value biased trade 
losses. We expect that gender difference in losses may reduce in a given trade size, if all executives 
possess equal access to information. However, Inci, Narayanan, and Seyhun (2017) report that even 
after controlling for trade size, male insiders earn greater profits than females; this indicates an 
informational advantage of male insiders over females. If we find gender differences in biased trader 
losses, it might be explained by the informational disadvantage of female insiders. 
We divide our sample into trade size terciles according to dollar values. We consider that within 
each tercile the trade size is approximately equal. Table 2.6 shows regression results of female trades 
and losses from the biased trades under each tercile of the trade size. We repeat the regression analysis 
shown in Table 2.4 and present the results in Column (1), (2), and (3) based on the Lowest, Middle, and 
Highest trade sizes, respectively. Using the full sample, we introduce in Column (4) an interaction term, 





Table 2.6. Biased Trade Loss and Female Insider Trading Conditional on Trade Size 
This table presents the findings of the regression of biased trade loss on female insider trades, controlling for trade size. The 
full sample is divided into three terciles based on the dollar value of the trade size, and the results are shown for each tercile. 
The dependent variable, Biased_Trade_Loss (B_T_Loss), is a measure of loss from prospect theory value biased trades and is 
equal to |𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑡+1 | if either of the two conditions mentioned in Equation (4) is met at time t and 0 otherwise. Female is a 
measure of trade by a female insider that is equal to 1 if the insider trading is carried out by the female at time t and 0 otherwise. 
The variable 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 × 𝑇𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 is the cross product of a female dummy and the trade size terciles (Lowest, Middle, and 
Highest). Retex_m is the monthly return in excess of the market return at time t-1. Retex_y is the cumulative past monthly 
returns in excess of the market returns from t-12 to t-2. Size is the log of the monthly market capitalization at time t-1. Turnover 
is the monthly volume turnover at time t-1; it is equal to the number of shares traded divided by the number of shares 
outstanding. Book_Mkt is the book-to-market ratio at time t-1, measured as (total assets - total liabilities) divided by (closing 
price*number of shares outstanding). Age_insider is the insider’s age at the time of transaction t. PhD equals 1 if the insider 
has doctoral degree and 0 otherwise. Grad equals 1 if the insider has a graduate degree and 0 otherwise. MBA equals 1 if the 
insider has a Master of Business Administration degree and 0 otherwise. Undergrad equals 1 if the insider has an undergraduate 
degree and 0 otherwise. To ensure that extreme values are not affecting the results, all variables are winsorized at their 1 and 
99 percentile levels. The results are presented with firm-fixed effects. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and 
* denote 99%, 95%, and 90% significance levels. 
𝐵_𝑇_𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒_𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 × 𝑇𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝑖,𝑡 
 Full Sample 
 Lowest Middle Highest Interaction 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Female 0.0034** 0.0046*** 0.0047*** 0.0036*** 
 (2.06) (3.46) (4.33) (3.43) 
Trade_Size - - - -0.0007*** 
    (-5.04) 
Female×TSize - - - 0.0012* 
    (1.65) 
Retex_m 0.0015 0.0073*** -0.0031*** 0.0017** 
 (1.16) (6.25) (-2.78) (2.51) 
Retex_y 0.0040*** 0.0003 0.0009** 0.0017*** 
 (6.53) (0.60) (2.00) (5.89) 
Size -0.0110*** -0.0112*** -0.0063*** -0.0089*** 
 (-18.73) (-25.46) (-19.31) (-36.05) 
Turnover 0.0001 0.0009*** 0.0007*** 0.0003*** 
 (0.47) (6.63) (6.10) (3.77) 
Book_Mkt -0.0016*** -0.0033*** -0.0027*** 0.0015*** 
 (-3.02) (-5.41) (-4.64) (5.23) 
Age_insider 0.0002*** 0.0001*** 0.0001** 0.0001*** 
 (5.87) (2.72) (2.28) (8.55) 
PhD 0.0017 -0.0020 -0.0105** -0.0036 
 (0.25) (-0.51) (-2.47) (-1.30) 
Grad -0.0151*** -0.0059*** -0.0040** -0.0073*** 
 (-6.13) (-3.25) (-2.40) (-6.49) 
MBA -0.0046 0.0004 -0.0017 -0.0027* 
 (-1.40) (0.12) (-0.75) (-1.64) 
UnderGrad 0.0028*** 0.0032*** 0.0006 0.0018*** 
 (3.01) (5.01) (1.21) (4.59) 
Firm-fixed Effect YES YES YES YES 
No. of Obs. 69,411 70,480 70,784 210,675 




By applying firm fixed effects and controlling for firm- and insider-specific characteristics, we 
find a significantly positive relation between female insider trades and the biased trade losses. In the 
lowest tercile, the magnitude of the positive coefficient is the smallest (at 0.34%), and significant at the 
5% level, compared with the middle and highest terciles. In the middle and highest terciles, the positive 
coefficients are significant at the 1% level. In Column (4), the positive coefficient of Female×TSize, at 
0.12%, is significant at the 10% level. Thus, consistent with the argument, we demonstrate that limited 
access to information may possibly explain higher biased trade losses in female insider trading.  
2.4.3.3 Female Insider Trading and Biased Trade Losses under Routine Trades 
The existing literature describes that insiders engage in opportunistic trading to exploit private 
information and earn abnormal profits (Ali & Hirshleifer, 2017). Opportunistic insiders trade whenever 
they receive superior information regarding their company; therefore, these trades do not follow a 
specific pattern or timing. Whereas, routine trades are unlikely to incorporate better quality information 
about their future earnings. Therefore, these routine traders trade on particular dates and their 
transactions follow a regular pattern. As routine trades are not indicative of a firm’s future prospects, 
they earn lower returns compared to opportunistic trades (Cohen, Malloy, & Pomorski, 2012). Hence, 
under the category of routine trades, we argue that availability of superior information is highly unlikely, 
and all insiders possess equal quality information. As a result, we expect to observe no gender difference 
in biased trade losses under routine trades’ category. 
We follow the same technique developed by Cohen, Malloy, and Pomorski (2012) to categorize 
the sample into different classes of insiders based on their trading patterns. We examine whether female 
insiders’ tendency to suffer higher losses from biased trades relative to their male counterparts differ 
under routine category. Our sample is divided into Routine trades (trades made by insiders at least once 
in the preceding three years and in the same calendar month each year), Opportunistic trades (trades for 
which there is no definite pattern in the preceding three years), and Non-classified trades (all remaining 
trades with no history of trades in the preceding three years). Cohen, Malloy, and Pomorski (2012) 




Table 2.7. Biased Trade Loss and Female Insider Trading under Routine Trades 
This table presents the findings of the regression of biased trade loss on female insider trades when insider trades are classified 
as routine, opportunistic, and non-classified. The dependent variable, Biased_Trade_Loss (B_T_Loss), is a measure of loss 
from prospect theory value biased trades and is equal to |𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑡+1 | if either of the two conditions mentioned in Equation (4) 
is met at time t and 0 otherwise. Female is a measure of trade by a female insider that is equal to 1 if the insider trading is 
carried out by the female at time t and 0 otherwise. 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 × 𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑒 is the product of the routine trade and a female dummy 
variable. Retex_m is the monthly return in excess of the market return at time t-1. Retex_y is the cumulative past monthly 
returns in excess of the market returns from t-12 to t-2. Size is the log of the monthly market capitalization at time t-1. Turnover 
is the monthly volume turnover at time t-1; it is equal to the number of shares traded divided by the number of shares 
outstanding. Book_Mkt is the book-to-market ratio at time t-1, measured as (total assets - total liabilities) divided by (closing 
price*number of shares outstanding). Age_insider is the insider’s age at the time of transaction t. PhD equals 1 if the insider 
has doctoral degree and 0 otherwise. Grad equals 1 if the insider has a graduate degree and 0 otherwise. MBA equals 1 if the 
insider has a Master of Business Administration degree and 0 otherwise. Undergrad equals 1 if the insider has an undergraduate 
degree and 0 otherwise. To ensure that extreme values are not affecting the results, all variables are winsorized at their 1 and 
99 percentile levels. The results are presented with firm-fixed effects. The t-statistics based on White robust standard errors 
are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote 99%, 95%, and 90% significance levels. 
𝐵_𝑇_𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 × 𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝑖,𝑡 
 Full sample 
 All controls but no fixed effect Fixed effect but no controls All controls and fixed effect 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Female 0.0028*** 0.0062*** 0.0046*** 
 (4.31) (5.81) (5.90) 
Routine -0.0019*** -0.0105*** -0.0074*** 
 (-5.59) (-12.05) (-12.29) 
Female×Routine 0.0129** 0.0123* 0.0110** 
 (2.06) (1.74) (2.35) 
Retex_m -0.0033*** - 0.0016** 
 (-3.46)  (2.28) 
Retex_y 0.0003 - 0.0016*** 
 (1.00)  (5.45) 
Size -0.0028*** - -0.0088*** 
 (-47.05)  (-35.71) 
Turnover 0.0008*** - 0.0003*** 
 (11.73)  (3.74) 
Book_Mkt 0.0007* - 0.0016*** 
 (1.76)  (5.71) 
Age_insider 0.0001*** - 0.0001*** 
 (9.43)  (9.17) 
PhD 0.0301*** - -0.0037 
 (12.05)  (-1.32) 
Grad 0.0118*** - -0.0073*** 
 (12.60)  (-6.48) 
MBA -0.0013 - -0.0026 
 (-1.19)  (-1.64) 
UnderGrad 0.0039*** - 0.0019*** 
 (17.81)  (4.84) 
Firm-fixed Effect NO YES YES 
No. of Obs. 210,675 223,755 210,675 




In Table 2.7, we report the results of the relationship of routine trades made by female insiders 
and the biased trade losses. We introduce an interaction term, Female×Routine, which is the product of 
Routine trades and the Female dummy variable. Column (1), controlling for firm and insider-level 
variables, and Column (2), with fixed effects, show that routine trades are negatively and significantly 
related to the losses from biased trades. However, when routine trades are made by female executives, 
the losses increase. In Column (3), we consider firm-fixed effects as well as all the control variables. 
The results report a significant 0.74% decrease in the losses when insiders are routine traders. 
Interestingly, the results show a positive relation between prospect theory value biased trade losses and 
routine trades by female insiders. There is an increase of 1.1% in the loss from biased trading when 
female insiders carry out routine trades and follow a regular pattern of trading. As shown in Column 
(3), this outcome is significant at the 5% level with a goodness of fit of 26.26%. 
Our results demonstrate that female insiders are subject to a higher prospect theory value bias, 
irrespective of the trading patterns. Even under routine trades category, where exploitation of superior 
non-public information is not observed, female insiders’ decisions are influenced by prospect theory 
value of the stock and they suffer with higher losses than male insiders. 
2.4.3.4 Female Insider Trading and Biased Trade Losses in Macro-level Market Uncertainty 
We run our analysis under uncertain market situation. There are various macro-level uncertainty 
variables, however, we focus on the factors which directly influence investment behaviors of investors 
and market participants. When uncertainty is high for investors, the signals conveyed from insider 
trading might be received differently from market participants. Hence, we expect that under uncertain 
market situation, insiders ought to trade on equal informational level and convey similar signals. If 
exploiting firm’s fundamental information and earning abnormal returns are avoided during uncertain 
market situation, we may expect to see no gender difference in the losses of biased trades. Following 
Kumar (2009b), our study considers four proxies to measure macro-level market uncertainty: (i) market 
volatility (Vlty), measured as the cross-sectional average of monthly standard deviation of the stocks’ 




of Individual Investors (AAII); (iii) national unemployment rate (Unempl), a monthly measure obtained 
from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics; and (iv) CBOE volatility index (VIX), a monthly measure 
obtained from Global Financial Data.  
 To examine the relation of female insiders and losses from biased trades under uncertain market 
conditions, we introduce four interaction terms; Female×Vlty, Female×Sntmt, Female×Unempl, and 
Female×VIX, which are the products of Female dummy variable and macro-level market uncertainty 
proxies. Table 2.8 provides the results with and without control variables and fixed effects. Column (1) 
is based on the basic model with no controls and fixed effects. Column (2) includes all firm and insider 
level control variables, without firm fixed effect, and shows that most of the uncertainty proxies, except 
VIX, are positively and significantly associated with the loss. Column (3), with fixed effects for firm, 
reports that the biased trades’ loss is significantly larger when market volatility, investor sentiment, and 
unemployment rate are high, or VIX is low. Under market uncertainty conditions, other than market 
volatility, the losses from biased trades made by inside female executives increase. Among these 
measures, the coefficient of investor sentiment is the strongest. 
In Column (4) of Table 2.8, we present results based on all control variables and firm fixed 
effects. It is evident that, when the market is volatile, biased trades’ losses by female insiders are 
reduced by 0.39%, while under high sentiment and VIX index, female insider trades are subject to 
higher losses compared to trades by male insiders. The positive estimate of Female×Unempl is not 
statistically significant. The findings of higher losses by female insider trades are supported only under 
increased investors’ sentiments and VIX. Due to mixed signs of coefficients, the results are not 
conclusive. 
As a result, in our first setting of informational level, higher losses of female insiders’ biased 
trading, compared to male trading, indicate that tendency of females to be influenced by their heuristics 





Table 2.8. Biased Trade Loss and Female Insider Trading under Macro-Level Market Conditions 
This table presents the findings of the regression of biased trade loss on female insider trades under various uncertain market 
conditions. The dependent variable, Biased_Trade_Loss (B_T_Loss), is a measure of loss from prospect theory value biased 
trades and is equal to |𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑡+1 | if either of the two conditions mentioned in Equation (4) is met at time t and 0 otherwise. 
Female is a measure of trade by a female insider that is equal to 1 if the insider trading is carried out by the female at time t 
and 0 otherwise. The uncertainty variables include Market Volatility (Vlty), Investors Sentiment Index (Sntmt), National 
unemployment rate (Unempl), and Volatility Index (VIX). These variables are measured at time t-1. 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 × 𝑉𝑙𝑡𝑦, 
𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 × 𝑆𝑛𝑡𝑚𝑡, 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 × 𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙, and 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 × 𝑉𝐼𝑋 are the product of female dummy variable and above mentioned 
uncertainty variables respectively. Retex_m is the monthly return in excess of the market return at time t-1. Retex_y is the 
cumulative past monthly returns in excess of the market returns from t-12 to t-2. Size is the log of the monthly market 
capitalization at time t-1. Turnover is the monthly volume turnover at time t-1; it is equal to the number of shares traded divided 
by the number of shares outstanding. Book_Mkt is the book-to-market ratio at time t-1, measured as (total assets - total 
liabilities) divided by (closing price*number of shares outstanding). Age_insider is the insider’s age at the time of transaction 
t. PhD equals 1 if the insider has doctoral degree and 0 otherwise. Grad equals 1 if the insider has a graduate degree and 0 
otherwise. MBA equals 1 if the insider has a Master of Business Administration degree and 0 otherwise. Undergrad equals 1 
if the insider has an undergraduate degree and 0 otherwise. To ensure that extreme values are not affecting the results, all 
variables are winsorized at their 1 and 99 percentile levels. The results are presented with firm fixed effects. The t-statistics 
based on White robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote 99%, 95%, and 90% significance 
levels. 
𝐵_𝑇_𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑉𝑙𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3 𝑆𝑛𝑡𝑚𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4 𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽6 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 × 𝑉𝑙𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽7  𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 × 𝑆𝑛𝑡𝑚𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 × 𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 × 𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠  + 𝑖,𝑡 
 Whole Sample 
 No controls and no 
fixed effect 
All controls but no 
fixed effect 
Fixed effect but no 
controls 
All controls and fixed 
effect 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Female 0.0090*** 0.0107*** 0.0077* 0.0001 
 (2.58) (3.60) (1.76) (0.05) 
Vlty 0.0039*** 0.0024*** 0.0037*** 0.0010*** 
 (15.64) (9.79) (11.13) (4.23) 
Sntmt 0.0029*** 0.0054*** 0.0055*** 0.0040*** 
 (5.19) (9.87) (6.54) (7.04) 
Unempl 0.0023*** -0.00001 0.0027*** -0.0002** 
 (14.95) (-0.15) (24.96) (-2.45) 
VIX -0.0003*** -0.0001*** -0.0002*** 0.0001** 
 (-9.65) (-3.18) (-4.33) (2.38) 
Female×Vlty -0.0033** -0.0053*** -0.0053*** -0.0039*** 
 (-2.46) (-4.18) (-2.86) (-3.04) 
Female×Sntmt -0.0155*** -0.0036 0.0106** 0.0265*** 
 (-4.11) (-0.91) (2.11) (7.19) 
Female×Unempl 0.00001 -0.0005 -0.0001 0.0005 
 (0.03) (-0.99) (-0.17) (1.17) 
Female×VIX 0.0003** 0.0006*** 0.0007*** 0.0006*** 
 (2.24) (4.17) (2.93) (3.53) 
Retex_m - -0.0031*** - 0.0017** 
  (-3.20)  (2.41) 
Retex_y - 0.0004 - 0.0014*** 
  (1.22)  (4.80) 
Size - -0.0027*** - -0.0081*** 
  (-46.43)  (-32.33) 
Turnover - 0.0007*** - 0.0001* 




     
Table 2.8. (continued) 
 
No controls and no 
fixed effect 
All controls but no 
fixed effect 
Fixed effect but no 
controls 
All controls and fixed 
effect 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Book_Mkt - 0.0006 - 0.0017*** 
  (1.51)  (5.81) 
Age_insider - 0.0001*** - 0.0001*** 
  (9.77)  (8.09) 
PhD - 0.0298*** - -0.0009 
  (12.34)  (-0.31) 
Grad - 0.0122*** - -0.0072*** 
  (13.06)  (-6.34) 
MBA - -0.0016 - -0.0024 
  (-1.47)  (-1.49) 
UnderGrad - 0.0039*** - 0.0018*** 
  (18.13)  (4.64) 
Firm Fixed Effect NO NO YES YES 
No. of Obs. 223,755 210,675 223,755 210,675 
R-squared 0.0054 0.0254 0.1714 0.2631 
 
 
2.4.4 Trades Induced by Superior Information and Female Insiders’ Losses from Prospect Theory Value 
Biased Trades 
In this setting, we consider the trades which are made when superior or high-quality information is 
available. For this setting, higher losses of female insiders’ biased trades are expected to diminish 
because the trades are influenced by superior information. We consider the sub-sample of buy trades 
and firms with high proportion of female insider transactions. 
2.4.4.1 Female Insider Trading and Biased Trade Losses for Buy Trades 
It is evident in the literature that insiders may sell due to reasons other than profit maximization, such 
as diversification or rebalancing of portfolio, liquidity, wealth, income, or tax-loss selling (Huddart & 
Ke, 2007). Insiders’ buy trades mostly reflect some good news concerning a company’s prospects and 
insiders earn abnormal returns in future. Lakonishok and Lee (2001) show that insider buying strongly 




over 6% annually after insider buying, as opposed to no significant abnormal performance for insider 
selling. Kallunki, Nilsson, and Hellstrom (2009) report that insiders tend to buy stocks that earn high 
positive abnormal returns on non-trading days, with returns that are greater than selling. Although 
insiders have an information advantage over other investors or market participants, there is always 
litigation risk associated with insider buy trades. Therefore, insiders are more likely to be cautious when 
timing their purchases than their sales because of the risk of regulatory monitoring (Seyhun, 1998). 
Jeng, Metrick, and Zeckhauser (2003) explain that CEO trades are closely scrutinized by regulators, 
therefore they trade more cautiously. We argue that if access to information explains our results, then a 
reduction in losses of female insiders’ biased trades is expected for superior information induced buy 
trades. 
Table 2.9 shows the regression results of the relationship between losses of prospect theory 
value biased trades and insider trading by females when they buy their company’s stock. Columns (1) 
and (2) present the results of the full sample, whereas Columns (3) and (4) include firms with trades by 
both genders. We use two different models for this test. First, we consider only buy transactions and 
investigate the association between female trades and losses. Second, we analyze an interaction term, 
Female×Buy, which is the product of Buy trades and a Female dummy. We test the relationship with 
firm-fixed effects as well as with firm- and insider-specific characteristics. Columns (1) and (3) present 
the regression results for buy transactions only, where it is evident that the coefficient of female trades 
and the losses is insignificant. This validates the supposition that our finding of higher biased trade 
losses by female insiders is inconsistent when we control for buy trades.  Similarly, Columns (2) and 
(4) exhibit negative coefficients of the Female×Buy variable that are significant at the 1% level. 
We argue that female insiders decide to buy their company’s stock when they have access to 
relatively higher quality internal information, resulting in a significant decrease in biased trade loss. 






Table 2.9. Biased Trade Loss and Female Insider Trading under Buy Transactions 
This table presents the findings of the regression of biased trade loss on female insider trades when female executives decide 
to buy the insider stock. We present results for buy transactions only, as well as for the interaction between female and buy 
insider trades using the full sample. The dependent variable, Biased_Trade_Loss (B_T_Loss), is a measure of loss from 
prospect theory value biased trades and is equal to |𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑡+1 | if either of the two conditions mentioned in Equation (4) is met 
at time t and 0 otherwise. Female is a measure of trade by a female insider that is equal to 1 if the insider trading is carried out 
by the female at time t and 0 otherwise. 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 × 𝐵𝑢𝑦 is the product of buy transaction and a female dummy variable. 
Retex_m is the monthly return in excess of the market return at time t-1. Retex_y is the cumulative past monthly returns in 
excess of the market returns from t-12 to t-2. Size is the log of the monthly market capitalization at time t-1. Turnover is the 
monthly volume turnover at time t-1; it is equal to the number of shares traded divided by the number of shares outstanding. 
Book_Mkt is the book-to-market ratio at time t-1, measured as (total assets - total liabilities) divided by (closing price*number 
of shares outstanding). Age_insider is the insider’s age at the time of transaction t. PhD equals 1 if the insider has doctoral 
degree and 0 otherwise. Grad equals 1 if the insider has a graduate degree and 0 otherwise. MBA equals 1 if the insider has a 
Master of Business Administration degree and 0 otherwise. Undergrad equals 1 if the insider has an undergraduate degree and 
0 otherwise. To ensure that extreme values are not affecting the results, all variables are winsorized at their 1 and 99 percentile 
levels. The results are reported for the full sample, as well as for the subsample of firms with trades by both genders. The 
results are presented with firm-fixed effects. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote 99%, 95%, and 
90% significance levels. 
𝐵_𝑇_𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐵𝑢𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 × 𝐵𝑢𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝑖,𝑡 
 Full sample Trades by both genders 
 Buy Transactions Interaction Buy Transactions Interaction 
 All controls and fixed 
effect 
All controls and fixed 
effect 
All controls and fixed 
effect 
All controls and fixed 
effect 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Female -0.0006 0.0075*** -0.0007 0.0076*** 
 (-0.32) (8.43) (-0.27) (8.49) 
Buy - 0.0056*** - 0.0126*** 
  (14.08)  (12.60) 
Female×Buy - -0.0098*** - -0.0117*** 
  (-6.01)  (-6.88) 
Retex_m 0.0165*** 0.0029*** 0.0561*** 0.0222*** 
 (10.45) (4.11) (15.03) (13.53) 
Retex_y 0.0068*** 0.0024*** 0.0237*** 0.0110*** 
 (10.12) (8.01) (15.80) (15.89) 
Size 0.0062*** -0.0085*** -0.0148*** -0.0132*** 
 (10.91) (-34.20) (-11.57) (-25.89) 
Turnover 0.0027*** 0.0002*** 0.0014** -0.0008*** 
 (11.76) (2.93) (2.12) (-4.01) 
Book_Mkt -0.0083*** 0.0014*** -0.0130*** -0.0125*** 
 (-14.71) (5.05) (-8.87) (-18.17) 
Age_insider -0.00004 0.0001*** -0.00002 -0.0001** 
 (-1.00) (8.77) (-0.23) (-1.99) 
PhD -0.0035 -0.0047* - -0.0013 
 (-0.45) (-1.69)  (-0.35) 
Grad -0.0143*** -0.0076*** -0.0308*** -0.0205*** 
 (-5.50) (-6.76) (-7.41) (-11.51) 
MBA -0.0066* -0.0028* 0.0084 0.0002 
 (-1.81) (-1.72) (0.92) (0.07) 
UnderGrad -0.0010 0.0015*** 0.0037 0.0047*** 
 (-0.89) (3.89) (1.41) (5.14) 
Firm-fixed Effect YES YES YES YES 
No. of Obs. 44,476 210,675 8,616 36,449 




2.4.4.2 Female Insider Trading and Biased Trade Losses in Firms with Higher Female Proportion 
We have reported in our descriptive statistics that 5.71% of the executives are female, but they are 
responsible for only 2.56% of the total insider transactions. It is evident that they are underrepresented 
in the firms, especially at the top corporate level. Moreover, their lack of connections and limited access 
to informal networks become a hurdle for females to collect useful, material information and for making 
profitable decisions (Fang & Huang, 2017; Inci, Narayanan, & Seyhun, 2017; Mobbs, Tan, & Zhang, 
2018). We anticipate that the impact of these factors may diminish in firms where the proportion of 
female insiders is comparatively higher than males. A greater number of females at top positions reflects 
stronger ties and networks among them, which ultimately improve their learning, work related 
experience, and the availability of useful information. Following Inci, Narayanan, and Seyhun (2017), 
we consider the proportion of female insider trades in a firm as a proxy of the proportion of female 
insiders. If access to information contributes to our results, in such firms we expect a decrease in the 
positive association between female insiders and their biased trades’ losses. 
Table 2.10 displays the findings of female insider trading and biased trade losses in the sub-
sample of firms with a higher proportion of female insiders (i.e., where the proportion of female insider 
trading is at the 95th percentile and above). First, we measure the proportion of female insider trades in 
each firm within our full sample. Subsequently, by using these proportions, we consider the sub-sample 
of firms in which the female insider trades’ proportion is at the 95th percentile and above. Columns (1), 
(2), and (3) of Table 2.10 present the results of the sub-sample of firms selected from the full sample. 
In Column (4), the sub-sample is chosen from the firms with insider trades by both genders. 
Considering firm fixed effects and all the control variables, the regression results show that, 
when we limit our sample to the firms in which the proportion of female insider trading is at the 95th 
percentile and above, no significant positive relation exists between female insiders and biased trade 
losses. This finding is consistent with the argument that when females are higher in number, the 
informational disadvantage is reduced. Hence, female insiders no longer suffer higher losses from the 




Table 2.10. Biased Trade Loss and Female Insider Trading in Higher-Female-Proportion Firms 
This table presents the findings of the regression of biased trade loss on female insider trades in firms with female trades that 
are in the 95th percentile of all female trades. We measure the proportion of female insider trades by taking the number of 
female trades divided by the total number of trades by both gender in each firm. Using these proportions, we take into account 
the sub-sample of firms in which female insider trades’ proportion is in the 95th percentile and above. The dependent variable, 
Biased_Trade_Loss (B_T_Loss), is a measure of loss from prospect theory value biased trades and is equal to |𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑡+1 | if 
either of the two conditions mentioned in Equation (4) is met at time t and 0 otherwise. Female is a measure of trade by a 
female insider that is equal to 1 if the insider trading is carried out by the female at time t and 0 otherwise. Retex_m is the 
monthly return in excess of the market return at time t-1. Retex_y is the cumulative past monthly returns in excess of the 
market returns from t-12 to t-2. Size is the log of the monthly market capitalization at time t-1. Turnover is the monthly volume 
turnover at time t-1; it is equal to the number of shares traded divided by the number of shares outstanding. Book_Mkt is the 
book-to-market ratio at time t-1, measured as (total assets - total liabilities) divided by (closing price*number of shares 
outstanding). Age_insider is the insider’s age at the time of transaction t. PhD equals 1 if the insider has doctoral degree and 
0 otherwise. Grad equals 1 if the insider has a graduate degree and 0 otherwise. MBA equals 1 if the insider has a Master of 
Business Administration degree and 0 otherwise. Undergrad equals 1 if the insider has an undergraduate degree and 0 
otherwise. To ensure that extreme values are not affecting the results, all variables are winsorized at their 1 and 99 percentile 
levels. The results are reported for the full sample, as well as for the subsample of firms with trades by both genders. The 
results are presented with firm-fixed effects. The t-statistics based on White robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
***, **, and * denote 99%, 95%, and 90% significance levels. 
𝐵_𝑇_𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝑖,𝑡 
 Full Sample Trades by both gender 
 All controls but no fixed 
effect 
Fixed effect but no 
controls 
All controls and fixed 
effect 
All controls and fixed 
effect 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Female -0.0029** 0.0011 -0.0008 -0.0055 
 (-2.37) (1.23) (-0.75) (-1.33) 
Retex_m -0.0295*** - -0.0269*** 0.0363*** 
 (-4.63)  (-7.44) (3.39) 
Retex_y 0.0011 - 0.0010 0.0210*** 
 (0.65)  (0.64) (4.45) 
Size -0.0039*** - -0.0061*** -0.0079** 
 (-14.79)  (-4.74) (-2.07) 
Turnover 0.0077*** - 0.0014*** -0.0070*** 
 (13.37)  (2.92) (-3.00) 
Book_Mkt -0.0009 - -0.0078*** 0.0294*** 
 (-0.88)  (-4.15) (3.90) 
Age_insider 0.0002*** - -0.00003 -0.0003 
 (3.50)  (-0.46) (-0.85) 
PhD 0.0700*** - 0.0007 0.0169 
 (15.84)  (0.22) (0.93) 
Grad -0.0272* - -0.0649* - 
 (-1.66)  (-1.78)  
MBA -0.0081*** - -0.0029 -0.0206 
 (-2.76)  (-0.39) (-0.66) 
UnderGrad 0.0006 - -0.0003 -0.0039 
 (0.48)  (-0.17) (-0.43) 
Firm-fixed 
Effect 
NO YES YES YES 
No. of Obs. 4,430 5,507 4,430 1,074 






Behavioral biases affect the profitability of insider trading. This study is the first to provide empirical 
evidence of gender differences in insider trading from the perspective of prospect theory. Using a 
sample of U.S. top executives’ insider trades, first, we document that insider trades earn lower returns 
in the subsequent month when insiders time to buy (sell) stock with a prospect theory value higher 
(lower) than that of other firms. Second, female insiders carry out prospect theory value biased trades 
and suffer losses higher than the losses their male counterparts suffer. It is evident that the number of 
insider transactions, past 12-months’ cumulative return, share turnover, number of shares traded, and 
dollar-value of male trades are greater than female trades, on average. Our regression results cannot be 
explained by the overconfidence hypothesis as the results show that female executives carry higher 
number of biased trades and suffer more losses than males. These results support the information access 
hypothesis and imply that the information disadvantage to female executives may explain their higher 
biased trade losses. 
We follow the literature that limited information contributes to higher behavioral biases, and 
that due to male dominance female insiders may have access to limited information, as compared to 
their male counterparts. We test these arguments in two different settings; first, where the access to 
information is considered to be equal for all the executive, second, where trades are induces by superior 
information availability. For our first setting, we run the analysis within executives’ formal titles, trade 
size, routine trades, and macro-level market uncertainty. For second setting, buy trades and firms with 
high proportion of female insider trades are examined. We find that the significant positive association 
between female insiders and prospect theory value biased trades’ losses exist even in the situations 
where information is supposed to be equally dispersed, indicating limited access of information to 
female insiders. Whereas, this association is significantly diminished when trades are induced by 
superior material information. Consequently, these findings indicate that access to information 






GENDER AND MUTUAL FUND LIQUIDITY 
This chapter consists of the second essay of the thesis which investigates fund managers’ preference for 
liquidity and analyzes the difference in portfolio liquidity among male and female managers. Using a 
sample of 1,932 U.S. domestic open-end single managed active equity funds from January 2000 to 
December 2017, the results show that preference of female fund managers to hold liquid portfolio is 
higher than male managers. 
The brief introduction and motivation of the study is given in section 3.1. Section 3.2 provides 
the literature review and hypotheses formation, while Section 3.3 establishes the research methodology 
and specifies the details of our data. Section 3.4 presents the applications of diagnostic tests, analysis, 
and discussion of results. Section 3.5 reports the findings of endogeneity analysis. Section 3.6 provides 






Gender and Mutual Fund Liquidity 
 
Abstract 
This study demonstrates that the gender of mutual fund managers affects the liquidity of a 
portfolio. Female managers prefer higher portfolio liquidity than their male counterparts. Funds 
managed by single female managers are 8-25% more liquid than single male managed funds. 
Contrary to the excessive trading hypothesis that expects a higher liquidity preference of 
overconfident male fund managers, the findings support the inclination of female fund 
managers for the price efficiency hypothesis. Funds experience an increased liquidity when 
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This study focuses on fund managers’ preference for liquidity and examines the role of gender in 
selecting a liquidity-preferred portfolio. Liquidity is one of the preferred stock characteristics for 
portfolio holdings of mutual funds (e.g., Falkenstein, 1996; Gompers & Metrick, 2001; Pinnuck, 2004). 
The prime reason for mutual funds to hold liquid securities is to build a safety cushion to manage 
liquidity risk in the event of a crisis. Fund managers can sell their liquid stocks first to reduce exposure 
and leverage, quickly and at a lower cost (Scholes, 2000). Recent studies provide insight that 
expectation of future market volatility and fund withdrawals encourage fund managers to sell their 
illiquid stocks first to preserve liquidity (e.g., Ben-Rephael, 2017; Huang, 2015; Vayanos, 2004). Do 
male and female fund managers exhibit a similar preference for portfolio liquidity? Several studies have 
concluded that there are no significant differences in the risk-adjusted performance of male and female 
fund managers.19 However, it is intriguing to analyze the liquidity choice of fund managers for portfolio 
holdings based on their gender. 
The gender of finance professionals is an important personality trait associated with differences 
in investment decisions. Earlier studies suggest that gender disparities exist in investment behaviors 
e.g., risk taking, conservatism, and overconfidence.20 We find strong empirical evidence that women 
have a stronger preference for stocks’ information transparency than men. With the inclusion of female 
directors on corporate boards, stock price informativeness improves and the level of information 
asymmetry in the stock market diminishes (Abad et al., 2017; Gul, Srinidhi, & Ng, 2011). Following 
this strand of literature, we expect a difference in liquidity preference among male and female fund 
managers. 
We develop two competing hypotheses in this regard: the excessive trading hypothesis; and the 
price efficiency hypothesis. The excessive trading hypothesis expects that, due to their overconfident 
investment behavior, male fund managers are involved in more frequent trading than female managers 
 
19 See for example, Atkinson, Baird, and Frye (2003); Niessen-Ruenzi and Ruenzi (2019). 
20 See for example, Beckmann and Menkhoff (2008); Huang and Kisgen (2013); Levi, Li, and Zhang (2014); 




(Barber & Odean, 2001; Niessen-Ruenzi & Ruenzi, 2019). The excessive turnover in their portfolios, 
and aggressively moving money into new securities, increase transaction costs (Chan & Lakonishok, 
1995). Therefore, the preference to trade in liquid stocks is higher for male managers as compared to 
their female counterparts. On the contrary, following the literature on female attraction for transparent 
information, the price efficiency hypothesis expects that, compared to male fund managers, females are 
more likely to prefer liquid stocks for which price adjustment to information occurs in a timely manner. 
Lang, Lins, and Maffett (2012) suggest that transaction costs are lower, and liquidity is higher, for firms 
with better transparency. 
We find a contradictory view in the literature regarding behavioral disparities among gender. 
A number of studies indicate that it is usual to observe a vivid difference in the investment behaviors 
of individual or household investors and professional managers (Dwyer, Gilkeson, & List, 2002). The 
managers belong to a category of highly experienced and qualified investors; therefore, they are most 
likely to behave in a similar way. Following this aspect of the literature and considering the importance 
of portfolio liquidity decisions, it is plausible that there exists no disparity in the choices of male and 
female fund managers when investing in liquid assets. Fund managers have a familiarity with risk as 
they are specialists in risk management. Additionally, they usually have advanced financial education 
and market knowledge. These two forces alleviate the gender effect on behavioral preferences of fund 
managers.21 The self-selection mechanism among females on becoming fund managers can be another 
reason to assume that females are equally confident and competitive as their male counterparts.22 The 
ongoing ranking of fund managers by market participants, and some investors’ gender bias towards 
female managed funds, are also reasons to assume that female and male fund managers tend to perform 
similarly.23 
 
21 Hibbert, Lawrence, and Prakash (2013) suggest that financial education mitigates the gender difference in risk 
aversion. 
22 Nekby, Thoursie, and Vahtrik (2008) show that women selected to participate in male-dominated environments 
are likely to be highly competitive. 
23 Niessen-Ruenzi and Ruenzi (2019) document significantly lower inflows in female-managed funds than in 





To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to investigate mutual fund managers’ liquidity 
preference for portfolio holdings, influenced by their gender. This study not only explores the 
controversial research area of gender but also deals with potential endogeneity issues. It is likely that 
some fund management companies discriminate in their selection of a fund manager based on gender, 
or females may self-select specific type of funds, e.g. growth funds or income funds, etc. Hence, the 
investment objective of a fund affects a stockholding’s liquidity, rather than it being affected by the 
gender of the fund manager. It should also be noted that female representation is uneven across different 
types of funds. Their underrepresentation in some funds with specific objectives can lead to spurious 
results. On the other hand, institutional ownership affects a stock’s liquidity (Agarwal, 2007; Rubin, 
2007). One major concern of this study is whether a fund manager has picked stocks based on their 
liquidity, or their inclusion in the fund portfolio has given rise to the stocks’ liquidity. Therefore, it is 
difficult to establish a fund manager’s preference for liquidity. The concern of time-invariant fund 
specific characteristics that might be correlated with omitted explanatory variables gives rise to 
endogeneity issues. In this scenario, a simple regression model may not be sufficient to justify the 
outcomes. We, therefore, apply propensity scores matching and difference-in-differences approaches 
to substantiate the authenticity of our results. 
First, we compare the liquidity preference of funds managed by female managers to a 
(propensity score) matched sample of peers run by male managers, that are indistinguishable in terms 
of investment objectives, time, fund, and manager level characteristics. Second, we compare the 
portfolio liquidity preference of the same funds, as managed by managers of different gender. We 
consider a sample of funds experiencing a transition from one manager to another, including male to 
male, female to female, male to female, and female to male fund manager (referred to as “transition 
funds”). Third, we apply propensity scores matching on the transition funds. Finally, we apply a 
difference-in-differences approach on the transition funds to compare fund liquidity before and after 




We conduct one additional test to rule out any endogeneity concerns. The test relies on the 
instrumental variable approach, in which we use a “state level gender equality index” as an instrument 
for a fund managed by a female manager (Di Noia, 2002). We assume that the friendlier a state is toward 
female equality the more likely a fund (with its headquarters in that state) is to have a female manager. 
The results support our hypothesis of a stronger female preference for portfolio liquidity relative to 
males. 
Using a sample of 1,932 U.S. domestic open-end single managed equity funds from January 
2000 to December 2017, 10% (on average) of which are run by single female managers, the results 
show that the preference of female fund managers for holding liquid portfolios is higher than for male 
managers. Our outcomes provide support to the price efficiency hypothesis as opposed to the excessive 
trading hypothesis. The findings are consistent with the literature that finds that females are involved 
in less frequent trading than their male counterparts. However, the net result of liquidity preference 
among male and female fund managers does not indicate higher liquidity demand by male managers. 
Price delay may result from lack of liquidity or investors’ inattention towards a stock (Hou & 
Moskowitz, 2005). The results show that female fund managers favor stocks for which their prices 
incorporate market and firm specific information in a timely manner. Subsequently, female fund 
managers’ inclination toward price-efficient stocks may explain their preference for higher portfolio 
liquidity. The findings of propensity scores matching, and difference-in-differences methodologies 
provide empirical evidence that a significant increase in portfolio liquidity occurs around the change 
from male to female fund manager, as compared to otherwise similar peers. The results from a two-
stage least squares (2SLS) instrumental variable (IV) design are consistent with the main findings of 
the study. Moreover, the outcomes depict that, on average, female managed funds are smaller in size 
and have lower flows and fund returns. We also present the impact of female fund managers on portfolio 
liquidity across investment styles and over time. We run a main regression model by controlling for 





The literature on liquidity and asset pricing states that the expected return of an illiquid stock 
is higher to compensate for its higher trading cost (Amihud & Mendelson, 1986). One possible 
explanation for our results is the tradeoff between liquidity and fund returns. The liquidity preference 
of female fund managers gives them the benefits of managing a less risky portfolio and protecting from 
excessive trading costs when the market is volatile. However, a liquidity preferred portfolio has a higher 
tendency to deteriorate fund performance due to lower returns. There exists empirical evidence that 
mutual fund investors reward superior performing funds by increasing flows into these funds (e.g., Fant 
& O'Neal, 2000; Sirri & Tufano, 1998). Therefore, it is not surprising if fund managers attract fund 
flows by holding less-liquid stocks and reporting higher fund return performance. Our results show that 
female fund managers prefer to hold more liquid assets, which reduces the riskiness of the portfolio; 
however, female managed funds have, on average, lower flows and returns as compared to male 
managed funds. Although our preliminary analysis depicts negative returns when the fund is female 
managed, the association is not statistically significant.24  
So far, the preference for portfolio liquidity among male and female mutual fund managers 
remains unexplored. Our study relates to several strands of literature. First, it contributes to the existing 
studies that report liquidity as one of the important characteristics of stockholdings, preferred by 
institutional investors (e.g., Del Guercio, 1996; Falkenstein, 1996; Gompers & Metrick, 2001). Second, 
our results are consistent with the notion that behavioral disparities among gender exist even in 
professional settings (e.g., Faccio, Marchica, & Mura, 2016; Ho et al., 2015; Huang & Kisgen, 2013). 
Third, the analysis of liquidity preference among male and female fund managers is a contribution to 
the existing literature on the gender of mutual fund managers (e.g., Beckmann & Menkhoff, 2008; 
Niessen-Ruenzi & Ruenzi, 2019). Fourth, our findings support the literature on females’ inclination 
towards informationally transparent stocks, and the positive association between stock price efficiency 
and liquidity (e.g., Abad et al., 2017; Callen, Khan, & Lu, 2013; Diamond & Verrecchia, 1991; Gul, 
 
24 We present the findings for fund risk and return in Table B6 in the Appendix. The use of more structured proxies 
to measure fund performance will undoubtedly provide greater insight; however, it is beyond the scope of this 




Srinidhi, & Ng, 2011; Lang, Lins, & Maffett, 2012). Finally, this study discusses the fact of stock 
liquidity and return tradeoff (Amihud & Mendelson, 1986). 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 provides the literature review and 
hypotheses formation, while Section 3.3 establishes the research methodology and specifies the details 
of our data. Section 3.4 presents the applications of diagnostic tests, analysis, and discussion of the 
results. Section 3.5 reports the analysis of the endogeneity issues. Section 3.6 provides the conclusions. 
 
3.2 Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
3.2.1 Liquidity and Mutual Funds 
Institutional investors, including fund managers, exhibit specific preferences for various stock 
characteristics, with liquidity being one of them. Del Guercio (1996) examines the impact of the 
prudent-man laws on the holding preferences of mutual funds and banks. By analyzing the reported 
portfolio holdings of 941 institutional managers, the study finds that bank managers significantly tilt 
their portfolios towards “prudent” (quality) stocks. The constraints of the prudent-man rule induce bank 
managers to prefer large-capitalization stocks with low book-to-market ratios. Mutual fund managers 
appear to display a slight preference for low book-to-market stocks and a stronger avoidance of high 
book-to-market stocks, in both large and small stocks. 
Transaction costs erode a fund’s performance and managers wishing to maximize fund 
performance will prefer highly liquid stocks to minimize implicit transaction costs. Falkenstein (1996) 
analyzes a cross-section of U.S. mutual fund equity holdings to determine fund managers’ preferences 
for various stock characteristics. Examining equity holdings of about 1000 funds for the years 1991 and 
1992, he finds strong preferences for stocks with high liquidity (low transaction cost), information flow, 
and high idiosyncratic volatility. The study also highlights that small-cap funds show a preference 
towards small-cap stocks, which are relatively low in liquidity. Gompers and Metrick (2001) extend the 




(1980 to 1996) of U.S. 13F institutional investors with at least US$100 million under management. 
They find that such large institutions prefer large market-capitalization stocks and highly liquid stocks 
that have low past returns. 
Using data of equity portfolio holdings of 35 Australian active equity fund managers from 1990 
to 1997, Pinnuck (2004) finds strong evidence that fund managers prefer large, liquid, and low volatility 
stocks. Brands, Gallagher, and Looi (2006) consider 36 active Australian institutional equity managers 
over the period from 2000 to 2001 and examine their preferences for securities according to stock size. 
The study shows significant preferences for stocks with higher stock price variance, lower transaction 
costs, larger market-capitalization, preferences towards value stocks, securities with higher analyst 
coverage and stocks with a lower standard deviation in analyst earnings forecasts. For small stock 
holdings, stock volatility and analyst coverage are of greater importance. On the other hand, there is 
evidence that over time institutional investors have shifted their aggregate preferences towards smaller 
and riskier securities (Bennett, Sias, & Starks, 2003). The study suggests that institutional investors’ 
informational advantages are greatest in smaller-capitalization securities. 
Mutual fund managers’ preference for liquidity and trading of stocks based on their liquidity 
provide managers with a safety cushion during changes in expected market volatility or redemptions. 
Liquid stocks can easily be converted into cash during market stress to cater for redemptions in the 
fund. Therefore, fund managers are likely to adjust the liquidity of their portfolios in response to 
changes in expected volatility. Huang (2015) examines fund managers’ changes in portfolio 
decomposition and finds that fund managers hold more cash, and their holdings are more inclined 
towards liquid stocks, during periods when expected market volatility is high. Such liquidity 
preferences are stronger for funds that face high exposure to investor withdrawals during volatile times.  
Huang argues that this is due to strategic liquidity planning by fund managers and it can serve as a shock 
absorber when large investor redemptions occur during volatile periods. The evidence suggests that this 




There are different predictions regarding which assets should be sold first in crisis, either liquid 
or illiquid. Scholes (2000) supports the view that fund managers sell their liquid securities first, quickly 
and at a lower cost. Clarke, Cullen, and Gasbarro (2007) provide evidence that, when fund managers 
face redemptions, they avoid selling their less-liquid assets because this would lead to a greater 
downward price pressure on the illiquid stocks. They find that low liquidity funds exhibit a higher 
preference for selling their more-liquid stocks when they experience redemptions. However, during 
volatile times when withdrawals become more likely, if fund managers act strategically, they sell their 
illiquid assets first to preserve liquidity. Vayanos (2004) concludes that, in crisis, fund managers 
increase their preference for liquidity, they reduce illiquid stocks’ holding, stocks’ liquidity premia, and 
illiquid assets’ market betas increase. Consistent with this view, Ben-Rephael (2017) analyses the 
aggregate liquidation of equity mutual funds during ten periods of extreme market volatility, defined 
by a significant positive jump in VIX, from 1986 to 2009. The findings show that mutual funds reduce 
their aggregate shareholdings of illiquid stocks during volatile periods. The cross-sectional analysis 
suggests that larger redemptions from funds that hold less-liquid stocks contribute to the aggregate 
reduction in illiquid stocks’ holdings, which may contribute to the relatively large decline of illiquid 
stock prices. 
While it appears that many researchers are convinced that portfolio liquidity plays an important 
role in dealing with fund redemptions, there exists another strand of literature which recognizes that 
liquidity provision to fund investors and liquidity-motivated trading have an adverse impact on fund 
performance. The studies narrate that fund managers respond to unanticipated investors’ flow and 
engage in trading to control liquidity, which is detrimental to fund performance. The liquidity-motivated 
trading by fund managers not only results in transaction costs, but also significant trading losses (e.g., 
Alexander, Cici, & Gibson, 2007; Edelen, 1999; Nanda, Narayanan, & Warther, 2000). Clarke, Cullen, 
and Gasbarro (2007) suggest that, until the following three- and six-month periods, redeeming funds 
that sell their more liquid stocks statistically and economically underperform redeeming funds that sell 




stocks underperform those that purchase less liquid ones. Massa and Phalippou (2004) conclude that 
fund performance is unrelated to portfolio liquidity. 
Managing portfolio liquidity is crucial for fund managers due to various fund- and market-
specific reasons. However, the degree of male and female fund managers’ preference for liquidity is 
still unexplored. This study conducts an empirical analysis to analyze gender aspects in liquidity 
choices. 
 
3.2.2 Gender, Behavioral Differences, and Liquidity Preference of Male Fund Managers 
In the behavioral finance literature, there are several studies exploring behavioral disparities among 
gender regarding financial decision making in different settings. 
Using a psychological survey experiment on shareholders, security analysts, institutional 
investors, and general businesspersons, Estes and Hosseini (1988) find that women are significantly 
less confident than men in investment decisions. Sunden and Surette (1998), using data from the 1992 
and 1995 Surveys of Consumer Finances, find that gender and marital status have a combined effect on 
the allocation decisions of defined contribution (DC) retirement plans. The results show that women, 
either single or married, tend to allocate their investments to the retirement plan more conservatively 
than men. The failure of women to invest adequate funds in stocks results in lower retirement wealth. 
Similarly, Jianakoplos and Bernasek (1998) use surveys and other economic data to conclude that single 
women are more risk averse in financial decision making than single men. 
Powell and Ansic (1997) design two computerized laboratory experiments to examine the 
gender differences in risk preferences. They find that females are less risk seeking than males in 
financial decision making, regardless of the degree of familiarity, frame, or cost. Moreover, the results 
show that males overvalue, and females undervalue, their current position in the currency market 
because females are less confident than males. However, Schubert et al. (1999) attribute the higher risk 




data to capture enough differences in relevant factors, like the investment opportunity set. They find no 
variances in risk taking behavior in men and women facing investment and insurance related decisions 
in a controlled setting. 
Investment decision making by professionals at the corporate level provides a perfect setting to 
explore behavioral differences among gender, because it is a homogeneous group of individuals with 
comparable levels of financial expertise and knowledge. Huang and Kisgen (2013) document that the 
propensity to make acquisitions is lower in companies with female CFOs. They indicate that female 
executives are more risk averse in investment and capital structure decisions than male executives. 
Berger, Kick, and Schaeck (2014) and Adams and Ragunathan (2017) state that the portfolio risk of 
banks with more female directors on their boards is higher than that of banks with fewer female 
directors.  Faccio, Marchica, and Mura (2016) evaluate whether corporate risk-taking is affected by 
CEO gender. They observe a subsequent decrease in risk-taking of a given firm around the transition 
from a male to a female CEO. Ho et al. (2015) document that female CEOs are more ethical and risk 
averse, hence firms with female CEOs report more conservative earnings. On the contrary, Sila, 
Gonzalez, and Hagendorff (2016) find no evidence that boardroom gender diversity affects a firm’s 
equity risk. 
There are studies exploring the characteristics of mutual fund managers and their impact on 
fund performance. Chevalier and Ellison (1999a) examine the manager’s age, the average composite 
SAT score at the manager’s undergraduate institution, and whether the manager has an MBA. They 
find that only the undergraduate college attended by the manager is relevant to fund performance. 
Atkinson, Baird, and Frye (2003) analyze a sample of fixed-income mutual fund managers and compare 
male and female managers to determine whether there is a difference in performance, risk, or other 
characteristics. They conclude that there is no significant difference in fund performance. However, 
female managers receive lower fund inflows into funds that they are managing. In a related study, 
Beckmann and Menkhoff (2008) test the survey responses of 649 fund managers in the U.S., Germany, 




overconfident than male managers. Recently, Niessen-Ruenzi and Ruenzi (2019) report that female 
equity fund managers are more risk averse, follow a less extreme investment style, have more consistent 
investments, and trade less than their male counterparts. Their study documents no gender difference in 
fund performance, but female managed funds receive significantly lower inflows than male managed 
funds.  
One of the personality characteristics that influences investment decisions is overconfidence. 
Odean (1999) finds that individual investors tend to trade excessively, are more risk taking, and make 
poor investment decisions. To analyze gender differences in overconfidence, Barber and Odean (2001) 
use account data from a large brokerage firm and examine the common stock investments of male and 
female investors. They find that men trade 45% more than women, which results in lower net returns 
than for women. They attribute the performance and trading activity of men to overconfidence in their 
investment abilities. Grinblatt and Keloharju (2009) evaluate trading data of Finnish investors and 
document that men trade substantially more than women at all age groups. Huang and Kisgen (2013) 
find that male executives exhibit higher overconfidence as compared to females as they are involved in 
more frequent acquisitions and debt issuance. Hence, male executives earn lower returns for these 
corporate decisions than their female counterparts. On the contrary, Nekby, Thoursie, and Vahtrik 
(2008) show that women selected to participate in male-dominated environments are likely to be highly 
competitive. Deaves, Lüders, and Luo (2009) provide experimental evidence that overconfidence drives 
trading but do not find any gender differences regarding overconfidence or trading activity of finance 
and economics students. 
Following the literature that finds men being more overconfident than women, we expect that 
male fund managers trade more actively than their female counterparts. These male managed high 
turnover funds face greater trading costs (Chan & Lakonishok, 1995). Subsequently, male fund 
managers prefer more liquid stocks in their portfolios to reduce trading costs.  





3.2.3 Stock Price Efficiency and Liquidity Preference of Female Fund Managers 
We conjecture that the preference for portfolio liquidity is higher for female fund managers than males. 
There is limited empirical work in the literature relating to the effect of gender on liquidity preference. 
Ahmed and Ali (2017) consider a sample of 944 Australian firms from 2008 to 2013 to investigate the 
relation between gender diverse boards and stock liquidity. They conclude that the efficient monitoring 
of female directors explains higher stock liquidity. They use three proxies to measure stock liquidity; 
Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity measure, liquidity ratio, and stock turnover, and find a positive and 
significant association between boardroom gender diversity and stock liquidity. Similarly, Loukil, 
Yousfi, and Yerbanga (2019) explore French firms between 2002 and 2012 to analyze the impact of 
gender diversity on boards on stock market liquidity, by distinguishing the effects of women inside and 
independent directors. They find that stock market liquidity is positively and significantly associated 
with the presence of women directors. 
In this study, we explore the potential explanation of the tendency of female fund managers to 
prefer more liquid stocks in their portfolio than their male counterparts. The monitoring role of females 
on corporate boards and the resulting improved informativeness of stock prices have been examined in 
detail in the finance literature. The extant literature provides evidence that liquidity is higher for a stock 
with efficient prices. We argue that females’ liking for price efficient stocks may explain their higher 
preference for liquid stocks. There is no literature in the investment field regarding inclination of 
females towards information efficiency, therefore, we support our argument from corporate finance 
literature. 
Adams and Ferreira (2009) describe how gender diverse boards are effective controllers. 
Female directors provide better monitoring of managers’ actions by promoting better board attendance, 
and joining monitoring positions on audit, nominating, and corporate governance committees. The 
literature shows that the boards performing an effective job of monitoring their managers’ actions, 




board quality is related to lower information asymmetry (e.g., Ajinkya, Bhojraj, & Sengupta, 2005; 
Karamanou & Vafeas, 2005). 
We find empirical evidence in the literature that the presence of female directors on boards 
improves transparency and increases the quality and quantity of public/private disclosure. A valuable 
study by Gul, Srinidhi, and Ng (2011) explains that stock prices are more informative when boards are 
gender diverse. They argue that gender diversity improves stock price informativeness through the 
mechanism of increased public disclosure in large firms, and by encouraging private information 
collection in small firms. The strong monitoring role of female directors make stock prices more 
efficient in timely incorporation of market and firm specific information. Upadhyay and Zeng (2014) 
test a sample of S&P 1500 firms from the years 2000 through 2003 and show that board diversity 
(gender and ethnicity) is negatively associated with corporate opacity. The index to measure the 
corporate information environment includes analyst following, analyst forecast error, bid–ask spread, 
and share turnover. Their findings provide the insight that board diversity creates a more transparent 
information environment. Similarly, in the Spanish market using data from 2004 through 2009, Abad 
et al. (2017) find that the gender diversity on boards is negatively associated with the level of 
information asymmetry in the stock market. They use proxies for information asymmetry i.e., relative 
bid-ask spread, price impact measure, and PIN; estimated from high-frequency data along with a system 
GMM panel methodology. Consequently, it is obvious that transparency and price informativeness 
inspire female professionals. 
The existing studies indicate a strong relationship between information asymmetry and stock 
liquidity. Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) show that revealing public information to reduce asymmetry 
of information, increases the liquidity of a firm’s securities. The effect is stronger for large firms who 
want to appeal to large holdings by institutional investors, and these investors are more concerned about 
future liquidity. Therefore, these large firms receive the largest benefit from reduced information 
asymmetry and a decreased cost of capital. Ng (2011) shows that higher information quality lowers 




quality and liquidity risk is stronger in times of large, unexpected changes in market liquidity. 
Moreover, Lang, Lins, and Maffett (2012) use a sample across 46 countries over the period of 1994 to 
2007 and conclude that transaction costs are lower, and liquidity is higher, for firms with better 
transparency. The transparency is measured as less evidence of earnings management, better accounting 
standards, higher quality auditors, more analyst following, and more accurate analyst forecasts. 
Enhanced quality of information increases the speed with which information is incorporated into prices, 
termed as price efficiency. We observe that various studies on price efficiency attempt to capture 
different dimensions of liquidity as controls and indicate that high liquidity stocks tend to have less 
price delay (e.g., Callen, Khan, & Lu, 2013; Hou & Moskowitz, 2005; Saffi & Sigurdsson, 2011). 
Following the literature, we expect that preference for informationally transparent stocks with 
efficient prices may explain female fund managers’ liquidity choices. A stock’s price efficiency is 
associated with high liquidity; therefore, we conjecture that preference for portfolio liquidity is higher 
for female fund managers than for their male counterparts. 
H1b: Portfolio liquidity preference is higher among female than male fund managers. 
 
3.3 Data and Methodology 
3.3.1 Data 
This study considers U.S. domestic actively managed open-end equity funds from January 2000 to 
December 2017. It follows the methodology of Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2008) to merge mutual 
funds’ characteristics data from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) Survivorship Bias-
Free Mutual Fund Database with holdings data from Thomson Reuters and stock prices data from the 
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). The set from the Thomson Financial database, known 
as CDA/Spectrum S12 for mutual funds holdings, covers almost all historical domestic mutual funds 




markets.25 Based on Investment Objective Codes (IOC), we exclude non-equity funds from the holdings 
data, i.e., international, municipal bonds, bond and preferred, and balanced funds. The study deals with 
the two main issues of the S12 dataset, which are “late reporters”, i.e., cases where a fund rarely shows 
RDATE (the date for which the holdings are actually held by the fund) holdings that correspond to the 
same quarter as the FDATE vintage (the date when the holdings are filed), and “stale data”, i.e., where 
the same RDATE based holdings are shown in two or more consecutive FDATE vintages. We keep the 
holdings of the first given FDATE and the most recent RDATE for a portfolio. According to the mutual 
funds disclosure policy in 2004, funds are required to disclose their holdings quarterly instead of 
semiannually. We assume that, for funds that report semiannual holdings or if the gap between 
disclosure dates is more than 6 months, the most recently available filing is unchanged until the next 
filing is reported (the cut off for the holding period is 6 months). The monthly prices from CRSP are 
obtained to allocate a dollar value to the monthly holdings. We exclude the holdings if their CUSIPs 
cannot be linked to the CRSP stock database. 
While selecting domestic equity funds from CRSP, we focus on funds with the following Lipper 
class or Lipper objectives: EIEI, G, LCCE, LCGE, LCVE, MCCE, MCGE, MCVE, MLCE, MLGE, 
MLVE, SCCE, SCGE, SCVE, or CA, EI, G, GI, MC, MR, SG. If both of them are missing, we select 
funds with the following Strategic Insight objectives: AGG, GMC, GRI, GRO, ING, or SCG. If Lipper 
class, objectives, and Strategic Insight objectives are not available for a fund, we choose funds with the 
following objectives of Wiesenberger Fund Type Code: G, G-I, AGG, GCI, GRI, GRO, LTG, IEQ, 
MCG, SCG. If none of these objectives is given and the fund has a CS policy (common stocks primarily 
held by the fund), then the fund is included.26 Moreover, following Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng 
(2008), we ignore funds that, on average, hold less than 80%, or more than 105%, in stocks. As the 
study considers actively managed equity funds, we exclude index funds based on the provided 
 
25 See for example, Wharton Research Data Services (2008) – User’s Guide. 
26 The description for the fund classifications from Lipper class or Lipper objectives, Strategic Insight objectives, 





index_fund_flag and their names that contain the following words: INDEX, INDE, INDX, IDX, S&P, 
MSCI, ETF, ISHARES, DOW JONES, INTERNATIONAL. 
Following Solomon, Soltes, and Sosyura (2014), the study uses the MFLINKS table, which is 
developed by Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS) in collaboration with Professor Russ Wermers 
(University of Maryland’s Robert H. Smith School of Business), to match portfolio holdings with 
mutual fund characteristics. The MFLINKS table uses “wficn” as the fund identifier, whereas the CRSP 
“fundno” identifier is used for each share class. Therefore, we aggregate multiple fundno share classes 
into one wficn. The annual expense and turnover ratio of fund share classes are converted to their 
monthly equivalent. The share class observations reporting negative monthly net assets, turnover ratio, 
or expense ratio are ignored. We sum monthly net assets of all share classes with the same wficn to 
derive the monthly total net assets of a fund. For the analysis, we compute the value-weighted average 
for the monthly fund return and expense ratio. For fund age and the turnover ratio, we consider the 
oldest share class. To avoid incubation bias, we exclude a fund’s monthly observations where the date 
of the observation is prior to the inception date of the fund reported in CRSP and we also eliminate 
observations where funds’ names are missing.27 From a fund’s aggregated holding data, we exclude 
funds that hold fewer than ten stocks or manage less than US$1 million in the previous month 
(Kacperczyk, Sialm, & Zheng, 2005). We require a fund to have at least one year of monthly returns. 
After matching the samples from CRSP and Thomson Reuters by wficn and monthly dates, we 
impose an additional filter to eliminate observations with errors. Following Pastor, Stambaugh, and 
Taylor (2020), we measure the ratio of a fund’s total net assets attained by adding up the net assets of 
CRSP share classes to the assets obtained by adding up the fund’s holdings from Thomson Reuters. We 
eliminate any fund-month observation if the ratio exceeds 2.0 (i.e., 200%), or is less than 0.5 (i.e., 50%). 
We have a matched sample of 3,165 domestic equity funds with 376,362 fund-month observations. 
We collect data on fund managers’ characteristics from the Morningstar Direct (MS) database. 
In MS, “secid” is the unique identifier for a fund share class, whereas “fundid” uniquely identifies a 
 




fund. Therefore, different share classes of the same fund have different secids, tickers, and CUSIPs, but 
the same fundid. For the purpose of matching, we use qualitative attributes like wficn, crsp_fundno, 8-
digit CUSIP, name, ticker, and inception date of fund share classes of our completely matched CRSP 
and Thomson Reuters sample. First, we use the CUSIP of each share class to find a match in MS and 
obtain the relevant fundid.28 Second, we verify the matching accuracy of the obtained fundid with 
crsp_fundno, and attain the missing fundid (if given) from the matched/merged list of CRSP and MS 
funds developed by Pastor, Stambaugh, and Taylor (2015).29 At this stage, our matched CRSP and 
Thomson Reuters sample of share classes has the matched fundid as well. Third, we make sure that all 
matched MS share classes with the same fundid also have a unique wficn. We encounter the following 
issues: 
(i) Almost 25% (or below) of the matched MS share classes with the same wficn have 
different fundid (e.g. there are 5 share classes belonging to a fund and have equal wficn. 
Out of these 5, 4 share classes have identical fundid, whereas 1 class’s fundid does not 
match with the rest), 
(ii) Almost 50% of the matched MS share classes with the same wficn have different fundid 
(e.g. there are 6 share classes belonging to a fund and have equal wficn. Out of these 
6, 3 share classes have identical, whereas 3 have varying fundids), 
(iii) Almost 75% (or above) of the matched MS share classes with the same wficn have 
different fundid (e.g. there are 8 share classes belonging to a fund and have equal wficn. 
Out of these 8, only 2 share class have identical fundid, whereas other 6 classes belong 
to diverse fundids), and 
(iv) Some share classes with a particular fundid belong to more than one wficn. 
 
28 Due to the unavailability of CUSIP in the Morningstar Direct database, we provided the list of CUSIPs of CRSP 
and Thomson Reuters matched fund share classes to the MS support team, who then supplied us with the fundid 
of all matched CUSIPs. 
29 Lucian A. Taylor has been very kind to provide the data of matched CRSP and MS share classes (including 
crsp_fundno, secid, and fundid). The comprehensive matching process, till the end of year 2014, is described in 
their paper (Pastor, Stambaugh, & Taylor, 2015). We find some discrepancies in their matched fundid and the 
ones we obtain from MS, due to different study time windows. For our analysis, we mostly rely on fundid retrieved 




We manually deal with these issues by verifying with “Manager history” from MS, as well as 
the name and inception date of the oldest share class from MS and our matched CRSP and Thomson 
Reuters sample (Patel & Sarkissian, 2017). The data point of manager history provides managers’ 
names and dates of joining and leaving the fund from the date of its origination. Therefore, all share 
classes belonging to one fund have a similar management history. To deal with the first matching issue, 
for every unique wficn, we keep management information of the share classes that are in majority and 
have the same fundid.30 For the second issue, we consider the management history of the share classes 
with varying fundid. We cross-verify the joining date of the very first fund manager with the inception 
date of the oldest share class having unique wficn. We consider the management information of the 
share class if the joining date is the same or very shortly after the inception date. We also look at the 
name and inception date of this share class to see if they match with the information of the oldest share 
class of unique wficn. We address the third issue by excluding such funds because share classes have 
different fundids as well as management history and inception dates. Finding an exact match in this 
case is not feasible. To deal with the fourth issue, we cross-check monthly net assets, names, and 
inception dates of the share classes with fundid with the ones having unique wficn. Then, based on the 
above-mentioned selection process, we finalize the management information of these funds.31 
At this stage, we have the share class aggregated fund characteristics, management history, and 
stock holdings for every unique wficn identifier, which forms the basis for further analysis. The 
resulting dataset contains 3,109 unique equity funds with 372,551 fund-month observations. We then 
hand-collect the data for various attributes of fund managers, including gender, year of graduation, 
tenure with the fund, earned degrees, and professional certifications. To specify whether a fund is 
managed by a male or female manager at the end of every month, we utilize the managers’ joining and 
resigning dates information provided in the “Manager history” data point. In this study, all managers 
and their characteristics are recorded according to whether they have been serving, joined, or left the 
 
30 In all such cases, name and inception date of the oldest share class with fundid are exactly matched with the 
oldest share class of the allocated unique wficn. 
31 During the selection process to deal with all the matching issues, we have verified inception dates of all funds 




fund during the sample period, i.e, January 2000 to December 2017. Managers who have resigned 
before January 2000 or started managing the fund after December 2017 are not the focus of this 
research. We also remove fund-month observations for which manager name or tenure date is 
unavailable. Similarly, we discard funds that are team managed but do not provide any description of 
their team members.  
Morningstar provides a “People” tab for every fund which contains management information. 
We identify the gender of managers with the help of the title prefixing their names (i.e., Mr., Ms., and 
Mrs., etc.). If the titles are missing, we search for terms like “he”, “his”, “him”, “she”, or “her” in their 
biography. Moreover, we record the graduation year when managers earn their first undergraduate 
degree, and the titles of all their degrees and certifications. If none of this information is available in 
MS, we look for their executive profile and biography in Bloomberg, LinkedIn, Facebook, Zoominfo, 
and the fund management company’s website. 
We identify sole managed, team managed, and a combination of single and team managed funds 
in our sample. Following Patel and Sarkissian (2017), we classify a fund as single or team managed 
based on the number of manager(s) managing the fund at the end of every month. If there is only one 
manager with the fund at the end of a month, we consider the fund as single managed for that month. If 
two or more fund managers’ names are given, we classify the fund as team managed for that specific 
month. We also categorize all the funds as team managed if they use expressions like “management 
team”, or “multiple managers” instead of one manager’s name. Management teams may overshadow 
individual member’s decisions, which makes it difficult to analyze the impact of gender on decision 
choices. We therefore concentrate the analysis on single managed funds only. Our final sample covers 
1,932 unique funds with 124,363 fund-month observations. 
Finally, to derive liquidity measures, we retrieve the data of daily stock return, price, volume, 






3.3.2 Variables Definition and Model Development 
In this section, we describe our main variables and models used to measure the liquidity preference of 
mutual fund managers based on their gender. 
3.3.2.1 Dependent Variable – Portfolio Liquidity 
We use three proxies to measure fund liquidity: Portfolio liquidity developed by Pastor, Stambaugh, 
and Taylor (2020), Amihud’s (2002) measure, and the bid-ask spread. 
3.3.2.1.1 Portfolio Liquidity: 
The measure of portfolio liquidity is introduced by Pastor, Stambaugh, and Taylor (2020) and consists 
of the liquidity of stocks held in the portfolio and the degree to which the portfolio is diversified. The 
measure defines the fundamental concept of portfolio liquidity and trading cost as follows: 









where 𝑁 is the number of stocks in the portfolio, 𝑤𝑖 is the portfolio’s weight on stock i, and 𝑚𝑖 is the 
weight on stock i in a market-cap-weighted benchmark portfolio containing 𝑁𝑚 stocks. The market-
cap-weighted benchmark portfolio is the overall market. We use monthly data from the CRSP stock 
database to calculate portfolio liquidity and denote it as 𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡_𝐿𝑖𝑞_𝑃𝑆𝑇. 
3.3.2.1.2 Amihud Illiquidity: 
To measure fund liquidity, we use the illiquidity measure of Amihud (2002), which is the daily ratio of 
absolute stock returns to the dollar volume of the stock. The Amihud measure is widely used in the 
literature as one of its main advantages is that it can be calculated for a large number of stocks at a daily 
frequency. It is a consistent measure of price impact and a reliable proxy for a stock’s liquidity due to 
its’ high correlation with the alternative price impact measures of liquidity which use intra‐day data 




Following Karolyi, Lee, and Van Dijk (2012) and Lee, Tseng, and Yang (2014), we add a 
constant to the Amihud measure and take the natural log to reduce the impact of outliers. We multiply 
this measure by “-1” to interpret our regression results in terms of liquidity, instead of illiquidity. 
Finally, the measure is multiplied by 106 to observe the impact of observations with a very small number 
of liquidity measure. 
 𝐴𝑚𝑖ℎ𝑢𝑑𝑖,𝑑 = [− log (1 +
| 𝑅𝑖,𝑑  |
𝑃𝑖,𝑑 𝑉𝑂𝑖,𝑑
)]  × 106 (2) 
where 𝑅𝑖,𝑑 is the return in absolute terms, 𝑃𝑖,𝑑 is the closing price, and 𝑉𝑂𝑖,𝑑 is the trading volume of 
stock i on day d. Before calculating the measure, we exclude all stock-day observations with CRSP 
reported returns less than “-1”, reported price and trading volume equal to “0” or missing, and we 
consider the absolute value of price. To obtain monthly stock liquidity, we average daily liquidity in 
every month of a year, under the condition that the stock has at least 11 daily observations per month. 
Our fund liquidity is the value weighted average of the monthly stock liquidity of all the stock holdings 
of a fund in a given month. To eliminate outliers, we winsorize this measure at the 1% and 99% levels 
and denote it as 𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡_𝐿𝑖𝑞_𝐴𝑚ℎ𝑑. 
3.3.2.1.3 Bid-Ask Spread: 
Our third proxy, bid-ask spread, is the daily quoted bid-ask spread of a stock divided by its midpoint 
(Chordia, Roll, & Subrahmanyam, 2000; Chordia, Roll, & Subrahmanyam, 2001). Bid-ask spread may 
be considered as the price the market-makers demand for providing liquidity services. Hence, a greater 
bid-ask spread signals higher stock illiquidity. We multiply this measure by “-1” to interpret our 
regression results in terms of liquidity, instead of illiquidity. 
 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑑 = [




] × −1 (3) 
where 𝐴𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑑 is the adjusted ask price, and 𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑑 is the adjusted bid price of stock i on day d. Before 
calculating the measure, we exclude all stock-day observations having CRSP reported bid or ask prices 




than 0.2% (0.002) or more than 50% (0.5). To obtain monthly stock liquidity, we average daily spread 
in every month of a year, under the condition that the stock has at least 11 daily observations per month. 
Our fund liquidity is the value weighted average of the monthly stock liquidity of all the stock holdings 
of a fund in a given month. We denote this measure as 𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡_𝐿𝑖𝑞_𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑑.  
3.3.2.2 Independent and Control Variables 
We use the female dummy as the independent variable, which is equal to “1” if the fund is single female 
managed, and “0” if it is single male managed in the given month. 
 We control for the following fund characteristics: fund size, which is the natural log of total net 
assets of the fund in millions of dollars at the end of a given month; fund return is defined as the asset-
based value weighted average of the returns of all the share classes; fund expense ratio typically includes 
accounting, administrator, advisor, auditor, board of directors, custodial, distribution (12b-1), legal, 
organizational, professional, registration, shareholder reporting, sub-advisor, and transfer agency fees, 
excluding the fund’s brokerage costs or any investor sales charges, and we measure it as the value 
weighted average of the net expense ratio of all the share classes; fund turnover ratio is the minimum 
of the fund’s dollar buys and sells during the fiscal year, scaled by the fund’s average total net assets; 
fund age is the natural log of fund age, measured as the difference between a fund’s inception year and 
the current year. We also use fund flow, defined as the net growth in total net assets of funds, as a 
percentage of their total net assets, adjusted for returns. Following Sirri and Tufano (1998), we measure 
fund flow as: 
 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡  =  
𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1(1 + 𝑅𝑖,𝑡)
𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
 (4) 
where 𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡 is the total net assets of share class i at month t, and 𝑅𝑖,𝑡  is the return of share class i 
earned in month t on assets under management. 𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 is share class i’s total net assets at the end of 





The demographic characteristics of managers may affect their decision choices; therefore, we 
control for the manager’s age and qualifications. Considering Bachelors (undergrad), Masters (grad), 
and Ph.D. (doctoral) degrees, we consider the highest degree earned by the manager. MBA is a dummy 
variable, which is equal to “1” if the manager holds a Master of Business Administration degree, and 
“0” otherwise. In our model, we include a dummy variable for professional certification, which is equal 
to “1” if the fund manager has a professional certification like CFA or CPA, and “0” otherwise. 
Following Chevalier and Ellison (1999a), we measure manager age by assuming that a manager is 21 
years old at the time of completion of his/her undergraduate degree. It is the natural log of manager age 
in years at year t.  
3.3.2.3 The Model 
The objective of this study is to analyze the relationship between fund liquidity and the gender of the 
fund manager. We run the following regression model including various controls for fund and manager 
attributes: 
 
𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡_𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽5 𝑇𝑂𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡  + 𝛽6 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡  + 𝛽7 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑_𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡  
+ 𝛽8 𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡  + 𝛽9 𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽10 𝑃ℎ𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽11 𝑀𝐵𝐴𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽12 𝐶𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑡  + 𝛽13 𝑀𝑔𝑟_𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡  + 𝑖,𝑡  
(5) 
where 𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡_𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑖,𝑡 is one of the three proxies used to measure liquidity of fund i at time t. 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡  is 
a dummy variable, which is equal to “1” if fund i is managed by a single female manager, and “0” if it 
is single male managed at time t. Fund return 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡, size 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡, expense ratio 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖,𝑡, turnover ratio 
𝑇𝑂𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡, flow 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡, and age 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑_𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 are characteristics of fund i at time t. 𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡 , 
𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡, and 𝑃ℎ𝐷𝑖,𝑡 are dummy variables, where one of them is equal to “1” depending upon the  highest 
degree earned by the manager, and the rest are equal to “0”. 𝑀𝐵𝐴𝑖,𝑡 is a dummy variable, which is equal 




variable equal to “1” if the manager of ith fund is a member of a professional certification body at time 
t, and “0” otherwise. 𝑀𝑔𝑟_𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 is used to control the age of the manager of fund i at time t.
32 
 
3.3.3 Summary Statistics 
Our final sample consists of 124,363 fund-month observations, of which 112,982 (90.85%) are for 
single male managed funds, and 11,381 (9.15%) are for single female managed funds. The total number 
of domestic equity funds in our sample is 1,932. We observe that 113 (5.85%) are only female managed 
funds and 1,658 (85.82%) are only male managed fund, whereas 161 (8.33%) are funds managed by 
single male and single female managers at different times. Overall, 86.91% funds are managed by a 
single male manager and 13.09% funds are single female managed during our sample period.33 On the 
manager level, we have 1,790 managers in our sample; 1,596 (89.16%) of them are male, and 194 
(10.84%) are female. During our sample period, the average number of funds managed by a female 
manager is 1.5 and a male manager manages 2.0 funds on average. The average number of unique male 
(female) fund managers per month is 380 (39). 
Figure 3.1 depicts the total number of single female and male managed funds in each year, from 
January 2000 to December 2017. It also plots the proportion of single female managed funds over our 
sample time period. We observe that the proportion of single female managed funds has decreased over 
our sample period from the maximum of 11.15% in 2001 to the minimum of 7.68% in 2012.34 Consistent 
with the previous studies, we notice an overall diminishing trend in the total number of single managed 
funds (Patel & Sarkissian, 2017), including male and female managed funds, which indicates higher 
preference for team managed funds in the U.S. mutual fund industry. 
  
 
32 The data of manager age contains a big number of missing observations because of the unavailability of 
graduation year of many fund managers. This reduces our sample significantly. Our main results, however, are 
not affected by the inclusion of this variable. 
33 We count the same fund twice, if it is managed by both genders. 




Figure 3.1. Distribution of Single Managed Funds by Manager Gender 
Figure 3.1 shows the total number of single male and female managed funds and the proportion of female managed funds from 




Table 3.1 displays the means and mean differences between female and male managed funds, 
regarding the fund as well as manager level characteristics used in our baseline model in Equation (5). 
The comparison of the three proxies of portfolio liquidity reports that female managed funds have a 
significantly higher Pastor, Stambaugh, and Taylor’s portfolio liquidity, as well as Amihud’s portfolio 
liquidity, than male managed funds. However, on average, there is no significant gender difference in 
the bid-ask spread’s portfolio liquidity.35 The mean of fund returns is lower for female funds than for 
male funds. We witness a significant difference in the total net assets (in millions of dollars) of female 
and male managed funds. On average, female managers manage smaller size funds compared to their 
male counterparts (Niessen-Ruenzi & Ruenzi, 2019). The average expense ratio of female funds is 
slightly higher, while the mean turnover ratio is also more than for male managed funds. Consistent 
with the literature, the findings show that female managed funds have significantly lower flows than 
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male managed funds (Niessen-Ruenzi & Ruenzi, 2019). As females manage smaller sized funds, the 
number of stocks held in their portfolio is also less than in male managed portfolios. 
Table 3.1. Summary Statistics 
This table presents average fund and manager characteristics for all observations in our sample from year 2000-2017. Column 
(1) shows descriptive statistics for all pooled observations, Column (2) for female managed funds, and Column (3) for male 
managed funds. Column (4) indicates the difference between the average characteristics of female and male managed funds. 
The number of fund-month observations is displayed in columns’ titles. 𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡_𝐿𝑖𝑞_𝑃𝑆𝑇 is a measure of monthly portfolio 
liquidity introduced by Pastor, Stambaugh, and Taylor (2020) and described in Equation (1). 𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡_𝐿𝑖𝑞_𝐴𝑚ℎ𝑑 is a measure of 
monthly portfolio liquidity which is the value weighted average of Amihud liquidity of all the stocks held by a fund at time t. 
The illiquidity measure of Amihud (2002) is the daily ratio of absolute stock return to dollar volume of the stock, described in 
Equation (2). 𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡_𝐿𝑖𝑞_𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑑 is a measure of monthly portfolio liquidity which is the value weighted average of Bid_Ask 
Spread of all the stocks held by a fund at time t. This illiquidity measure is the daily quoted bid-ask spread of a stock divided 
by its midpoint, described in Equation (3). 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if fund is single female managed at time t, 
and 0 if it is single male managed. 𝑅𝑒𝑡 is a measure of monthly fund return and equal to the value weighted average of returns 
of all the share classes of a fund at time t. 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 is a measure of monthly fund size and equal to the natural log of total net assets 
of all the share classes of a fund in million dollars at time t. 𝐸𝑥𝑝 is a measure of monthly fund expense ratio and equal to the 
value weighted average of net expense ratio of all the share classes of a fund at time t. 𝑇𝑂𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 is a measure of monthly fund 
turnover ratio and equal to the minimum of the fund’s dollar buys and sells during the fiscal year, scaled by the fund’s average 
total net assets. The annual measure is divided by 12 to convert to monthly frequency. 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤 is a measure of monthly fund 
flow and equal to the net growth in total net assets of a fund, as a percentage of its total net assets adjusted for returns at time 
t, described in Equation (4). 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑_𝐴𝑔𝑒 is a measure of monthly fund age and equal to the natural log of the difference between 
fund’s inception date and the date at time t. 𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑 is a dummy variable and equal to 1 if the undergraduate degree is the 
highest that a fund manager has earned, and 0 otherwise. 𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑑 is a dummy variable and equal to 1 if the graduate degree is 
the highest that a fund manager has earned, and 0 otherwise. 𝑃ℎ𝐷 is a dummy variable and equal to 1 if the PhD degree is the 
highest that a fund manager has earned, and 0 otherwise. 𝑀𝐵𝐴 is a dummy variable and equal to 1 if a fund manager has 
obtained a Master of Business Administration degree, and 0 otherwise. 𝐶𝑒𝑟𝑡 is a dummy variable and equal to 1 if a fund 
manager has obtained a professional qualification (e.g. CFA or CPA), and 0 otherwise. 𝑀𝑔𝑟_𝐴𝑔𝑒 is a measure of monthly 
fund manager’s age and equal to the natural log of the difference between completion date of manager’s undergraduate degree 
and the date at time t. Significance is calculated based on a two-sided t-test. ***, **, and * denote 99%, 95%, and 90% 
significance levels. 
 Sample Mean Female Funds Male Funds Difference 
 (N = 124,363) (N = 11,381) (N = 112,982) (Female-Male) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Port_Liq_PST 0.0381 0.0407 0.0378 0.0029*** 
Port_Liq_Amhd -0.0104 -0.0046 -0.0110 0.0063*** 
Port_Liq_Sprd -24.5700 -24.5597 -24.5755 0.0158 
Ret 0.0044 0.0032 0.0045 -0.0013** 
TNA (mil $) 1376.9553 678.2136 1447.3415 -769.1278*** 
Exp 0.0011 0.0012 0.0011 0.0001*** 
TOratio 0.0763 0.0774 0.0762 0.0012* 
Flow 0.6858 0.2751 0.7272 -0.4521** 
Fund_Age 14.5307 14.6777 14.5159 0.1618 
N_Stocks 112.3043 86.9736 114.8560 -27.8824*** 
Undergrad 0.8328 0.8597 0.8301 0.0296*** 
Grad 0.1402 0.1315 0.1411 -0.0096*** 
PhD 0.0257 0.0066 0.0276 -0.0210*** 
MBA 0.5735 0.5589 0.5749 -0.0160*** 
Cert 0.5807 0.6409 0.5747 0.0662*** 





Regarding managers’ characteristics, Table 3.1 shows that female fund managers are 
significantly less likely to hold a graduate or Ph.D. degree, whereas they are highly likely to hold an 
undergraduate degree as their highest earned degree. The likelihood of female fund managers holding 
an MBA degree is also less, however, having professional certification is significantly higher than for 
their male counterparts. The mean age of female fund managers is lower than that of male fund 
managers.36 
Table 3.2 presents the correlation matrix of our main variables. Panel A confirms a positive and 
significant correlation between all three measures of portfolio liquidity. This positive correlation is 
significant at the 1% level. Panel B exhibits the coefficients of correlation between all three proxies of 
portfolio liquidity, and the independent and control variables. We observe that except for 
Port_Liq_Sprd, the other two measures of portfolio liquidity are positively and significantly related to 
the Female variable. This shows that female managed funds are connected to higher liquidity, at the 1% 
level of significance. Further examination of the control variables explains that large size funds are 
more liquid because the TNA variable is positively related to the three measures of portfolio liquidity, 
and this relation is significant at the 1% level. The funds with a smaller expense ratio, and old funds (in 
age) are significantly correlated to higher portfolio liquidity. Moreover, the results show that funds 
managed by those with a graduate degree are related to higher portfolio liquidity, while those holding 
a Ph.D. degree are associated with lower liquidity. 
Finally, Panel C reports the correlation between the independent, and fund and manager-
specific control variables. We find that fund returns, fund size, number of stocks held in the portfolio, 
manager’s age, year of graduation, Ph.D., and MBA degrees are negatively and significantly correlated 
to female managed funds. The association is positive and significant for the fund expense ratio, manager 
with undergrad degree, and professional certification variables. Panel C shows that the fund and 
 
36 For female and male managed funds, we provide detailed summary statistics of fund and manager level 




manager level characteristics mentioned in our baseline model in Equation (5) are positively or 
negatively correlated to each other. 
Table 3.2. Correlation Matrix 
This table presents correlation matrix for the fund and manager characteristics from year 2000 to 2017. Panel A provides the 
results of correlation among the three measures of portfolio liquidity. Panel B presents the correlation matrix for the three 
measures of portfolio liquidity, gender of fund manager, and other fund and manager level characteristics. Panel C depicts 
correlation among the gender of fund manager, and other fund and manager level characteristics. See Table B1 in the appendix 
for the explanation of all the variables. 
Panel A. Correlation Matrix for Portfolio Liquidity Measures 
 Port_Liq_PST Port_Liq_Amhd 
Port_Liq_Amhd 0.146a  
Port_Liq_Sprd 0.056a 0.321a 
Panel B. Correlation Matrix for Portfolio Liquidity and All Variables 
 Port_Liq_PST Port_Liq_Amhd Port_Liq_Sprd 
Female 0.015a 0.048a 0.0001 
Ret -0.015a 0.002 0.101a 
TNA 0.203a 0.038a 0.043a 
Exp -0.250a -0.090a -0.089a 
TOratio -0.109a 0.016a -0.069a 
Flow 0.007b 0.003 0.004 
F_Age 0.115a 0.081a 0.136a 
N_Stocks 0.366a -0.135a -0.003 
Undergrad -0.006b -0.022a 0.006b 
Grad 0.014a 0.025a 0.007b 
PhD -0.012a -0.005c -0.027a 
MBA 0.065a -0.046a -0.017a 
Cert -0.029a 0.037a -0.005c 




Table 3.2. (continued)  
Panel C. Correlation Matrix for All Variables 
 Female Ret TNA Exp TOratio Flow F_Age N_Stocks Undergrad Grad PhD MBA Cert 
Ret -0.007b             
TNA -0.045a 0.011a            
Exp 0.042a -0.016a -0.195a           
TOratio 0.004 -0.032a -0.083a 0.205a          
Flow -0.003 -0.003 0.017a -0.008a 0.000         
F_Age 0.003 0.016a 0.245a -0.157a -0.101a 0.011a        
N_Stocks -0.035a 0.016a 0.083a -0.195a -0.067a 0.000 -0.016a       
Undergrad 0.023a 0.001 -0.082a 0.011a -0.018a -0.008a 0.012a 0.011a      
Grad -0.008a -0.001 0.094a -0.032a 0.020a 0.008a -0.004 -0.013a -0.901a     
PhD -0.038a 0.001 -0.009a 0.012a 0.001 0.000 -0.021a 0.006b -0.362a -0.066a    
MBA -0.009a 0.014a 0.073a -0.072a -0.037a 0.001 0.022a 0.107a 0.249a -0.212a -0.113a   
Cert 0.039a 0.001 -0.007a -0.070a -0.025a 0.004 0.007b -0.094a 0.061a -0.043a -0.039a 0.073a  
Age_mgr -0.012a 0.012a 0.003 0.051a -0.151a -0.005 0.145a -0.049a -0.033a -0.008b 0.110a -0.011a -0.036a 





3.4 Empirical Results and Discussion 
3.4.1 Effect of Gender on Preference for Portfolio Liquidity 
We start our empirical analysis by examining the impact of a fund manager’s gender on portfolio 
liquidity and present the results in Table 3.3. Panel A displays the results of the pooled regression, 
where each of the portfolio liquidity measures is regressed on the female dummy variable, without 
controlling for fund or manager level characteristics. To address the concern of any impact of time and 
fund related fixed factors, we include a year and fund fixed effects model, where the number of funds 
is 1,932 and we have 18 years’ data. To make the small coefficients presentable, throughout the analysis 
we measure bid-ask spread portfolio liquidity in basis points.37 The positive and significant coefficients 
for all three proxies indicate higher portfolio liquidity for female managed funds.  
 The results of Panel A may be affected by the possibility of unobserved omitted fund, as well 
as manager-specific variables. These characteristics may explain a significant portion of the variability 
in portfolio liquidity preference of fund managers. Therefore, in Panel B, we present the findings of the 
model given in Equation (5), which controls for the relevant fund and manager level attributes.38 
Columns (1) to (3) show that Pastor, Stambaugh, and Taylor’s portfolio liquidity (Port_Liq_PST) is 
significantly higher for female managed funds. The results indicate that the liquidity of female managed 
funds is 25% higher than the average liquidity of male managed funds, and this positive difference is 
significant at the 1% level.39 We also observe that fund return, expense, and turnover ratio are negatively 
related to Port_Liq_PST, whereas fund size and age are positively and significantly associated with it. 
There is no strong association between Port_Liq_PST and only manager level controls. Nevertheless, 
the combined results of all the control variables in Column (1) describe that Port_Liq_PST is 
significantly higher for the funds that are managed by managers having undergraduate or graduate 
 
37 The Port_Liq_Sprd is scaled by 104. 
38 See for example, Solomon, Soltes, and Sosyura (2014); Niessen-Ruenzi and Ruenzi (2019). 
39 The coefficients of regressions between female and the three measures of portfolio liquidity are interpreted in 
comparison with the average portfolio liquidity of male managed funds, i.e., coefficient/mean Port_Liq of male 




degrees. All these associations are significant at the 1% level and the goodness of fit of the models is 
around 84%. 
Columns (4) to (6) of Panel B display a significantly positive association between Amihud’s 
portfolio liquidity and female managed funds. The female managed funds report 11% higher 
Port_Liq_Amhd than the average liquidity of male managed funds and this positive relationship is 
significant at the 1% level. The findings in Column (4) report significantly higher Port_Liq_Amhd for 
funds with large size, higher turnover ratios, that are managed by a manager who holds an undergraduate 
or graduate or Ph.D. degree, and who has professional certification. Conversely, old funds and funds 
managed by a manager with an MBA degree have lower portfolio liquidity. The goodness of fit of these 
three models is around 62%. 
We find consistent results for the third proxy of liquidity. Columns (7) to (9) provide evidence 
that female managed funds prefer higher bid-ask spread portfolio liquidity compared to male managed 
funds. The liquidity of single female managed funds is 8% higher than the mean portfolio liquidity of 
single male managed funds and is significant at the 1% level. The fund and manager-specific control 
variables show a significant association with Port_Liq_Sprd. Similar to Port_Liq_Amhd, fund size and 
turnover ratio are positively associated with Port_Liq_Sprd, whereas fund age, expense ratio, and 
manager with an MBA degree are negatively associated with the measure. The overall goodness of fit 
of these models is around 72%.40 
  
 
40 We have a large number of missing data for the control variable of manager age, i.e. Mgr_Age. The inclusion 
of this variable significantly reduces the number of observations for our regression analysis. Although the results 




Table 3.3. Fund Manager Gender and Preference for Portfolio Liquidity 
This table presents the findings of the regression of portfolio liquidity on the gender of single managed funds. Panel A exhibits the results without the fund and manger level controls. Panel B 
shows the findings of the regression model given in Equation (5). The dependent variable is portfolio liquidity, 𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡_𝐿𝑖𝑞. We use three proxies 𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡_𝐿𝑖𝑞_𝑃𝑆𝑇, 𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡_𝐿𝑖𝑞_𝐴𝑚ℎ𝑑, and 
𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡_𝐿𝑖𝑞_𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑑 to measure portfolio liquidity. The independent variable is 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 which is equal to 1 if fund is single female managed at time t, and 0 if it is single male managed. 𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡_𝐿𝑖𝑞_𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑑 
and 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤 are measured in basis points. The results are presented with fund and year fixed effects. The t-statistics based on White robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and 
* denote 99%, 95%, and 90% significance levels. See Table B1 in the appendix for the explanation of the fund and manager level control variables. See Table B4 in the appendix for the regression 
results with the control variable of 𝑀𝑔𝑟_𝐴𝑔𝑒. 
𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡_𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5 𝑇𝑂𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑_𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8 𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9 𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽10 𝑃ℎ𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽11 𝑀𝐵𝐴𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽12 𝐶𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽13 𝑀𝑔𝑟_𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑡 
Panel A. Gender and Portfolio Liquidity without Controls 
  Port_Liq_PST Port_Liq_Amhd Port_Liq_Sprd 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Female 0.0099*** 0.0006** 1.2630*** 
 (16.69) (2.12) (3.02) 
Year-fixed Effect YES YES YES 
Fund-fixed Effect YES YES YES 
No. of Obs. 124,363 124,363 124,363 
Adj. R-squared 0.8429 0.6171 0.7205 
    
Panel B. Gender and Portfolio Liquidity with Controls 
  Port_Liq_PST   Port_Liq_Amhd   Port_Liq_Sprd 
 All controls Fund controls Manager controls  All controls Fund controls Manager controls  All controls Fund controls Manager controls 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 
Female 0.0095*** 0.0095*** 0.0099***  0.0012*** 0.0011*** 0.0008***  1.9918*** 2.092*** 1.2376*** 
 (15.44) (15.54) (16.57)  (4.05) (3.52) (2.76)  (4.40) (4.65) (2.94) 
Ret -0.0048*** -0.0048*** -  0.0024 0.0024 -  9.5592*** 9.4985*** - 
 (-3.94) (-3.98)   (1.43) (1.43)   (6.51) (6.47)  
Size 0.0054*** 0.0054*** -  0.0041*** 0.0041*** -  4.0280*** 4.0246*** - 




Panel B. Gender and Portfolio Liquidity with Controls (continued) 
 Port_Liq_PST  Port_Liq_Amhd  Port_Liq_Sprd 
 All controls Fund controls Manager controls  All controls Fund controls Manager controls  All controls Fund controls Manager controls 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 
Exp -1.6139*** -1.6079*** -  0.8876 0.8857 -  -1945.3000*** -1964.2000*** - 
 (-4.26) (-4.26)   (1.50) (1.50)   (-3.76) (-3.80)  
TOratio -0.0163*** -0.0159*** -  0.0128*** 0.0125*** -  7.0946*** 7.6553*** - 
 (-11.57) (-11.41)   (5.23) (5.11)   (5.37) (5.79)  
Flow 0.0206 0.0207 -  -0.0018 -0.0017 -  -9.0872 -8.9632 - 
 (1.06) (1.07)   (-0.77) (-0.72)   (-1.35) (-1.32)  
Fund_Age 0.0023*** 0.0021*** -  -0.0024*** -0.0023*** -  -5.8234*** -6.0324*** - 
 (4.03) (3.80)   (-5.03) (-4.84)   (-12.24) (-12.66)  
Undergrad 0.0040*** - -0.0004  0.0030* - 0.0005  -7.2871* - -2.1912 
 (3.00)  (-0.32)  (1.71)  (0.36)  (-1.71)  (-0.72) 
Grad 0.0049*** - -0.0007  0.0032* - -0.0001  -6.4583 - -2.0399 
 (3.41)  (-0.56)  (1.82)  (-0.07)  (-1.51)  (-0.67) 
PhD -0.0001 - -0.0024  0.0081*** - 0.0054***  -13.1000*** - -8.5473*** 
 (-0.05)  (-1.60)  (4.39)  (3.51)  (-2.99)  (-2.66) 
MBA 0.0002 - 0.0000  -0.0007** - -0.0011***  -0.5895** - -1.0124*** 
 (0.43)  (0.07)  (-2.22)  (-3.62)  (-2.01)  (-3.62) 
Cert 0.0004 - 0.0000  0.0008*** - 0.0016***  -0.0280 - 0.3074 
 (0.82)  (0.06)  (3.53)  (6.90)  (-0.08)  (0.96) 
Year-fixed 
Effect 
YES YES YES  YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Fund-fixed 
Effect 
YES YES YES  YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
No. of Obs. 113,855 113,855 124,363  113,855 113,855 124,363  113,855 113,855 124,363 
Adj. R-
squared 




Based on the results presented in Table 3.3, we conclude that the gender of mutual fund 
managers does affect the choice of portfolio liquidity, and female fund managers have a higher 
preference for liquidity than male managers (Ahmed & Ali, 2017). The coefficients of all three measures 
of portfolio liquidity exhibit a significantly positive relationship to female managed funds, even after 
controlling for fund and manager-specific characteristics, and including year and fund fixed effects. By 
combining the results of the three proxies of the liquidity portfolio, it is evident that the funds managed 
by single female managers are 8% to 25% more liquid than single male managed funds. Consistent with 
Pastor, Stambaugh, and Taylor (2020), the overall results demonstrate that funds with more liquid 
portfolios are larger and cheaper. The coefficients of two of the proxies indicate that funds managed by 
managers having a graduate degree are positively, while managers holding an MBA degree are 
negatively, related to portfolio liquidity.41 
3.4.1.1 Impact of Female Managers’ Preference for Portfolio Liquidity Across Investment Objectives 
Morningstar categorizes mutual funds in different investment objectives based on the type of stocks 
they invest in, e.g., growth or value stocks. The existing literature provides evidence that these 
investment styles or objectives significantly influence trading costs (Chan & Lakonishok, 1995) and a 
fund’s preference for various stock characteristics (Falkenstein, 1996). Yan (2008) tests the association 
between fund size and performance across investment styles and concludes that the negative relation 
between size and performance is more pronounced among growth and high turnover funds. Hence, we 
analyze the impact of female fund managers on portfolio liquidity across various investment objectives. 
We consider six investment objectives that represent most equity holdings. These categories 
are Growth, Aggressive growth, Growth-income, Equity-income, Income, and Small company funds. 
Our study analyzes single managed funds; therefore, we have only eight funds in the Income group. 
Due to a small number of observations, we combine Income funds with Equity-income funds. To 
explore the effect of investment styles on the relation between female fund managers and portfolio 
 
41 We run our main regression analysis by controlling for various stock-specific characteristics that may affect a 




liquidity, we include interaction terms between Female and Investment style dummy variables in the 
baseline model. For comparison, we consider Growth funds as a benchmark category. 
 Table 3.4 presents the findings of female fund managers’ preference for portfolio liquidity 
across major investment objectives, with fund and manager-specific control variables and year and fund 
fixed effects. Combining the results of all three proxies of portfolio liquidity, we document that the 
effect of female managers on portfolio liquidity is weaker for Aggressive-growth compared to the 
benchmark. As explained by Yan (2008), growth funds have a high need for immediacy in their trades 
and they tend to have short-term trading strategies. Subsequently, their liquidity is lower, or transaction 
costs are higher (Chan & Lakonishok, 1995). 
We find that the positive relation between female managers and portfolio liquidity is 
significantly lower when funds belong to the Small-company investment style. Falkenstein (1996) 
explains that Small-company funds cater for demand from investors who have preferences for small 
companies. These funds targeting small sized firms exhibit a much weaker preference for higher 
liquidity. Small stocks are illiquid and, when female managers manage funds with a Small-company 
investment objective, the higher preference for liquidity declines.  
The effects of Growth-income and Equity-income investment objectives are not conclusive due 
to the mixed significance and signs of coefficients for all three proxies of portfolio liquidity. The results 
of Table 3.4 suggest that investment styles of funds play a significant role in either strengthening or 






Table 3.4. Preference for Portfolio Liquidity by Female Fund Managers Across Styles 
This table presents the findings of the regression of portfolio liquidity on the single female managed funds across four 
investment styles. The dependent variable is portfolio liquidity, 𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡_𝐿𝑖𝑞. The variable 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 × 𝐴𝑔𝑔_𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ is the cross 
product of female fund dummy and fund’s aggressive growth style dummy variables. 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 × 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ_𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 is the cross 
product of female fund dummy and fund’s growth income style dummy variables. 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 × 𝐸𝑄_𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 is the cross product 
of female fund dummy and fund’s equity income style dummy variables. 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 × 𝑆𝑚_𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝 is the cross product of female 
fund dummy and fund’s small company style dummy variables. Female×Growth is the benchmark category. 𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡_𝐿𝑖𝑞_𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑑 
and 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤 are measured in basis points. The results are presented with fund and year fixed effects. The t-statistics based on 
White robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote 99%, 95%, and 90% significance levels. See 
Table B1 in the appendix for the explanation of all the variables. 
𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡_𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 × 𝐴𝑔𝑔_𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 × 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ_𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽4 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 × 𝐸𝑄_𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 × 𝑆𝑚_𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡  + 𝑖,𝑡 
  Port_Liq_PST Port_Liq_Amhd Port_Liq_Sprd 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Female 0.0121*** 0.0017*** 2.4455*** 
 (14.53) (4.76) (4.53) 
Female×Agg_Growth 0.0008 -0.0012* -3.5139*** 
 (0.51) (-1.66) (-2.68) 
Female×Growth_Income 0.0018 -0.0017*** 1.0368 
 (0.83) (-3.76) (0.66) 
Female×EQ_Income -0.0116*** 0.0026*** -0.7520 
 (-5.45) (3.98) (-0.36) 
Female×Sm_Comp -0.0143*** -0.0029** -3.1656** 
 (-15.85) (-2.10) (-2.46) 
Ret -0.0048*** 0.0024 9.5655*** 
 (-3.92) (1.43) (6.52) 
Size 0.0054*** 0.0041*** 4.0321*** 
 (41.99) (24.22) (30.11) 
Exp -1.6159*** 0.8906 -1934.5000*** 
 (-4.27) (1.51) (-3.74) 
TOratio -0.0164*** 0.0128*** 7.0292*** 
 (-11.62) (5.22) (5.32) 
Flow 0.0209 -0.0019 -0.0009 
 (1.07) (-0.80) (-1.34) 
Fund_Age 0.0023*** -0.0024*** -5.8203*** 
 (4.12) (-5.01) (-12.23) 
Undergrad -0.0052*** 0.0010 -9.4537** 
 (-4.47) (0.54) (-2.12) 
Grad -0.0042*** 0.0013 -8.5747* 
 (-3.38) (0.66) (-1.92) 
PhD -0.0098*** 0.0063*** -15.3000*** 
 (-6.68) (3.08) (-3.35) 
MBA 0.0000 -0.0007** -0.5906** 
 (0.10) (-2.23) (-2.01) 
Cert 0.0003 0.0008*** -0.0562 
 (0.64) (3.42) (-0.17) 
Year-fixed Effect YES YES YES 
Fund-fixed Effect YES YES YES 
No. of Obs. 113,855 113,855 113,855 




3.4.1.2 Impact of Female Managers’ Preference for Portfolio Liquidity Over Time 
Bennett, Sias, and Starks (2003) report a shift in the preferences of institutional investors from large 
capitalization stocks to smaller and riskier stocks. They suggest that over time institutional investors 
have moved towards smaller securities because these stocks offer “green pastures”. Keeping this view 
in mind, we expect a change in the preference for portfolio liquidity by female fund managers over 
time. The aggregate change in the preferences of all the classes of institutional investors may affect the 
positive relation between female fund managers and portfolio liquidity during our sample time window. 
Over time, we may expect the strength of this relationship to move either in a positive or 
negative direction. On the one hand, we have documented the fact of a diminishing proportion of single 
female managed funds in our sample from 2000 to 2017. This is a signal that there are few female 
managers who are solely responsible for making all the investment decisions. Due to the pressure of 
continuous scrutiny by investors, competitors, and the media they are likely to increase their preference 
for holding more liquid stocks in the portfolio, which helps them to trade with a lower transaction cost 
and sell these stocks quickly when the market is volatile. On the other hand, as explained by Niessen-
Ruenzi and Ruenzi (2019) and presented in the descriptive statistics of our study, female managed funds 
receive lower flows from investors compared to male managed funds. In this situation, the female 
preference for holding more liquid stocks in the portfolio will contribute to a decreased fund return and 
performance. Ultimately, this can be damaging for their reputation and career. Subsequently, they may 
choose to reduce their preference for portfolio liquidity over time. 
To test these assumptions, we create a Trend variable for the years from 2000 to 2017. In our 
baseline model, we introduce an interaction term between the Female and Trend variables; the outcomes 
are shown in Table 3.5. In column (1), the positive and significant coefficient of the interaction term 
indicates that the preference of female fund managers for Pastor, Stambaugh, and Taylor’s portfolio 
liquidity is getting stronger over time and they are highly inclined towards holding liquid stocks. In 
contrast, the negative coefficients of the interaction term in columns (2) and (3) show that, over time, 




liquidity measures. The coefficients of the three measures of portfolio liquidity are contradictory, 
rendering them inconclusive regarding the strengthening or weakening of the impact of female 
managers on portfolio liquidity over time.  
Table 3.5. Preference for Portfolio Liquidity by Female Fund Managers Over Time 
This table presents the findings of the regression of portfolio liquidity on the single female managed funds over time during 
our sample period. The dependent variable is portfolio liquidity, 𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡_𝐿𝑖𝑞. The variable 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 × 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 is the cross product 
of female fund dummy variable and yearly trend variable. The trend variable takes the value 1 for year 2000 and increases 
annually till year 2017. 𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡_𝐿𝑖𝑞_𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑑 and 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤 are measured in basis points. The results are presented with fund and year 
fixed effects. The t-statistics based on White robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote 99%, 
95%, and 90% significance levels. See Table B1 in the appendix for the explanation of all the variables. 
𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡_𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 × 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡  + 𝑖,𝑡 
  Port_Liq_PST Port_Liq_Amhd Port_Liq_Sprd 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Female 0.0074*** 0.0041*** 3.6907*** 
 (7.84) (8.55) (4.84) 
Female×Trend 0.0003*** -0.0004*** -0.2288*** 
 (3.80) (-6.95) (-3.25) 
Ret -0.0048*** 0.0024 9.5808*** 
 (-3.97) (1.45) (6.53) 
Size 0.0054*** 0.0041*** 4.0134*** 
 (41.98) (24.08) (30.03) 
Exp -1.6003*** 0.8686 -1956.7000*** 
 (-4.21) (1.47) (-3.79) 
TOratio -0.0162*** 0.0126*** 6.9869*** 
 (-11.51) (5.16) (5.29) 
Flow 0.0206 -0.0019 -0.0009 
 (1.06) (-0.78) (-1.36) 
Fund_Age 0.0023*** -0.0024*** -5.8237*** 
 (4.03) (-5.04) (-12.24) 
Undergrad 0.0031** 0.0043** -6.5232 
 (2.26) (2.33) (-1.56) 
Grad 0.0040*** 0.0044** -5.6977 
 (2.70) (2.43) (-1.36) 
PhD -0.0010 0.0095*** -12.3000*** 
 (-0.63) (4.90) (-2.85) 
MBA 0.0001 -0.0007** -0.5743** 
 (0.38) (-2.13) (-1.96) 
Cert 0.0003 0.0009*** 0.0031 
 (0.74) (3.75) (0.01) 
Year-fixed Effect YES YES YES 
Fund-fixed Effect YES YES YES 
No. of Obs. 113,855 113,855 113,855 





3.4.2 Female Fund Managers and Preference for Portfolio Liquidity 
To explain female fund managers’ preference for liquidity, we develop and test two contrasting 
hypotheses. For the excessive trading hypothesis, H1a, we measure aggressive trading by using the 
proxy of the fund Turnover ratio (Niessen-Ruenzi & Ruenzi, 2019). The fund turnover ratio is the 
minimum of the fund’s dollar buys and sells during the fiscal year, scaled by the fund’s average total 
net assets. The higher turnover ratio depicts excessive trading by the fund. To examine the relation 
between a fund manager’s gender and trading style, we run the model given in Equation (6).42 
 
𝑇𝑂𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡  
+ 𝛽6 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑_𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡  + 𝛽7 𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡  + 𝛽8 𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9 𝑃ℎ𝐷𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽10 𝑀𝐵𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽11 𝐶𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑡  + 𝛽12 𝑀𝑔𝑟_𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡  +  𝑖,𝑡 
(6) 
where the variables are as defined in Section 3.3.  
Table 3.6, columns (1) and (2) display the results with all fund and manager level control 
variables, as well as the year and fund fixed effects. Consistent with the literature, we find that female 
fund managers are less likely to be involved in excessive trading compared to their male counterparts. 
Our excessive trading hypothesis assumes that more overconfident male fund managers exhibit a high 
preference for liquidity to avoid high transaction costs resulting from aggressive trading. Our findings 
do not support this conjecture and provide empirical evidence that funds managed by single female 
managers tend to prefer higher portfolio liquidity compared to male managed funds.  
We then test our price efficiency hypothesis, H1b, which expects that females’ preference for 
information transparency explains their tendency to hold more liquid stocks in the portfolio. The 
literature on stock price efficiency describes that if the information environment of a firm is opaque, 
the stock price response to information is delayed. Callen, Khan, and Lu (2013) explain that due to a 
firm’s uncertain environment and poor quality of accounting/financial information, its stock price will 
be more delayed in incorporating newly arriving value-relevant information. Hence, in our study, we 
 




assume that female fund managers are more likely to hold stocks whose prices have less delay in 
responding to the new information. 
Following Hou and Moskowitz (2005), we measure the delay variable. Firstly, from CRSP we 
obtain daily returns of all the stocks held by single managed funds in our sample from January 2000 to 
December 2017. Since our focus is to obtain weekly returns, we allocate a unique “week_id” to the 
daily dates that belong to a week from Wednesday to the following Tuesday. We take the natural 
logarithm of daily stock returns to convert them into continuous returns. We define weekly returns as 
the sum of daily continuous returns for every unique “week_id”, and then convert them to simple weekly 
returns. The weekly market return from Fama and French (1993) is employed as the relevant news to 
which a stock responds.43 As the measure of price delay requires a year of prior weekly returns history 
(52-weeks), our calculation begins from 1999. We consider the past 52 weeks of returns corresponding 
to the last week of every month. Moreover, we exclude firm-year-month observations if 25 weeks out 
of past 52 weekly stock returns are missing. To obtain the monthly Delay variable, at the end of every 
month of a year we run two regressions: first, for each stock’s weekly returns on the contemporaneous 
market return; and second, for each stock’s weekly returns on four weeks of lagged market returns over 
the past year. 
 𝑟𝑗,𝑡 = α𝑗 + 𝛽𝑗𝑅𝑚,𝑡 + 𝑗,𝑡 (7) 




+ 𝑗,𝑡 (8) 
where 𝑟𝑗,𝑡 is the return on stock j in week t, 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 is the market return in week t, and 𝑅𝑚,𝑡−𝑛 is the lagged 
market return from week t-1 to week t-4. If the stock responds rapidly to market news, 𝛽𝑗 significantly 
differs from zero, but none of the 𝛿𝑗
(−𝑛)
 will be different from zero. If the stock’s price responds with a 
lag, then some of the 𝛿𝑗
(−𝑛)
 will be significantly different from zero.  
 




Using the estimated R2 from the regressions in Equations (7) and (8), we compute the measure 
of the monthly Price Delay for each stock as follows: 












2  is from the regression in Equation (7), which restricts 𝛿𝑗
(−𝑛)
=0 for lagged 
weekly market returns. 𝑅2 is from the regression in Equation (8), with no restrictions.  
In our study, we measure portfolio delay as the value weighted average of the monthly stock 
price delay of all the stock holdings of a fund in a given month. A higher value of this variable indicates 
that prices of majority of the stocks held in a portfolio are less efficient and incorporate new information 
with a delay. Whereas, if portfolio stocks’ prices respond quickly, the value of delay variable is lower.  
We denote this measure as 𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑦 and run the model given in Equation (10). 
 
𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑦𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡  
+ 𝛽6 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑_𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡  + 𝛽7 𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡  + 𝛽8 𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9 𝑃ℎ𝐷𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽10 𝑀𝐵𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽11 𝐶𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑡  + 𝛽12 𝑀𝑔𝑟_𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡  +  𝑖,𝑡 
(10) 
where 𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑦𝑖,𝑡 is the value weighted average delay of fund i in month t. The other variables are as 
defined in Section 3.3. 
 Table 3.6, Columns (3) and (4) show the findings of the regression model given in Equation 
(10) with fund and year fixed effects, and control variables. The results provide empirical evidence that 
funds managed by single female managers significantly reduce holding those stocks whose prices are 
not efficient in integrating available information. Consistent with the literature, female managers are 
more inclined towards price efficient stocks, and it signals their preference for firms with a good quality 
information environment. Hence, we cannot reject the price efficiency hypothesis, and conclude that 






Table 3.6. Reason for Higher Portfolio Liquidity Preference of Female Fund Managers 
Table 3.6, Columns (1) and (2) present the findings of the regression of fund turnover on the single female managed funds. 
The dependent variable is monthly turnover ratio, 𝑇𝑂𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜. Columns (3) and (4) report the findings of the regression of 
portfolio stock prices’ delay on the single female managed funds. The dependent variable is monthly portfolio delay, 𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑦, 
which is the value weighted average of price delay of all the stocks held by a fund at time t. The price delay measure i s one 
minus the ratio of the restricted R2 over the unrestricted R2. The independent variable is 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 which is equal to 1 if fund is 
single female managed at time t, and 0 if it is single male managed. 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤 is measured in basis points. The results are presented 
with fund and year fixed effects. The t-statistics based on White robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, 
and * denote 99%, 95%, and 90% significance levels. See Table B1 in the appendix for the explanation of all the variables. 
𝑇𝑂𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡  + 𝑖,𝑡 
𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑦𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡  + 𝑖,𝑡 
  TOratio   Delay 
 All controls with 
manager age 
All controls without 
manager age 
 All controls with 
manager age 
All controls without 
manager age 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Female -0.0058*** -0.0020*  -0.0072** -0.0095*** 
 (-3.54) (-1.96)  (-2.41) (-5.57) 
Ret 0.0066 0.0009  -0.0183** -0.0203*** 
 (1.29) (0.25)  (-2.27) (-3.62) 
Size -0.0079*** -0.0059***  -0.0072*** -0.0064*** 
 (-9.88) (-14.50)  (-9.44) (-13.83) 
Exp 19.9253*** 20.3350***  18.8691*** 11.5427*** 
 (3.73) (7.89)  (6.22) (6.32) 
Flow 0.0438 0.0205  -0.0080 -0.0106 
 (1.46) (1.03)  (-0.14) (-0.22) 
Fund_Age -0.0058*** -0.0075***  0.0153*** 0.0159*** 
 (-3.71) (-6.37)  (6.01) (9.49) 
Undergrad 0.0216*** 0.1363***  0.0213** 0.0563*** 
 (6.75) (6.01)  (2.47) (3.78) 
Grad 0.0222*** 0.1468***  0.0122 0.0518*** 
 (7.60) (6.45)  (1.48) (3.47) 
PhD 0.0000 0.1019***  0.0000 0.0508*** 
 - (4.47)  - (3.32) 
MBA 0.0077*** -0.0031***  -0.0001 0.0015 
 (5.78) (-3.96)  (-0.05) (1.27) 
Cert -0.0076*** -0.0028***  0.0110*** 0.0035*** 
 (-5.18) (-3.27)  (4.24) (2.67) 
Mgr_Age -0.0258*** -  -0.0056 - 
 (-7.26)   (-0.86)  
Year-fixed 
Effect 
YES YES  YES YES 
Fund-fixed 
Effect 
YES YES  YES YES 
No. of Obs. 55,253 113,855  55,253 113,855 






3.5 Endogeneity Issues 
The issue of non-random selection of female fund managers is obvious in our study. To address the 
concern that fund companies might assign female managers to funds that are more liquid, or females’ 
self-selection of more liquid funds, we apply various approaches to mitigate any endogeneity concerns. 
In this section, we use the full sample as well as a sub-sample of funds that experience replacement of 
one manager with another manager. This sub-sample of “transition funds” consists of all fund-month 
observations of those funds experiencing at least one event of transition from either male to male, male 
to female, female to male, or female to female. 
 
3.5.1 Propensity Score Matching and Univariate Analysis 
Following Faccio, Marchica, and Mura (2016), we compare the liquidity of funds managed by female 
managers to the liquidity of a (propensity score) matched sample of peers run by male managers, that 
are indistinguishable in terms of various fund, as well as manager level characteristics. Each pair of 
matched funds manifests no observable differences in relevant attributes except for the gender of the 
manager.  
To apply this methodology, we consider female managed funds as a treatment group, and male 
managed funds (within similar investment objective and date as the treatment group) belonging to a 
control group. We calculate propensity scores by running a probit regression where the dependent 
variable is a dummy and takes the value equal to “1” if the fund belongs to the treatment group, or “0” 
if the fund is from the control group. We consider the fund level characteristics as independent variables, 
i.e., fund return, fund size, expense ratio, turnover ratio, flow, and fund age. Particularly, the propensity 
score is estimated within the same fund investment objective and date. To find an adequately precise 
nearest neighbor match (with replacement) between the female managed funds and the peer funds in 
the control group, we only consider the pairs where the maximum difference between their propensity 
scores does not exceed 0.01 in the absolute term. Additionally, we select the unique pair with minimum 




treatment and control groups. We find that the majority of the coefficients of fund level characteristics 
lose their significance, which confirms that the matched pairs are almost the same regarding their fund 
related attributes. 
Table 3.7, Panel A reports the comparison of Port_Liq_PST, Port_Liq_Amhd, and 
Port_Liq_Sprd with the matched samples. The results show that average portfolio liquidity (for the three 
measures) of funds managed by female managers is higher than the portfolio liquidity of male managed 
funds, even when other relevant characteristics between the fund pairs are virtually equal. All mean 
differences in portfolio liquidity between the two groups are significant at the 1% level. Hence, we 
suggest that the gender-related differences in portfolio liquidity do not result from the observable 
differences in fund characteristics. In addition to the fund characteristics, there are also some observable 
manager-specific characteristics. Therefore, we obtain the propensity score as a function of fund and 
manager level characteristics (i.e., undergrad, grad, Ph.D., MBA, cert, and manager age), within the 
same fund investment objectives and date. Table 3.7, Panel B presents the comparison of portfolio 
liquidity between the matched funds, and the results support the outcomes in Panel A. 
We implement the same propensity score matching approach to the sub-sample of transition 
funds. This sub-sample consists of all fund-month observations of those funds experiencing at least one 
event of transition from either male to male, male to female, female to male, or female to female. We 
consider only those transition funds where a manager is managing the fund at least for 13 months, after 
transition. All the fund-month observations are considered as the treatment group when these transition 
funds are managed by single female. When the transition funds are single male managed (within similar 
investment objective and date as the treatment group), they belong to the control group. As mentioned 
earlier, we calculate probability (propensity score) as a function of fund level, and then fund and 
manager level characteristics. The propensity score is estimated within the same fund investment 
objective and date. All other conditions are the same to match the treatment fund with an identical 





Table 3.7. Propensity Score Matching and Univariate Analysis for Female Managed Funds 
This table presents the results of the propensity score matching approach and the univariate regression analysis of the three 
measures of portfolio liquidity and matched female and male managed funds. The propensity score is estimated within the 
same investment objective and time. Applying propensity scores to the whole sample, Panel A and B report the comparison of 
portfolio liquidity between the two gender groups that are similar in only fund level characteristics, and fund as well as manager 
level characteristics, respectively. Using propensity scores for the transition funds sample, Panel C and D show the comparison 
of portfolio liquidity between the two gender groups that are similar in only fund level characteristics, and fund as well as 
manager level characteristics, respectively. Significance is calculated based on a two-sided t-test. Panel E presents the findings 
of the univariate regression of portfolio liquidity on the female and matched male managed transition fund. The dependent 
variable is portfolio liquidity. The independent variable is 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 which is equal to 1 if transition fund belongs to the 
Treatment group, and 0 if it belongs to the matched Control group. 𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡_𝐿𝑖𝑞_𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑑 is measured in basis points. The t-statistics 
based on White robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote 99%, 95%, and 90% significance 
levels. See Table B1 in the appendix for the explanation of all the variables 
Panel A. Propensity Score Matching using Fund Level Characteristics – All funds 
  Mean-Female Funds Mean-Male Funds Difference t-statistic 
 (N=10,282) (N=10,282) (Female-Male)  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Port_Liq_PST 0.0409 0.0353 0.00562*** 7.02 
Port_Liq_Amhd -0.00482 -0.0135 0.0087*** 18.51 
Port_Liq_Sprd -25.8000 -29.1000 3.3000*** 6.35 
Panel B. Propensity Score Matching using Fund and Manager Level Characteristics – All funds 
  Mean-Female Funds Mean-Male Funds Difference t-statistic 
 (N=4,946) (N=4,946) (Female-Male)  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Port_Liq_PST 0.0489 0.0367 0.0122*** 9.89 
Port_Liq_Amhd -0.0053 -0.0136 0.00834*** 12.05 
Port_Liq_Sprd -25.8000 -30.1000 4.3000*** 5.19 
Panel C. Propensity Score Matching using Fund Level Characteristics – Transition funds 
  Mean-Female Funds Mean-Male Funds Difference t-statistic 
 (N=5,267) (N=5,267) (Female-Male)  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Port_Liq_PST 0.0523 0.0427 0.00952*** 8.05 
Port_Liq_Amhd -0.00291 -0.00814 0.00523*** 10.81 
Port_Liq_Sprd -22.6000 -26.2000 3.6000*** 5.18 
Panel D. Propensity Score Matching using Fund and Manager Level Characteristics – Transition 
funds 
  Mean-Female Funds Mean-Male Funds Difference t-statistic 
 (N=2,155) (N=2,155) (Female-Male)  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Port_Liq_PST 0.0638 0.0562 0.00759*** 2.78 
Port_Liq_Amhd -0.0041 -0.00674 0.00264*** 4.11 
Port_Liq_Sprd -27.1000 -29.4000 2.3000** 1.99 




Table 3.7. (continued) 
Panel E. Univariate Regression of Propensity Score Matched Transition Funds 
  Fund level Characteristics   Fund and Manager level Characteristics 
 Port_Liq_PST Port_Liq_Amhd Port_Liq_Sprd  Port_Liq_PST Port_Liq_Amhd Port_Liq_Sprd 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Female 0.0095*** 0.0052*** 3.5666***  0.0076*** 0.0026*** 2.3443** 
 (8.05) (10.81) (5.18)  (2.78) (4.11) (1.99) 
Constant 0.0428*** -0.0081*** -26.2000***  0.0562*** -0.0067*** -29.4000*** 
 (51.14) (-23.78) (-53.83)  (29.12) (-14.82) (-35.26) 
No. of 
Obs. 
10,534 10,534 10,534  4,310 4,310 4,310 
Adj. R-
squared 
0.0060 0.0109 0.0025  0.0016 0.0037 0.0007 
 
The findings presented in Table 3.7, Panels C and D are consistent with the earlier results. The 
comparison of the three proxies of portfolio liquidity confirms that even transition funds managed by 
females tend to hold more liquid portfolios compared to the otherwise matched male managed transition 
funds, even when the observable characteristics between the pairs are virtually identical. 
Finally, following Huang and Kisgen (2013), we run univariate regressions on the matched 
sample of transition funds to examine the gender differences in portfolio liquidity. Table 3.7, Panel E 
reports that, in comparison with the matched male managed funds, female managed transition funds are 
positively and significantly associated with all three proxies of portfolio liquidity. Columns (1) to (3) 
are the regression results for the propensity score matched funds that are indistinguishable regarding 
the fund level characteristics, whereas Columns (4) to (6) are the findings of the matched funds with 
respect to fund and manager level characteristics. 
 
3.5.2 Pooled Regression Analysis of Transition Funds 
Following Faccio, Marchica, and Mura (2016), we run a traditional panel regression analysis on all 
fund-month observations of the transition funds by including the controls.44 Omission of these controls 
 
44 It is not the matched sample. This regression is run to examine the association of female fund managers and 




might lead us to wrongly attribute the differences in portfolio liquidity to the disparities in fund manager 
gender. We control for time-invariant fund specific characteristics that might be correlated with omitted 
explanatory variables. Specifically, in the fixed effects regressions, we compare fund managers of 
different genders managing the same fund. Moreover, the transitions might be accompanied by changes 
in fund manager characteristics, other than gender. If we do not consider the effects of manager level 
characteristics on portfolio liquidity, we may wrongly attribute the change in portfolio liquidity 
observed at the time of a transition to gender. Hence, we run panel regression analysis with fund and 
year fixed effects, controlling for fund and manager-specific observable characteristics. We restrict our 
sample to the funds experiencing either male to female, or female to male transitions only. 
The findings in Table 3.8, Panel A exhibit a significantly positive relationship between female 
managed funds and the three proxies of portfolio liquidity. The observable fund and manager level 
characteristics show significant association with the measures of portfolio liquidity. However, with all 
the controls and fixed effects, the results reveal that portfolio liquidity is higher when the fund is 
managed by a female manager than when the same fund is managed by a male manager. 
Following Huang and Kisgen (2013), we repeat the above applied panel regression analysis 
with fixed effects and controls. For this analysis, we include in our sample all the funds experiencing 
either male to male, female to female, male to female, or female to male transitions during our sample 
period. The results of Table 3.8, Panel B strongly support the evidence of the higher preference in 
female managed funds for portfolio liquidity. This analysis mitigates the concerns that our findings 





Table 3.8. Female Fund Manager and Preference for Portfolio Liquidity of Transition Funds 
This table presents the findings of the regression of portfolio liquidity on the single female managed transition funds, the model 
is given in Equation (5). Panel A reports the results from Male to Female and Female to Male transition funds. Panel B shows 
the regression results using panel observations of all the transition funds, including Male to Female, Female to Male, Male to 
Male, and Female to Female. The dependent variable is portfolio liquidity, 𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡_𝐿𝑖𝑞. 𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡_𝐿𝑖𝑞_𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑑 and 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤 are measured 
in basis points. The results are presented with fund and year fixed effects. The t-statistics based on White robust standard errors 
are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote 99%, 95%, and 90% significance levels. See Table B1 in the appendix for 
the explanation of all the variables. 
Panel A. Regression Analysis of Male to Female and Female to Male Transition Funds 


























  (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6) 
Female 0.0105*** 0.0110***  0.0014* 0.0008**  2.0359** 0.2907 
 (7.26) (14.89)  (1.91) (2.20)  (2.13) (0.62) 
Ret -0.0056 -0.0087*  0.0072 0.0017  19.2000*** 14.7000*** 
 (-0.79) (-1.80)  (1.27) (0.51)  (3.19) (3.68) 
Size 0.0034*** 0.0053***  0.0056*** 0.0031***  6.4965*** 3.2863*** 
 (4.49) (13.18)  (7.60) (10.79)  (7.98) (8.97) 
Exp -24.0376*** -10.6622***  5.6796** 4.1629***  -4386.3000 -1654.3000 
 (-4.43) (-3.79)  (2.49) (2.96)  (-1.30) (-0.89) 
TOratio -0.0550*** -0.0488***  0.0308*** 0.0065***  12.3000 3.0688 
 (-3.33) (-8.48)  (5.22) (3.37)  (1.29) (0.94) 
Flow -0.0398 -0.0363  0.0148 0.0044  -0.0004 -0.0022 
 (-0.31) (-0.09)  (0.45) (0.82)  (-0.04) (-0.40) 
Fund_Age 0.0444*** 0.0255***  -0.0069*** -0.0024***  -11.9000*** -6.1508*** 
 (12.62) (14.06)  (-4.94) (-2.96)  (-3.83) (-3.91) 
Undergrad -0.0122*** -0.0089***  0.0044*** 0.0034**  -3.3749 -13.1000*** 
 (-3.16) (-2.81)  (3.92) (2.41)  (-1.16) (-2.81) 
Grad 0.0070* -0.0058*  0.0084*** 0.0061***  1.7614 -10.4000** 
 (1.69) (-1.74)  (4.89) (4.05)  (0.63) (-2.21) 
PhD 0.0000 -0.0275***  0.0000 0.0288***  0.0000 -31.6000*** 
 -   (-7.10)  -   (6.74)  -   (-5.27) 
MBA 0.0179*** 0.0072***  -0.0006 0.00005  3.6683*** 1.7126*** 
 (10.16) (8.78)  (-0.58) (0.10)  (3.19) (3.33) 
Cert 0.0466*** 0.0090***  0.0025* 0.0023***  1.4353 -1.0359 
 (19.39) (8.47)  (1.75) (4.38)  (1.03) (-1.54) 
Mgr_Age -0.0288*** -  -0.0045** -  -4.1164 - 
 (-5.81)   (-2.37)   (-1.02)  
Year-fixed Effect YES YES   YES YES   YES YES 
Fund-fixed Effect YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
No. of Obs. 5,961 12,095  5,961 12,095  5,961 12,095 





Table 3.8. (continued) 
Panel B. Regression Analysis of Male to Female, Female to Male, Male to Male, and Female to 
Female Transition Funds 






















  (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6) 
Female 0.0084*** 0.0124***  0.0020*** 0.0006**  2.3727*** 1.4103*** 
 (5.80) (18.46)  (3.06) (2.17)  (2.75) (3.10) 
Ret -0.0094*** -0.0066***  0.0037 -0.0002  9.4526*** 7.5954*** 
 (-2.64) (-3.01)  (1.07) (-0.09)  (2.88) (3.68) 
Size 0.0089*** 0.0066***  0.0054*** 0.0030***  4.8834*** 3.3744*** 
 (18.14) (30.25)  (12.66) (15.49)  (12.95) (17.96) 
Exp 0.9191 -0.8512  1.0279 1.4092  807.7000 -135.0000 
 (0.99) (-1.24)  (0.92) (1.57)  (0.72) (-0.17) 
TOratio -0.0237*** -0.0398***  0.0322*** 0.0193***  24.0000*** 14.9000*** 
 (-4.87) (-16.11)  (9.56) (12.68)  (7.44) (7.00) 
Flow -0.0206 0.0107  0.0002 -0.0042*  -0.0004 -0.0009 
 (-0.31) (0.15)  (0.01) (-2.02)  (-0.24) (-0.38) 
Fund_Age 0.0235*** 0.0067***  -0.0098*** -0.0043***  -10.2000*** -5.7300*** 
 (11.09) (6.80)  (-9.71) (-7.59)  (-7.20) (-7.75) 
Undergrad 0.0179*** 0.0110***  -0.0014 0.0053***  0.8548 -11.3000** 
 (5.74) (6.78)  (-1.39) (3.57)  (0.36) (-2.40) 
Grad 0.0044 0.0103***  -0.0020*** 0.0049***  0.5707 -11.5000** 
 (1.53) (5.86)  (-2.83) (3.26)  (0.26) (-2.42) 
PhD 0.0000 0.0071***  0.0000 0.0105***  0.0000 -17.2000*** 
 -   (3.90)  -   (6.46)  -   (-3.56) 
MBA -0.0034*** -0.0006  -0.0037*** -0.0023***  -3.0067*** -1.4303*** 
 (-3.26) (-1.44)  (-5.21) (-8.01)  (-3.82) (-4.59) 
Cert 0.0099*** 0.0011**  0.0004 0.0012***  0.5817 0.7510** 
 (8.20) (2.27)  (0.91) (4.74)  (0.91) (2.06) 
Mgr_Age 0.0111*** -  -0.0002 -  0.2020 - 
 (4.13)   (-0.10)   (0.10)  
Year-fixed 
Effect 
YES YES   YES YES   YES YES 
Fund-fixed 
Effect 
YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
No. of 
Obs. 
21,886 47,518  21,886 47,518  21,886 47,518 
Adj. R-
squared 






3.5.3 Difference-in-Differences Regression Analysis Considering Transition Events 
We apply a difference-in-differences approach for our empirical examination comparing portfolio 
liquidity before and after transitions from a male to female fund manager with a control sample of male 
to male transition funds (Huang & Kisgen, 2013). We refer to the treatment group of funds with male 
to female transition as Female_Trans. The sample for this analysis is twelve months before and twelve 
months after a transition, excluding the month when transition occurs. We require a fund manager to be 
solely managing the fund for at least twelve months (the month he or she is hired and the eleven months 
following) to ensure that the manager has enough time to make important changes in portfolio 
composition. We exclude a transition event if observations are missing for twelve months before or 
after the transition. We run regression on the model given in Equation (11) with controls, and time and 
fund fixed effects: 
 
𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡_𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑖,𝑡+1 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒_𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡+1 + 𝛽2 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡+1 + 𝛽3 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽4 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6 𝑇𝑂𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽8 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑_𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9 𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡  + 𝛽10 𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽11 𝑃ℎ𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽12 𝑀𝐵𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽13 𝐶𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑡                               
(11) 
where 𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡_𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑖,𝑡+1 is one of the three measures of portfolio liquidity measured at the end of month 
t+1. 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒_𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖 is a dummy variable which is equal to “1” if fund i is a male to female transition 
fund, and “0” if the fund is a male to male transition fund. 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡+1is a dummy variable which is equal 
to “1” if month t+1 is after the transition, and “0” if it is before the transition. 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒_𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖 ×
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡+1 is an interaction term between transition funds and Post variables. Time t+1 presents the 
months after transition, whereas t shows one month lagged observations of control variables, excluding 






Table 3.9. Difference-in-Differences Regression for Transition Funds 
This table presents the findings of the difference-in-differences regression of portfolio liquidity after the event of Male to 
Female transition. The dependent variable is portfolio liquidity, 𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡_𝐿𝑖𝑞. 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒_𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠 is a dummy variable which is equal 
to 1 if fund is a male to female transition fund, and 0 if the fund is a male to male transition fund. 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 is a dummy variable 
which is equal to 1 if month t+1 is after the transition, and 0 if it is before the transition. 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒_𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 is the cross 
product of transition funds and Post variables. 𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡_𝐿𝑖𝑞_𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑑 and 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤 are measured in basis points. The results are presented 
with and without fund and year fixed effects. The t-statistics based on White robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
***, **, and * denote 99%, 95%, and 90% significance levels. See Table B1 in the appendix for the explanation of all the 
variables. 
𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡_𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑖,𝑡+1 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒_𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡+1 + 𝛽2 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡+1 + 𝛾 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡  + 𝑖,𝑡 
  Port_Liq_PST   Port_Liq_Amhd   Port_Liq_Sprd 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6) 
Female_Trans×Post 0.0133*** 0.0069***  0.0041*** 0.0001  1.5754*** 1.3554 
 (5.12) (6.02)  (6.17) (0.19)  (2.78) (1.26) 
Post -0.0027** -0.0011**  -0.0004 0.0002  0.9383*** 2.6364*** 
 (-2.18) (-2.28)  (-0.78) (0.50)  (2.83) (8.43) 
Ret -0.0253** -0.0060  -0.0048 0.0007  -6.4226 7.1154** 
 (-2.29) (-1.57)  (-0.66) (0.17)  (-1.38) (2.03) 
Size 0.0043*** 0.0056***  -0.0003** 0.0065***  0.6694*** 5.3207*** 
 (10.10) (10.30)  (-2.43) (8.07)  (4.94) (10.70) 
Exp -28.4981*** -0.8991  -1.7258** -4.0899***  139.8000 1085.7000 
 (-8.75) (-1.05)  (-2.25) (-3.81)  (0.28) (0.64) 
TOratio -0.1251*** -0.0448***  0.0406*** 0.0084***  19.9000*** 3.6957 
 (-17.63) (-9.18)  (12.99) (2.64)  (8.99) (1.08) 
Flow 0.0266 0.0043  -0.0070 -0.0025  -0.0002 -0.0004 
 (0.85) (0.21)  (-0.47) (-1.47)  (-1.22) (-0.26) 
Fund_Age -0.0094*** -0.0081***  0.0023*** -0.0021  -1.1627*** -3.7455* 
 (-7.20) (-2.96)  (6.06) (-1.19)  (-2.87) (-1.87) 
Undergrad 0.0412*** 0.0117***  0.0108*** 0.0074***  10.7000*** 9.7681*** 
 (13.34) (6.06)  (6.76) (4.03)  (10.14) (3.96) 
Grad 0.0399*** 0.0066***  0.0138*** 0.0073***  11.2000*** 10.4000*** 
 (12.56) (3.01)  (8.46) (4.05)  (10.23) (4.06) 
PhD 0.0246*** 0.0079***  0.0147*** 0.0052***  10.2000*** 6.3305** 
 (7.08) (3.71)  (8.36) (2.81)  (8.51) (2.50) 
MBA 0.0056*** -0.0025***  -0.0037*** -0.0017***  -1.3375*** -1.9400*** 
 (4.98) (-3.65)  (-7.88) (-3.54)  (-3.53) (-4.07) 
Cert -0.0062*** -0.0016**  0.0052*** -0.0011***  1.5446*** 0.9625* 
 (-5.53) (-2.32)  (9.97) (-4.17)  (4.09) (1.71) 
Year-fixed Effect YES YES   YES YES   YES YES 
Fund-fixed Effect NO YES  NO YES  NO YES 
No. of Obs. 10,772 10,772  10,772 10,772  10,772 10,772 
Adj. R-squared 0.1516 0.8758   0.1013 0.6250   0.6452 0.7440 
 
The results from the difference-in-differences analysis are reported in Table 3.9. We do not 




have consumed the effects of this variable. In Columns (1) and (2), the positive and significant 
coefficient of 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒_𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 indicates that female fund managers prefer higher Pastor, 
Stambaugh, and Taylor’s portfolio liquidity, compared to male fund managers. The findings are 
significant at the 1% level and we report the t-statistics based on White standard errors. Columns (3) to 
(6) carry similar analysis for the Amihud and bid-ask spread’s portfolio liquidity methods. These tests 
show some evidence that female managed funds are more liquid. The coefficient of the 
𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒_𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 variable is positive and statistically significant, as shown in Columns (3) and 
(5).  
 
3.5.4 Instrumental Variable Approach 
We conduct one additional test to rule out any remaining endogeneity concerns. We implement an 
instrumental variable approach, where the instrument that we use is the state’s level of gender status 
equality index, initially developed by Sugarman and Straus (1988) and updated by Di Noia (2002). The 
measure analyzes the extent to which females have the same access as men to economic resources, legal 
rights, and positions of political power in each of the 50 U.S. states. The state’s gender equality index 
is a composite index to represent the cumulative effect of the economic, legal, and political indicators, 
and assigns each of the states a score for its gender status equality. The scores range from 33.6 
(Alabama) to 73.1 (Washington), where higher values indicate more gender equality. 
Following Huang and Kisgen (2013), we hypothesize that the more friendly a state is towards 
female equality, the more likely a fund with its headquarters located in that state is to appoint a female 
manager. Based on the fund’s headquarter location, we allocate each fund the state’s gender status 
equality value. The purpose for using this instrumental variable is that there is a high possibility that 
the measure is correlated with the decision to hire a female fund manager; however, it is highly unlikely 
that it will affect our portfolio liquidity proxies. The only way it may affect the outcome variables is 




fulfills the requirements of an instrumental variable. We use two stage least squares (2SLS) instrumental 
variable (IV) design: 
First stage: 
 
𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖 =  𝜑 + 𝛾1 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖 + 𝛾2 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾3 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾4 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛾5 𝑇𝑂𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡  + 𝛾6 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡  + 𝛾7 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑_𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡  
+ 𝛾8 𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡  +  𝛾9 𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾10 𝑃ℎ𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾11 𝑀𝐵𝐴𝑖,𝑡




𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡_𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑑_𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽4 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5 𝑇𝑂𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑_𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽8 𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9 𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽10 𝑃ℎ𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽11 𝑀𝐵𝐴𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽12 𝐶𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑡 
(13) 
where 𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡_𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑖,𝑡 is one of the three measures of portfolio liquidity measured at the end of month t. 
𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖 is a dummy variable which is equal to “1” if the fund is single female managed, and “0” if it 
is single male managed. 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖 is the instrumental variable of the state’s gender status 
equality index (Di Noia, 2002). 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑑_𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖 is the fitted value of the female dummy 
variable from the first-stage regression. All other control variables are as explained in Section 3.3. 
 Column (1) of Table 3.10 reports the results of first-stage regression and concludes that the 
gender equality index is significantly associated with the decision to have a female manager to manage 
the fund. The association is significant at the 1% level. The F-statistic is 38.58, which confirms the 
strength of the instrument. Columns (2) to (4) of Table 3.10 depict the outcomes of the second-stage 
analysis and confirm our main findings of the study. In our analysis, the positive coefficient of 
Port_Liq_Sprd is insignificant; however, the rest of the two measures are positively and significantly 





Table 3.10. Preference for Portfolio Liquidity - Instrumental Variable Approach 
This table presents the findings of the two stage least squares regression. Column (1) reports the results from the first-stage 
ordinary least squares regression with the female dummy as dependent variable. 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 is the state’s gender equality 
index. F-statistics from the first-stage regression is given at the bottom of the table. Columns (2), (3) and (4) show the results 
for the second-stage regressions with the three measures of portfolio liquidity as the dependent variables. 
𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑑_𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 is the fitted value of the female dummy from the first-stage regression. 𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡_𝐿𝑖𝑞_𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑑 and 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤 
are measured in basis points. The results are presented with year and fund style fixed effects. The t-statistics based on White 
robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote 99%, 95%, and 90% significance levels. See Table 
B1 in the appendix for the explanation of all the variables. 
𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖 =  𝜑 + 𝛾1 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖 + 𝛾 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡  + 𝑖,𝑡 
𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡_𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑑_𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖 + 𝛾 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡  + 𝑖,𝑡 
    Port_Liq_PST Port_Liq_Amhd Port_Liq_Sprd 
 First stage Second stage Second stage Second stage 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Instrumented_Female - 0.0661*** 0.0321*** 0.4700 
  (6.91) (4.73) (0.10) 
Ret -0.0224 -0.0182*** -0.0053** 1.6000 
 (-1.35) (-6.06) (-2.04) (0.87) 
Size -0.0048*** 0.0053*** 0.0011*** 0.8200*** 
 (-9.03) (49.63) (16.47) (18.01) 
Exp 27.8319*** -24.1122*** -5.5284*** -1160.8000*** 
 (13.19) (-32.65) (-13.70) (-5.37) 
TOratio -0.0103 -0.0280*** 0.0231*** 12.2300*** 
 (-1.04) (-14.23) (13.07) (12.98) 
Flow -0.1000 0.0347 0.0059 -0.0008 
 (-0.78) (1.48) (1.26) (-1.12) 
Fund_Age 0.0112*** -0.0039*** 0.0005*** -0.2000* 
 (8.27) (-11.98) (3.02) (-1.76) 
Undergrad -0.0066 -0.0203*** -0.0202*** -0.3000 
 (-0.28) (-6.38) (-15.76) (-0.09) 
Grad -0.0096 -0.0179*** -0.0197*** -0.0871 
 (-0.40) (-5.56) (-15.07) (-0.03) 
PhD -0.0769*** -0.0230*** -0.0209*** -6.2000** 
 (-3.13) (-6.74) (-13.29) (-2.09) 
MBA -0.0080*** 0.0058*** -0.0028*** -1.6000*** 
 (-4.45) (17.33) (-11.77) (-10.93) 
Cert 0.0294*** -0.0093*** 0.0018*** 0.3300* 
 (16.69) (-21.77) (5.85) (1.77) 
Equality_Index 0.0036*** - - - 
 (18.91)    
Year-fixed Effect YES YES YES YES 
Style-fixed Effect YES YES YES YES 
No. of Obs. 112,842 112,842 112,842 112,842 
Adj. R-squared 0.0157 0.1770 0.0981 0.6340 
F-statistics 38.58 - - - 






This study provides empirical evidence that preference for portfolio liquidity differs among male and 
female fund managers. Using a sample of 1,932 U.S. domestic open-end single managed equity funds 
from January 2000 to December 2017, the results show that the preference of female fund managers to 
hold liquid portfolios is significantly higher than for male managers. This evidence is consistent with 
the price efficiency hypothesis and infers that female fund managers are likely to incline towards stocks 
whose prices incorporate available information efficiently. Hence female managers’ preference for 
informationally transparent stocks possibly explains their higher tendency to hold liquid stocks in the 
portfolio. Consistent with the literature, this study reports lower portfolio risk of female managed funds. 
We document that, on average, female managed funds are smaller in size, earn lower return, receive 
lesser flow, and hold a smaller number of stocks in their portfolio compared to male managed funds. 
Moreover, female fund managers have a higher likelihood of holding an undergraduate degree and 
professional certification than male fund managers. 
Further, the analysis of change in portfolio liquidity around manager transitions indicates that 
portfolio liquidity increases after a male to female transition as compared to a male to male transition. 
We run multiple tests to mitigate endogeneity concerns. Our findings are in line with the literature which 
suggests that professional women at the top positions are different from their male counterparts. 
Additionally, this study provides a new insight regarding gender differences in one of the preferred 
stock characteristics for portfolio holdings of mutual funds. The study highlights the concerns regarding 
negatively affected fund performance due to the potential tradeoff between liquidity and return, 
however, further detailed analysis is required to reach a conclusion on this issue.  
As female managers prefer higher portfolio liquidity, the lower stocks’ return might affect their 
funds’ performance. It is not surprising if male fund managers attract fund flows by holding less-liquid 
stocks and reporting higher fund return performance. Therefore, fund investors and management 
companies should scrutinize the performance of male managed funds by analyzing the riskiness and 





FEMALE FUND MANAGERS AND COLLECTIVISM 
This chapter presents the third essay of the thesis which investigates the impact of gender of fund 
managers on the degree of active investment of funds. The study uses Morningstar Direct database to 
collect the data for U.S. domestic open-end single and team managed active equity funds from January 
2004 to December 2014. The results describe that funds with a higher fraction of female managers in 
management team track the benchmark more closely than other funds. These findings provide an insight 
that female managers tend to manage funds less actively. 
Section 4.1 provides the research question and motivation of the study. Section 4.2 presents the 
literature review and hypotheses formation. Section 4.3 comprises of establishing methodology and 
specifying the details of our data. The application of diagnostic tests, analysis, and discussion of results 
is given in Section 4.4. Section 4.5 includes description of additional tests and results. Section 4.6 
provides the conclusions of the study. An appendix to this chapter and the relevant reference list are 





Female Fund Managers and Collectivism 
 
Abstract 
Collectivism is one of the important dimensions of female self-construal which makes women 
more social, interdependent, relational, and allocentric to each other than do men, as shown in 
the psychology literature. Consistent with the collectivism argument, we find that funds with a 
higher proportion of female managers track a multifactor benchmark more closely. This 
suggests female fund managers invest less actively than their male counterparts. The results 
indicate reduced diversification benefits of investing in funds managed by a higher fraction of 
female managers. Female fund managers herd more, take less risk, and are less overconfident 
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The self-construal of gender, explained in the psychology literature, motivates this study. 
Interdependent and independent self-construal refer to different cognitive depictions of the self that 
people may hold. Past research states that interdependence is one of the important dimensions of female 
self-construal, which makes women more social, relational, and allocentric with each other than men 
(Cross & Madson, 1997; Kashima et al., 1995). Women view their close relationships, social roles, 
and group memberships as central to their sense of self. The thoughts and actions of people in their 
surroundings or in the groups to which they belong determine the behaviors of women. The studies 
describe that their affiliative tendencies prefer collective group goals more than private goals. They thus 
have a lower requirement of being unique (Yamaguchi, Kuhlman, & Sugimori, 1995). Hence, this study 
investigates the impact of collective self-construal of female fund managers on their fund investment 
strategy. We argue that the interdependent self-attribute of female fund managers potentially contributes 
to the degree with which their funds track the market benchmark. 
Active mutual fund managers decide to capitalize on their stock picking skills or timing abilities 
to outperform the chosen benchmark. In contrast, passive portfolio management is a strategy that fully 
tracks the returns of an index or market benchmark. There exists a wide strand of literature on active 
versus passive funds’ performance.45 However, our study considers only actively managed funds and 
their managers’ goal is to beat the market benchmark. Under the category of active investment, we may 
expect fund managers to be less or more active, based on personality traits, skills, or behaviors. 
Nevertheless, the impact of gender of mutual fund managers on the degree of active investment is yet 
to be explored.  Additionally, the use of gender self-construal to explain the investment strategy of fund 
managers has not been studied. Furthermore, Lutton and Davis (2015) report that only 9.4% of fund 
managers in U.S. mutual funds are women, and most of them manage funds in gender diverse teams. 
We follow the gender literature which suggests that females influence the decisions of the team to which 
they belong (e.g., Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Gul, Srinidhi, & Ng, 2011; Jurkus, Park, & Woodard, 2011). 
 




We thus expect that funds managed by a high proportion of female managers would co-move to a greater 
extent against a benchmark than other funds. 
The literature on the efficient frontier reports that investors are interested in exploring whether 
the minimum-variance frontier of a set of benchmark assets is different from the minimum-variance 
frontier of the benchmark assets plus a set of additional test assets (Huberman & Kandel, 1987). The 
benefits of diversification improve when adding a new set of assets can allow the investor to improve 
the minimum-variance frontier from a set of benchmark assets. The literature on mean-variance 
spanning tests in different settings is extensive (e.g., Cumby & Glen, 1990; De Roon, Nijman, & 
Werker, 2001; Kan & Zhou, 2001). Following De Roon and Nijman (2001), we apply a mean-variance 
spanning test of the efficient frontier to analyze whether a collective self-construal influences the 
diversification gains of investing in funds managed by more female managers. By using the Sharpe 
optimization model of performance, the results indicate that economic benefits of diversification 
diminish 1.86% when a high fraction of female managers manage the fund. This suggests that funds 
sacrifice their reward-to-performance focus due to the collectivism of female managers. 
In addition to the personality attributes, we examine the contribution of investment behaviors 
linked to the gender of mutual fund managers to the co-movement of fund returns with benchmark 
returns. The issue of gender differences in investment behaviors is an unsolved puzzle. There exist a 
number of studies suggesting that there are no significant differences in the cognitive skills and resulting 
performance, among male and female professionals.46 On the contrary, the literature reports that females 
behave significantly different from their male counterparts in terms of management, leadership style, 
and decision making.47 In the field of finance, there are a number of studies providing empirical 
evidence that females are more risk averse and less overconfident than males; therefore, investment 
decisions differ among gender (Barber & Odean, 2001; Faccio, Marchica, & Mura, 2016). Following 
Niessen and Ruenzi (2006), this study explores possible contribution of gender differences in risk-
taking, overconfidence, and investment styles to the degree of active investing strategy of female 
 
46 See for example, Atkinson, Baird, and Frye (2003); Nekby, Thoursie, and Vahtrik (2008). 




managers. Considering the collective self-construal of females, we expect that female fund managers 
exhibit higher herding behavior compared to their male counterparts. We hypothesize that these 
investment behaviors of female fund managers potentially explain funds’ co-movement with the 
benchmark. 
To test how closely funds track the market benchmark, we use the measure of a fund’s strategy 
or activity, R2, developed by Amihud and Goyenko (2013). This measure is the proportion of fund 
returns variance that is explained by the variation in the benchmark factors’ returns. A lower R2 depicts 
divergence of the returns of funds from the returns of benchmark factors. The literature on investors’ 
behavior and stock price co-movement uses R2 as a measure of synchronicity.48 Hence, our study applies 
the measure of fund activity to analyze gender differences in fund activeness and uses self-construal 
and investment behaviors as possible explanations of the results. 
Using a sample of 1,565 U.S. domestic open-end single and team managed active equity funds 
from January 2004 to December 2014, the results show that funds with a higher fraction of female 
managers in the management team track the benchmark more closely than other funds. These findings 
provide the insight that female managers tend to manage funds less actively. The results support our 
conjecture that funds with a higher proportion of female managers in the team herd more in a popular 
sector, and assets’ representation in their portfolio holdings follows the trends of the benchmark 
holdings. Consequently, higher herding contributes to less active fund management. The findings of 
our study indicate that less risk-taking behavior (Niessen & Ruenzi, 2006) and less overconfidence 
(Barber & Odean, 2001) among female fund managers possibly explain their less active investing 
strategy. Unlike Niessen and Ruenzi (2006), our findings do not show a significant relationship between 
female fund managers and investment style extremity. However, a less extreme investment style 
significantly increases R2.  
Although the collective self of females may explain their higher tendency to herd, reputational 
concern is likely to explain part of their herding behavior. The literature documents that managers 
 




mimic the investment decisions of other managers because they face a reputational cost for acting 
differently from the herd (Scharfstein & Stein, 1990). Managers imitate strategies of the crowd to 
enhance the market’s perception of their ability (Avery & Chevalier, 1999), or as a response to their 
career concerns (Chevalier & Ellison, 1999b). The scope of our study does not include the investigation 
of reputational herding of female managers; hence, there is no empirical evidence to justify this 
explanation. We run several additional tests to check the robustness of the outcomes. We use the time-
varying conditional correlation of fund returns by applying the dynamic conditional correlation (DCC) 
model of Engle (2002) as an alternative measure of R2. All the results are consistent with time-varying 
correlation. In our main model, we consider managerial characteristics such as the manager’s age, 
professional certification, education, and tenure. Moreover, we control for the size of the fund 
management team and time varying fund characteristics. By categorizing funds based on their size, the 
results indicate that the positive relation between the proportion of female fund managers and a fund’s 
correlation with the benchmark becomes stronger as the fund size increases. 
Our findings contribute to the psychology literature of collective self-construal of women (e.g., 
Kashima et al., 1995; Markus & Kitayama, 1991). To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study 
which explores the role of the gender of fund managers in funds’ co-movement with the index, using 
the activity measure of R2. The existing studies on fund managers’ gender explore characteristics and 
investment behaviors of male and female managers who are the sole managers of funds. Few notable 
studies analyze behavioral differences among teams and single managed funds. Our research 
contributes to the mutual fund literature on gender diversity of fund managers and team managed funds 
(e.g., Atkinson, Baird, & Frye, 2003; Bär, Kempf, & Ruenzi, 2010; Bär, Niessen-Ruenzi, & Ruenzi, 
2009; Niessen & Ruenzi, 2006). The application of the mean-variance frontier spanning test is a 
contribution to the related literature (e.g., De Roon & Nijman, 2001; Kan & Zhou, 2001). Moreover, 
the finding of reduced economic benefits of diversification for funds managed by a higher proportion 
of female managers is a contribution to the existing literature, which suggests lower performance of 




The rest of the study is structured as follows. Section 4.2 provides the literature review and 
hypotheses formation. Section 4.3 comprises of establishing methodology and specifying the details of 
our data. The application of diagnostic tests, analysis, and discussion of results is given in Section 4.4. 
Section 4.5 includes the description of additional tests and results. Section 4.6 provides the conclusions 
of the study. 
 
4.2 Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
4.2.1 Activeness of Mutual Funds, Behavioral Biases, and R2 
The existing mutual fund literature that examines active management of funds and subsequent 
performance includes a detailed study by Wermers (2003). It uses the S&P500 tracking error (the 
standard deviation of the difference of the fund return and its benchmark return) as a measure of active 
management and investigates fund performance. Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2005) analyze 
industry concentration of mutual funds as a measure of activity management and examine its impact on 
fund performance. The study investigates whether or not funds with concentrated stock holdings or 
large factor bets in industries perform better than other funds. Cremers and Petajisto (2009) and Cremers 
et al. (2011) show that an increased active share (deviation of a fund’s stock holdings from the average 
holdings in the fund’s index) enhances fund performance. Kacperczyk and Seru (2007) find that funds 
whose stock holdings are related to company-specific information that differs from analysts’ 
expectations, demonstrate better performance. However, the study of Amihud and Goyenko (2013) 
introduces a simple but robust measure of R2 to analyze the selectivity of a fund and to predict fund 
performance. The measure of R2 is the proportion of fund returns variance that is explained by the 
variation in benchmark factors’ returns. 
The behavioral finance literature uses the measure of R2 extensively. Price synchronicity or co-
movement explains the extent to which stock returns move together with market returns. Barberis, 
Shleifer, and Wurgler (2005) explain return co-movement by modelling an environment where 




the category level. The correlated demand by moving funds from one category to another induces 
common factors in the returns of otherwise unrelated assets. Secondly, they argue that investors prefer 
to trade only a subset of all securities. Hence, any change in these investors’ risk aversion or sentiments 
(e.g., Baker & Wurgler, 2006) brings about common factors in the returns of these securities. Green 
and Hwang (2009) describe stock price co-movement with investors’ sentiments before and after the 
event of stock split. Stock returns co-move more with correlated trading among retail investors (Kumar 
& Lee, 2006), as well as among institutional investors (Pirinsky & Wang, 2004). Moreover, studies 
have shown the impact of cross-country variations in the protection of private property rights and 
information opaqueness on stock return co-movement (Jin & Myers, 2006; Morck, Yeung, & Yu, 2000). 
Eun, Wang, and Xiao (2015) have made another important contribution to the literature explaining 
behavioral biases in the context of different cultures and their impact on synchronicity. 
In addition to active management, mutual fund literature describes the impact of several 
investment styles, stock picking talent, and characteristics of fund managers on fund performance. 
Wermers (1997) concludes that fund managers possess stock picking ability, which allows them to 
choose stocks that outperform their benchmarks before expense deduction. Fund managers process 
information about firm-specific and economy-wide shocks, they pick stocks in boom, and time the 
market in recession (Kacperczyk, Nieuwerburgh, & Veldkamp, 2014). Chevalier and Ellison (1999a) 
consider different demographics of fund managers including education, experience, and age to examine 
their impact on fund performance. 
Following the studies which analyze the influence of trading behaviors of fund managers on 
fund returns, we expect that investment behaviors of fund managers are highly likely to influence the 
investing strategy of funds. 
 
4.2.2 Gender Behaviors in Mutual Funds and Mixed-Gender Teams 
Atkinson, Baird, and Frye (2003) contribute to the literature of gender diversity in mutual funds. They 




funds with single male managed fixed income funds. The study does not find significant differences in 
fund performance, risk, and other characteristics of the funds managed by male and female managers. 
However, it concludes that funds managed by female managers receive smaller net asset flows from 
investors compared to male managed funds. Niessen and Ruenzi (2006) conduct univariate as well as 
multivariate analysis to compare the performance of single female managed equity funds with single 
male managed funds. The findings show that female fund managers take less risk, consistently use a 
less extreme investment style, and are less overconfident than male fund managers. Niessen-Ruenzi and 
Ruenzi (2019) report no gender difference in fund performance, but single female managed funds 
receive significantly lower inflows than single male managed funds. 
Bär, Kempf, and Ruenzi (2010) compare the investment behavior of fund management teams 
with single-person managed funds. While analyzing the impact of different characteristics of fund 
managers as control variables, they find that female fund managers exhibit similar investment behavior 
to that of teams. They follow significantly less extreme investment styles with respect to all style 
dimensions. They hold less industry concentrated portfolios. There are less extreme performance 
outcomes among female managers than among male managers. Bär, Niessen-Ruenzi, and Ruenzi 
(2009) describe that gender diversity is negatively related to fund performance, while information gains 
(tenure and educational diversity) lead to positive fund performance. In an experiment study, Bogan, 
Just, and Dev (2013) examine gender composition of fund management teams and its impact on 
investment decision making behavior. They state that having a male presence in the team increases the 
risk seeking and loss aversion of the team. These studies indicate the importance of gender composition 
in fund management teams. Apesteguia, Azmat, and Iriberri (2012) compare the economic performance 
of gender mixed teams with single gender teams by playing a large business game with three members 
in each group. Involving undergraduate and MBA students, the study concludes that the best performing 
team consists of two men and one woman. They explain that gender diversity is positively associated 
with good team dynamics, as the different skills and knowledge of participating men and women 




There are some conflicting evidences in the literature regarding the influential ability and 
decision-making power of males and females in mixed gender teams. Carli (2001) states that men are 
more influential than women in mixed gender groups because they are highly competent, assertive, and 
task oriented. Moreover, the gender effect on influence is not primarily due to behavioral biases among 
gender, but due to resistance by men to women’s influence. Men particularly resist the influence of a 
competent woman, unless they are likely to benefit from her competence. Men are likely to have higher 
status roles than women, hence, they are more influential (Eagly, 1983).  
Campbell and Mínguez-Vera (2008) show that having a higher proportion of female directors 
on the corporate boards of Spain tends to improve the monitoring quality of the board and firm financial 
performance. Adams and Ferreira (2009) find that the presence of female directors on a board plays a 
monitoring role in mitigating agency costs. Moreover, they show the peer effect of female directors on 
their male counterparts in terms of correcting their attendance issues. Our study expects that female 
managers in either single managed or team managed funds exhibit different investment behaviors than 
their male counterparts. 
 
4.2.3 Self-Construal and Behavioral Disparities in Gender 
There is a consensus in academic literature that a woman possesses cognitive skills and personality 
characteristics which differentiate her from men. Psychology literature conceptualizes the self-construal 
of individuals and proves that these internal traits are regulators of one’s behavior. The individual-self 
is described as independent, separate, self-contained individual, producer of one’s actions, and 
autonomous. On the contrary, the collective construal is described as interdependent, relational, a sense 
of connectedness with others, and communal (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Individuals containing 
individualistic self-construal prefer to be distinctive in different situations, while others’ emotions and 
actions largely regulate the behavior of collective-self individuals (Cross, Hardin, & Gercek-Swing, 




than men. Women are more likely to describe themselves in connection with others, while men describe 
themselves independent of others (Kashima et al., 1995). 
The self-schema also plays another important role in determining the overall characteristic of 
an individual. The self-schema refers to a long lasting and stable set of memories that summarize a 
person’s beliefs, experiences and generalizations about the self, in specific behavioral domains. A 
person may have a self-schema based on any aspect of himself or herself as a person, including physical 
characteristics, personality traits and interests, as long as they consider that aspect of their self-important 
to their own self-definition.  As documented in Konrad et al. (2000), gender self-schemas are developed 
from childhood, male self-schemas are based on roles, norms, values, and beliefs that are perceived to 
be appropriate for men, such as achievement, aggression, autonomy, dominance, endurance, exhibition, 
and income provider. Female self-schema, on the other hand, are based on similar aspects that are 
perceived to be appropriate for women, such as abasement, affiliated to others, deference, homemaker, 
and nurturance (Konrad et al., 2000). 
In the literature on gender, it is a prevalent belief that women are more risk averse in financial 
decision making than men. Jianakoplos and Bernasek (1998) explain that in financial decision-making 
single women are more risk averse than single men. Byrnes, Miller, and Schafer (1999) have carried 
out a meta-analysis of 150 studies and conclude that in various situations there is a greater risk-taking 
tendency in male participants, as compared to female participants. Dwyer, Gilkeson, and List (2002) 
argue that investors’ gender affects investment decisions in mutual funds as females demonstrate less 
risk taking than males when considering risky investments. However, the impact of gender on risk 
taking significantly weakens when investor knowledge of financial markets and investments is 
controlled in the regression equation. 
Puetz and Ruenzi (2011) find that overconfident managers are optimistic about their trading 
abilities and are involved in excessive trading, which leads to a higher turnover ratio. Moreover, they 
find that, among the funds in the top decile of performers sorted on a Carhart four factor alpha, low 




categorize investors based on their gender and find that men are more overconfident than women, are 
involved in excessive trading, and risk-adjusted live trading affects the performance of men more than 
women. In a laboratory experiment, Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) find that men select their 
compensation scheme by preferring a competitive tournament twice as much as women. Their study 
concludes that men are more overconfident than women. 
 Despite possessing leadership qualities, there are few females at managerial positions in the 
corporate world. Among many other explanations, “gender-based stereotyping” and the closed circle of 
the “old boy network” are strong social forces that are slow to change, and work as barriers to female 
promotion or joining top management positions (Oakley, 2000). Niessen and Ruenzi (2006) state that 
female managers encounter discrimination by gender stereotyping investors and experience 18% lower 
fund inflow than male managed funds. In this situation, one wrong investment move by female fund 
managers can boost gender-based criticism and bring harm to their reputation. According to Scharfstein 
and Stein (1990), managers who are concerned about their reputations mimic the investment strategies 
of other managers in the market. Chevalier and Ellison (1999b) analyze the termination-performance 
relation of young fund managers and their impact on fund performance. Their study concludes that 
career concern and the termination-performance relation are incentives for young managers to herd. 
Popescu and Xu (2014) provide empirical evidence that institutional herding is driven by the 
reputational concerns of institutional managers. 
 Following the literature, we expect that investment behaviors of female fund managers 
influence their decisions, hence, they invest in accordance with the market. 
H1: Funds with a higher proportion of female fund managers than male managers closely track 
the market benchmark. 
The collective self-construal explains the tendency of female fund managers to herd the market 
and make conventional investment decisions. Herd behavior contributes to return co-movement (Eun, 
Wang, & Xiao, 2015). The lower risk-taking investment style of female fund managers may explain 




move with benchmark returns. The study conjectures that funds with a high proportion of less 
overconfident female managers have a moderate turnover ratio and consistent returns. It signals that 
fund returns are less likely to deviate from the benchmark index.  
H2: Investment behaviors of female fund managers are highly likely to explain their less active 
investing strategy than male managers. 
 
4.3 Data and Methodology 
4.3.1 Data 
The study considers the U.S. domestic open-end single and team managed active equity funds from 
January 2004 to December 2014. We collect our sample from the Morningstar Direct database. We 
exclude index funds and consider equity funds with more than US$1 million assets under management 
(Lou, 2012). We also exclude international funds, sector funds, balanced funds, all fixed income funds, 
and precious metal funds. We focus on the following four investment objectives of funds: Aggressive 
Growth, Growth, Growth and Income, and Income. The data is free of survivorship bias as it includes 
all surviving and non-surviving funds. We ignore share class observations reporting negative monthly 
net assets, turnover ratios, or expense ratios. To avoid incubation bias, we exclude fund’s monthly 
observations where the date of the observation is prior to the inception date of the fund reported in 
Morningstar (Elton, Gruber, & Blake, 2001). We require a fund to have at least one year of monthly 
returns. 
To avoid multiple counting, we aggregate all share classes belonging to the same fund by using 
their FundId. FundId is an identification code of Morningstar, which is similar for all the share classes 
that belong to the same fund. We sum monthly net assets of all share classes with the same FundId to 
derive the monthly total net assets of a fund. For the analysis, we compute the value-weighted average 
for the monthly fund return and expense ratio. We repeat the turnover ratio of fund share classes to 




with a total of 5,964 share classes. In the Aggressive Growth category there are 46 funds (152 share 
classes), the Growth category has 1,273 funds (4,804 share classes), the Growth and Income category 
has 241 funds (1,000 share classes), and the Income category has 5 funds (8 share classes). 
We collect fund managers’ data from Morningstar Direct. We record all the relevant 
information manually including the manager’s name, qualification, professional certification, 
graduating year, and tenure with the fund. Morningstar provides a data point; “Manager History”; which 
we utilize to specify the name and gender of each fund manager in each month from year 2004 to 2014. 
The data point of “Manager History” provides managers’ names and dates of joining and leaving the 
fund, since the fund is originated. We identify managers’ gender through the title prefixing their names 
(e.g. Mr., Ms., and Mrs., etc.). Executive profiles and biographies are gathered from Bloomberg, 
LinkedIn, Facebook, Zoominfo, and fund management companies’ websites for all those managers with 
missing information in Morningstar Direct. 
In our sample, there are funds that are single male or female managed for a specific time period, 
which are later managed by team of managers. We ignore the funds which do not provide any 
description of their team members, and only mention that they are “Team Managed”. We keep all those 
managers and their characteristics who either have been serving, joined or left the fund during our 
sample time window, i.e., January 2004 - December 2014. Managers who have resigned before January 
2004, or started managing the fund after December 2014, are not the focus of this analysis. We also 
remove fund-month observations for which manager name or tenure date is unavailable. The final 
sample of this study contains 206,580 fund-month observations from January 2004 to December 2014. 
The total number of U.S. domestic open-end equity funds for the sample is 1,565, and we collect the 
information of around 9,000 fund managers. 
We retrieve monthly data of sector concentration from Morningstar Direct. By knowing how 
heavily a fund invests in each sector, it is easy to measure how much sector risk a fund manager has 
taken on. Morningstar has introduced a sector structure that divides the stock universe into three major 




there are a total of eleven economic sectors. The cyclical super sector includes the basic materials, 
consumer cyclical, financial services, and real estate sectors. In the defensive super sector are the 
consumer defensive, healthcare, and utilities sectors. Finally, in the sensitive super sector, there are the 
communication services, energy, industrials, and technology sectors. Morningstar calculates a fund’s 
sector exposure based on the amount of assets invested in stocks in each sector.49 We measure the 
monthly fund net exposure in each of the three super sectors as the percentage difference between the 
long and short positions of fund investments. Net exposure is the measure of the extent to which a 
fund’s portfolio is vulnerable to market fluctuations.50 
 
4.3.2 Variables Definition and Model Development 
4.3.2.1 Measure of R2 
The study uses R2 as a measure of fund strategy or activity (Amihud & Goyenko, 2013). The literature 
on stock price synchronicity widely uses R2 (Eun, Wang, & Xiao, 2015; Jin & Myers, 2006; Roll, 1988). 
We derive R2 by regressing individual fund’s monthly excess returns on returns of a multifactor 
benchmark model. R2 is the proportion of the variability in fund returns that is explained by the variation 
in these factors’ returns. Higher R2 shows that the fund tracks benchmark factors closely. We use the 
benchmark model of factor-mimicking portfolios (4 factor model) presented by Carhart (1997). It 
includes the 3 factor model of Fama and French (1993): RM-RF (market excess return), SMB (small 
minus big size stocks), HML (high minus low book-to-market ratio stocks), and the momentum factor 
MOM (winner minus loser stocks) of Carhart (1997). We retrieve R2 from the following annual time 
series regression for each fund: 
 
49 Morningstar (2010). 
50 Morningstar provides four data points for sector concentration, Equity Econ Super Sector % (Long), (Short), 
(Net) and (Long Rescaled). Long Rescaled takes the long positions, and re-weights them to sum to 100%. The 
data point “Rescaling Factor” helps to interpret these numbers, as it shows the number that equals the Long-





𝑅𝑖,𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑚,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑖,𝑀,𝑡(𝑅𝑀,𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑚,𝑡) + 𝛽𝑖,𝑆,𝑡𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑚,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖,𝐻,𝑡𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑚,𝑡
+ 𝛽𝑖,𝑀𝑂,𝑡𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑚,𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑚,𝑡 
(1) 
where (𝑅𝑖,𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑚,𝑡) is fund i’s excess return over the risk-free rate in month m of year t. (𝑅𝑀,𝑚,𝑡 −
 𝑅𝑓,𝑚,𝑡) denotes the excess return of the market over the risk-free rate in month m of year t. 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑚,𝑡 is 
the return difference between small and large capitalization stocks, 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑚,𝑡  is the return difference 
between high and low book-to market ratio stocks, and 𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑚,𝑡 is the return difference between stocks 
with high and low previous year’s returns, in month m of year t.51 
 The value of the resulting R2 from the time series regression, i.e., Equation (1), varies between 
0 and 1. Following Eun, Wang, and Xiao (2015), we apply logistic transformation to the bounded 
explanatory variable. The bounded outcomes have a non-standard distribution. We obtain the logit-
normal distribution by applying logistic transformation on a normally distributed random variable. 






2 is the return activity measure for individual fund i derived from Equation (1).52 
4.3.2.2 Measure of Female Proportion and Fund-specific Characteristics  
We measure the monthly fraction of female fund managers by dividing the number of females to the 
total number of managers (male and female) in the management team of individual funds in each month. 
We control for the following fund characteristics: fund size is measured as the natural log of 
total assets under management of the fund in millions of dollars at the end of a given month; 
Morningstar defines the net expense ratio as the percentage of fund assets paid for operating expenses 
and management fees, however, we measure it as the value weighted average of the net expense ratio 
 
51 We retrieve the market, size, value, and momentum portfolio returns from the website of Kenneth R. French. 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html 
52 As an initial analysis, the study assumes that 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑑 𝑅2 for each fund in each year remains constant 




of all the share classes; and, following Sirri and Tufano (1998), we measure monthly fund level net 
flow, which is the net growth in fund assets beyond reinvested dividends: 
 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡  =  
𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1(1 + 𝑅𝑖,𝑡)
𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
 (3) 
where 𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡 is the total net assets of fund i at time t and 𝑅𝑖,𝑡  is the return of fund i earned on assets 
under management. This measure assumes that flows for the fund arise at the end of the period. 
4.3.2.3 The Model 
This study aims to examine the relation between the female proportion in the management team and 
fund returns tracking the returns of benchmark factors. We run the following model, with fund level 
controls, to test our main hypothesis: 
 𝑇(𝑅𝑖,𝑡
2 ) =  𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑡 (4) 
where 𝑇(𝑅𝑖,𝑡
2 ) is the transformed R2 measured in Equation (2). 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 is the monthly proportion of 
female fund managers in fund i at time t. 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 is the monthly size, 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖,𝑡 denotes the monthly net 
expense ratio (%), and 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 is the monthly net flow (%) of fund i at time t. 
 
4.3.3 Summary Statistics 
The study provides information about the total number of funds, number of male and female managers, 
and proportion of female managers in management teams in each year of our sample period.53 Figure 
4.1 depicts that the number of female fund managers is increasing each year from 2004 to 2014. 
However, the ratio of female to male managers is diminishing over time, from 11.27% in 2004 to 9.51% 
in 2014. There is a minor decrease in the proportion of female managers in fund management teams. 
We observe the minimum level in the female proportion (i.e. 8.092%) in 2012, and it starts improving 
from the following year. 
 




Figure 4.1. Trends of Female Managers Participation in Mutual Funds 
Figure 4.1 shows total number of female fund managers, their ratio to male managers, and proportion in mixed gender 




Figure 4.2 shows that from 2004 to 2014, on average, male only managed funds (single as well 
as team) are 78.4%, female only managed funds (single as well as team) are 2.59%, and teams with 
mixed gender manage 19% of the sample funds. We observe a small but obvious increase in funds 
managed by mixed gender teams over the study period, i.e., 17.7 % in 2004 increasing to 18.9% in 
2014. However, it is noticeable that the funds managed by only female managers are decreasing over 
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Figure 4.2. Gender Balance of Mutual Fund Managers from 2004-2014 
Figure 4.2 shows percentage of the sample funds managed by male only (single or team), female only (single or team), and 




Table 4.1 presents the summary statistics for the variables of this study. See Table C1 in the 
appendix for the detail explanation of all the variables. The mean (median) of R2 for the sample is 0.937 
(0.948). According to Q1, 25% of R2 is less than or equal to 92.4%. The results of this measure are 
limited within the interval of 0 and 1, therefore, we apply logistic transformation to R2. The mean 
(median) of the transformed R2, T(R2), is 2.416 (2.360). The average proportion of female managers in 
the sample funds is 0.083 or 8.3%. It is evident that 75% of the female proportion in fund management 
teams is less than or equal to 10.4%. The mean (median) of the measure of herding, SecDev, is 13.280 
(11.955). Total risk has a mean (median) of 1.832 (1.754), while 25% of the risk is below 1.56%, and 
75% is less than or equal to 2.03%. The mean (median) of the measure for overconfidence, i.e., TOratio, 
is 76.690 (61.817). The mean of the style extremity measure, i.e., AggSE, is 1.035 with 50% of style 
extremity less than or equal to 0.924. 
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Table 4.1. Summary Statistics 
This table presents summary statistics of the main variables of this study. The sample consists of 206,580 fund-month 
observations from January 2004 to December 2014. 𝑅2 is the measure of fund activity introduced by Amihud, and Goyenko 
(2013), it is the proportion of the variability in fund returns that is explained by the variation in market factors’ returns. 𝑇(𝑅2) 
is the logistic transformation of R2. 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 is the measure of female proportion and equal to the number of female managers 
divided by the total number of managers in fund’s management team at time t. 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝐷𝑒𝑣 is the measure of herding (%) and 
equal to the square root of the sum of squared differences between portfolio concentration of fund i in each of the three super 
sectors and the average concentration in each sector among all the funds in fund i’s investment segment in the same year t. 
𝑈𝑛𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 is the measure of unsystematic risk (%) and equal to the annual standard deviation of fund return residuals obtained 
from Carhart’s (1997) four factor model. 𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 is the measure of systematic risk (%) and equal to the annual beta retrieved 
from regressing fund’s excess return on the excess return of market. 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 is the measure of total risk (%) and equal to the sum 
of systematic and unsystematic risk of fund at time t. 𝑇𝑂𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 is the measure of overconfidence (%) and equal to the lesser of 
annual purchases or sales and dividing by average net assets of fund in time t. 𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑆𝐸 is the measure of aggregate style 
extremity (%) and equal to the mean of style extremity of three style dimensions i.e., size, value, and momentum in time t. 
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 is the measure of fund size and equal to the natural log of total assets under management of fund in time t. 𝐸𝑥𝑝 is the 
measure of expense ratio (%) and equal to the value weighted average of net expense ratio of all the share classes of a fund at 
time t. 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤 is the measure of fund flow and equal to the growth in fund’s assets under management in time t. 
 Mean Median Std. dev. Q1 Q3 
R2 0.937 0.948 0.051 0.924 0.966 
T(R2) 2.416 2.360 0.782 1.964 2.868 
Female 0.083 0.000 0.166 0.000 0.104 
SecDev 13.280 11.955 6.694 8.674 15.879 
SysRisk 0.989 1.000 0.119 0.949 1.042 
UnsysRisk 0.842 0.780 0.387 0.580 1.028 
Risk 1.832 1.754 0.416 1.557 2.027 
TOratio 76.690 61.817 70.903 35.670 92.550 
AggSE 1.035 0.924 0.483 0.744 1.194 
Size 8.279 8.300 0.875 7.683 8.886 
Exp 1.128 1.100 0.432 0.821 1.301 
Flow 0.013 0.005 0.019 -0.004 0.022 
 
Table 4.2 describes the correlation between the variables. The correlation between T(R2) and 
female proportion is significantly positive. Moreover, the correlation between T(R2) and the herding 
measure is negative and significant. The correlation between risk and T(R2) is significantly negative. 
The measures of overconfidence and style extremity are both correlated negatively and significantly 
with T(R2). Among the fund-specific variables, expense ratio and flow are negatively, while fund size 
is positively correlated with T(R2), and all of these correlations are significant. On the other hand, the 





Table 4.2. Correlation Matrix 
This table presents correlation matrix of the variables in this study. The sample consists of 206,580 fund-month observations from January 2004 to December 2014. See Table C1 in the appendix 
for the explanation of all the variables. 
 T(R2) Female SecDev SysRisk UnsysRisk Risk TOratio AggSE Size Exp 
Female 0.067a          
SecDev -0.262a -0.068a         
SysRisk -0.009c -0.013c -0.038a        
UnsysRisk -0.596a -0.057a 0.293a 0.113a       
Risk -0.487a -0.046a 0.245a 0.485a 0.924a      
TOratio -0.089a -0.023a 0.063a 0.058a 0.245a 0.238a     
AggSE -0.233a -0.017a 0.274a 0.096a 0.422a 0.409a 0.164a    
Size 0.119a -0.007a -0.096a 0.054a -0.157a -0.118a -0.129a -0.154a   
Exp -0.291a 0.005b 0.169a -0.024a 0.319a 0.273a 0.136a 0.200a -0.406a  
Flow -0.049a -0.010a 0.035a -0.019a 0.017a 0.008a 0.004 0.045a -0.129a -0.005b 




4.4 Empirical Results and Discussion 
4.4.1 Effect of Female Proportion on Fund R2 
We start our empirical analysis by examining the impact of the proportion of female fund managers on 
fund R2 and present the results in Table 4.3. Using Equation (4), Column (1) of Table 4.3 reports that 
fund returns closely track the returns of the multifactor benchmark when there is a higher proportion of 
female managers in the management team. The goodness of fit of the baseline model is 9.26%. The 
finding is consistent with our argument that collective self-construal of female managers possibly 
contributes to their tendency of investing in accordance with the market. Hence, female fund managers 
manage funds less actively. 
The significantly positive relationship between female proportion and R2 holds even after 
controlling for each fund-specific variable in Columns (2), (3) and (4). The findings describe that fund 
size has a significantly positive impact on fund R2, indicating that the returns of large funds co-move 
more with the benchmark in comparison to small funds. In contrast, the expense ratio and fund flow 
affect R2 negatively and the results are statistically significant at the 1% level. This signals that less 
actively managed funds are less costly and receive lower flows in comparison to actively managed 
funds. We present the results with adjusted standard errors for fund and month clustering. We conclude 
that the presence of female managers, either in single or mixed-gender team management, does affect 
the investing strategy of funds. The outcome of our study is consistent with the literature on gender, 
which argues that females influence the decisions of teams. Hence, their corporate decisions are 





Table 4.3. Female Proportion and Fund R
2
 
This table presents the findings of regression of fund’s R2 on female proportion, including fund level controls. 𝑅2 is retrieved 
from the annual time series regression of Carhart’s (1997) four factor model given in Equation (1). The dependent variable is 
the transformed 𝑅2 explained in Equation (2). The independent variable is 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 which is the number of female fund 
managers divided by the total number of managers managing the fund at time t. We winsorize the fund level control variables 
at 1% and 99%. The t-statistics based on clustered standard errors for time and fund are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and 
* denote 99%, 95%, and 90% significance levels. See Table C1 in the appendix for the explanation of the variables.  
𝑇(𝑅𝑖,𝑡
2 ) =  𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑡 
 Fund R2 
 All Controls Fund Size Control Expense Control Flow Control 

































No. of Obs. 164,645 170,464 167,293 167,620 
Adj. R-squared 0.0926 0.0188 0.0892 0.0069 
 
 
4.4.2 Effect of Female Proportion on Economic Benefits of Diversification 
In this study we perform a mean-variance spanning test to investigate the effect of investing in funds 
on the minimum-variance frontier and apply a performance measure to assess the economic gains of 
diversification when a high fraction of female managers manages funds. Huberman and Kandel (1987) 
describe the concept of mean-variance spanning. They suggest that a set of K risky assets (benchmark 
assets) spans a larger set of K+N risky assets (test assets) if the minimum-variance frontier of both sets 
of assets is identical. Modern portfolio theory states that when there exists a risk-free asset, and 
unlimited lending and borrowing at the risk-free rate is allowed, investors who care only about the mean 
and variance of their portfolios will only be interested in the tangency portfolio of the risky asset (the 




Nijman, 2001; Kan & Zhou, 2001). The tangency portfolio relates to the changes in the Sharpe ratio 
that correspond to the shift in the optimal risky portfolio when the test asset is added to the set of 
benchmark assets. The Sharpe ratio of the tangency portfolio gives the largest mean return per unit of 
standard deviation risk attainable for the assets. 
In our study, we consider the benchmark portfolio of assets based on Carhart’s (1997) four 
factors (i.e., RMRF, SMB, HML, MOM). We assess the additional gains when we add funds in the 
benchmark portfolio. Firstly, we examine the benchmark case of diversification and measure the 
maximum Sharpe ratio for the addition of every fund in the benchmark. Then, to test whether the 
maximum Sharpe ratio of the optimal benchmark portfolio is different from the Share ratio of every 
fund, we take the difference between the Sharpe ratios. A difference between the Sharpe ratios, 
computed for the optimal benchmark and the funds, indicates that investors can enhance their returns 
per unit of risk by diversifying their investments in the funds. This assesses the magnitude of 
diversification benefit. Finally, to examine the impact of having a high proportion of female managers 
in a fund’s management team on the diversification benefits of the fund, we use the following model:  
 
𝐷𝑖𝑣_𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑚_𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽3 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑖,𝑡  
(5) 
where 𝐷𝑖𝑣_𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑖,𝑡 is the difference between the Sharpe ratios computed for the optimal benchmark 
and each fund i in time t. The other variables are as defined in Section 4.3. 
According to the findings in Table 4.4, the diversification gains of funds managed by a higher 
fraction of female fund managers are 1.86% lower than other funds. The results are significant after 
controlling for fund-specific characteristics and time and segment (i.e. find investment objective) fixed 
effects. The benefits are 1.64% smaller than other funds when we control for team size and fund-specific 
time varying variables. Hence, we conclude that less active investing of female managers reduces the 
rewards of diversification. Investors who want to enhance their returns per unit of risk by diversification 





Table 4.4. Female Proportion and Economic Benefits of Diversification 
This table presents the findings of regression of diversification benefits on female proportion, including team size and fund 
level controls. The dependent variable is 𝐷𝑖𝑣_𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡, which is the difference in the Sharpe Ratio of optimized benchmark 
and our sample funds. The independent variable is 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 which is the number of female fund managers divided by the total 
number of managers managing the fund at time t. Column (1) controls for all fund level characteristics. Column (2) presents 
the results with team size and time lagged fund level variables. 𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑚_𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 is equal to the total number of managers in fund 
management team in time t. We winsorize the fund level control variables at 1% and 99%. We include fixed effect at time and 
segment level. The t-statistics based on clustered standard errors for time and fund are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * 
denote 99%, 95%, and 90% significance levels. See Table C1 in the appendix for the explanation of the variables.  
𝐷𝑖𝑣_𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑚_𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑖,𝑡 
 Diversification Benefits 






























Year-fixed Effect YES YES 
Segment-fixed Effect YES YES 
No. of Obs. 164,794 163,290 
Adj. R-squared 0.1434 0.1486 
 
 
4.4.3 Effect of Investment Behaviors of Female Managers on Fund R2 
The existing research studies explore the impact of several investment behaviors of gender on 
investment decisions. We consider three behaviors, mostly studied in the context of fund managers, and 





4.4.3.1 Effect of Herding on R2 
The psychology literature states that the actions of people in a group, which women belong to, influence 
the behavior of women due to their collective self-construal. Therefore, we expect that, compared to 
male fund managers, females are less likely to make unique decisions which are against the common 
investment strategies of the group (i.e., the market benchmark). Mimicking the strategies of other 
managers explains higher herding. Bo, Li, and Sun (2016) provide evidence that boards with more 
female directors make investment decisions closer to their peers in the same industry. There exists 
empirical evidence that herd behavior potentially contributes to return co-movement (Eun, Wang, & 
Xiao, 2015).  
To measure fund herding, we use a proxy developed by Chevalier and Ellison (1999b). The 
measure is Sector deviation, which estimates sectors’ concentration within a fund’s portfolio that 
deviates from those sectors that are most popular in the specific year. Sector deviation, 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝐷𝑒𝑣, is the 
square root of the sum of the squared differences between a fund’s portfolio concentration in each of 
the three super sectors (reported by Morningstar) and the average exposure in each sector among all the 
funds in that fund’s investment segment in the same year. Small 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝐷𝑒𝑣 indicates that a fund manager 
is less likely to concentrate the portfolio in sectors which are not popular among other funds.54 We 
measure Sector deviation as follow𝑠: 




where 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 is the measure of herding for fund i at time t. n is equal to 3 (number of super sectors). 
𝑤𝑖,𝑘,𝑡 is the investment weight/concentration of fund i in each of the three super sectors k in year t, while 
?̅?𝑘,𝑡  is the average weight in each of the sectors k in year t among all the funds in fund i’s investment 
segment (growth, aggressive growth, growth and income, income). 
 





 We hypothesize that female fund managers herd more in popular sectors. First, we run the 
following model to test the relationship between the fraction of female managers and fund herding:  
 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑡 (7) 
where 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 is the proxy of herding of fund i at time t. The other variables are as defined in Section 
4.3. 
Second, we test our hypothesis that fund herding explains higher R2 in the following model: 
 𝑇(𝑅𝑖,𝑡
2 ) =  𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑡 (8) 
Table 4.5 presents the results of the influence of female managers on fund herding. Column (1) 
displays the results with all fund level controls. It is shown that when a high fraction of female managers 
manages funds, their portfolio concentration in each of the three super sectors strongly mimics the 
average exposure in each sector by all other funds. The negative coefficients in Columns (1) to (4) 
indicate that a fund’s sector deviation decreases with more female managers serving in the fund 
management team. This negative relation is significant at the 1% level. We conclude that female fund 
managers exhibit higher herding behavior than their male counterparts. One of the explanations of their 
herding behavior might be the reputational concern. According to Scharfstein and Stein (1990), 
managers who are concerned about their reputations, mimic investment strategies of other managers in 
the market. Popescu and Xu (2014) reports that reputational concerns of institutional managers drive 
institutional herding. The underrepresentation of female fund managers may increase strict scrutiny of 
their decisions by the market participants. Any unique decision can damage their reputation; therefore, 
female fund managers may prefer to herd the popular investment strategies of their peers. We do not 
provide empirical evidence in this regard because the topic of reputational herding is beyond the scope 





Table 4.5. Female Proportion and Fund Herding 
This table presents the findings of regression of fund herding on female proportion, including fund level controls. The 
dependent variable is fund herding, which is measured as Sector Concentration Deviation, 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝐷𝑒𝑣, explained in Equation (6). 
The independent variable is 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 which is the number of female fund managers divided by the total number of managers 
managing the fund at time t. We winsorize the fund level control variables at 1% and 99%. The t-statistics based on clustered 
standard errors for time and fund are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote 99%, 95%, and 90% significance levels. 
See Table C1 in the appendix for the explanation of the variables.  
𝑆𝑒𝑐𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑡 
 Sector Concentration Deviation 
 All Controls Fund Size Control Expense Control Flow Control 

































No. of Obs. 164,794 171,307 167,521 168,083 
Adj. R-squared 0.0353 0.0138 0.0334 0.0059 
 
The results in Table 4.6, Columns (1) to (4), show that Sector concentration deviation is 
negatively related to T(R2) and the association is statistically significant at the 1% level. The negative 
effect is consistent and statistically significant with the controls of all fund-specific variables in 
Columns (2) to (4). These findings show that, when funds deviate their investment concentration from 
the popular sectors, their returns do not closely track the benchmark returns. We conclude that funds 
with a high fraction of female managers herd more in the poplar sectors, and their returns tend to closely 





Table 4.6. Herding and Fund R
2
 
This table presents the findings of regression of fund’s R2 on herding, including fund level controls. 𝑅2 is retrieved from the 
annual time series regression of Carhart’s (1997) four factor model given in Equation (1). The dependent variable is the 
transformed 𝑅2 explained in Equation (2). The independent variable is fund herding, which is measured as Sector 
Concentration Deviation, 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝐷𝑒𝑣, explained in Equation (6). We winsorize the fund level control variables at 1% and 99%. 
The t-statistics based on clustered standard errors for time and fund are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote 99%, 
95%, and 90% significance levels. See Table C1 in the appendix for the explanation of the variables.  
𝑇(𝑅𝑖,𝑡
2 ) =  𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑡 
 Fund R2 
 All Controls Fund Size Control Expense Control Flow Control 

































No. of Obs. 165,181 171,035 167,864 168,156 
Adj. R-squared 0.1350 0.0780 0.1323 0.0710 
 
 
4.4.3.2 Effect of Risk-taking Behavior on R2 
To analyze the risk-taking behavior of fund managers, the study follows Chevalier and Ellison (1999a) 
and measures the systematic and unsystematic risk of a fund. The systematic risk, 𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘, is the annual 
market beta coefficient (𝛽𝑖,𝑀,𝑡) of Carhart’s (1997) four factor model described in Equation (1). On the 
other hand, the unsystematic risk, 𝑈𝑛𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘, is the annual standard deviation of each fund’s return 
residuals from the model in Equation (1). In Equation (1), 𝛽𝑖,𝑀,𝑡  is the annual measure of systematic 
risk of fund i in year t, which describes the sensitivity of a fund’s excess returns with the volatility in 
market excess returns. 𝑖,𝑚,𝑡  is the return residual of fund i in month m of year t. We expect negative 
association between fund returns co-movement with the benchmark and riskiness. The less risky fund 




We use the following model to test the impact of investment riskiness on fund returns’ co-
movement with the benchmark: 
 𝑇(𝑅𝑖,𝑡
2 ) =  𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘_𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑡 (9) 
where 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘_𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 are the three measures of fund riskiness: 𝑈𝑛𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡  which is the annual 
standard deviation of fund i’s return residuals in year t; 𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡, which is the annual 𝛽𝑖,𝑀,𝑡  of fund i 
from Equation (1); and 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡, which is the total risk of fund i in year t measured as the sum of 
systematic and unsystematic risk. The other variables are as defined in Section 4.3.  
Table 4.7 presents the results of the association between level of riskiness and fund activity. 
After controlling for fund level characteristics, we observe that all three measures of fund riskiness 
show a negative relation with R2 and the relation is significant at the 1% level. The outcomes support 
the hypothesis that risky investments decrease the tracking of funds’ returns with the benchmark returns. 
High risk-taking behavior of fund managers may explain the outperformance from the benchmark.  
The literature on gender behaviors argues that female fund managers show less risk-taking 
behavior than male managers (Atkinson, Baird, & Frye, 2003; Niessen & Ruenzi, 2006). We analyze 
the effect of the proportion of female managers on fund riskiness, and the results are consistent with the 
literature. We present the results in Table C3 in the Appendix. The findings provide empirical evidence 
that the total risk of a fund diminishes when more female managers are in the management team and 
the association is statistically significant at the 1% level. Hence, we conclude that the lesser risk-taking 






Table 4.7. Risk and Fund R
2
 
This table presents the findings of regression of fund’s R2 on riskiness of fund investments, including fund level controls. 𝑅2 
is retrieved from the annual time series regression of Carhart’s (1997) four factor model given in Equation (1). The dependent 
variable is the transformed 𝑅2 explained in Equation (2). The independent variable is fund’s risk level, which is measured as 
𝑈𝑛𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘, 𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘, and 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 using Equation (1). We winsorize the fund level control variables at 1% and 99%. The t-
statistics based on clustered standard errors for time and fund are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote 99%, 95%, 
and 90% significance levels. See Table C1 in the appendix for the explanation of the variables. 
𝑇(𝑅𝑖,𝑡
2 ) =  𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝑈𝑛𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑡 
𝑇(𝑅𝑖,𝑡
2 ) =  𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑡 
𝑇(𝑅𝑖,𝑡
2 ) =  𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑡 
 Fund R2 





































No. of Obs. 165,181 165,181 165,181 
Adj. R-squared 0.3691 0.0954 0.2720 
 
 
4.4.3.3 Effect of Overconfidence on R2 
A small turnover ratio suggests a less overconfident manager and less trading activity than peers (Barber 
& Odean, 2001). Morningstar describes the turnover ratio as a measure of the fund’s trading activity, 
and computes the measure by taking the lesser of purchases or sales (excluding all securities with 
maturities of less than one year), and dividing this by the average monthly net assets. We hypothesize 




Therefore, a higher turnover ratio, 𝑇𝑂𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜, reduces a fund’s R2. The following model tests our 
argument: 
 𝑇(𝑅𝑖,𝑡
2 ) =  𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝑇𝑂𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑡 (10) 
where 𝑇𝑂𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡 is the turnover ratio of fund i at time t. The other variables are as defined in Section 
4.3. 
Table 4.8. Trading and Fund R
2
 
This table presents the findings of regression of fund’s R2 on trading activity, including fund level controls. 𝑅2 is retrieved 
from the annual time series regression of Carhart’s (1997) four factor model given in Equation (1). The dependent variable is 
the transformed 𝑅2 explained in Equation (2). The independent variable is fund’s trading activity, which is measured by 
turnover ratio, 𝑇𝑂𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜. We winsorize the fund level control variables at 1% and 99%. The t-statistics based on clustered 
standard errors for time and fund are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote 99%, 95%, and 90% significance levels. 
See Table C1 in the appendix for the explanation of the variables. 
𝑇(𝑅𝑖,𝑡
2 ) =  𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝑇𝑂𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑡 
 Fund R2 
 All Controls Fund Size Control Expense Control Flow Control 

































No. of Obs. 161,359 165,129 163,787 162,657 
Adj. R-squared 0.0891 0.0209 0.0859 0.0105 
 
Table 4.8 presents that the turnover ratio is negatively associated with R2 and the association is 
statistically significant at the 1% level. The findings are consistent with controlling for every fund 
specific variable and indicate that funds diverge from the benchmark due to excessive and frequent 
trading by managers. The existing research studies provide evidence that females are less overconfident 
than males in their corporate decisions (Huang & Kisgen, 2013) and they are less likely to be involved 




argument by analyzing the trading behavior of male and female fund managers. Our results are 
consistent with the literature that female fund managers are less aggressive in trading activities. We 
present the results in Table C4 in the Appendix. The findings show that a 1% increase in the fraction of 
female managers is related to a 0.1% (monthly) decrease in a fund’s turnover ratio, with this result being 
significant at the 10% level. Hence, we suggest that the aggressive trading behavior of male team 
members is tamed as the proportion of less overconfident female fund managers goes up. 
4.4.3.4 Effect of Investment Style Extremity on R2 
To capture the investment style of a fund manager, the study considers the measure of investment style 
extremity. We define this measure as taking a large bet on the size, value, or momentum factor (Bär, 
Kempf, & Ruenzi, 2010; Niessen & Ruenzi, 2006). To measure style extremity, we first compute the 
annual factor loading (𝛽𝑖,𝑆,𝑡 , 𝛽𝑖,𝐻,𝑡 , 𝛽𝑖,𝑀𝑂,𝑡) on Carhart’s (1997) four factor model described in Equation 
(1). Style extremity (𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡
𝐹 ) is the absolute difference between the fund’s factor weightings (𝛽𝑖,𝑡
𝐹 ) and the 
style benchmark (?̅?𝑖,𝑡
𝐹 ). The style benchmark is the average factor weightings of all the funds in fund i’s 
investment segment and the style factor in the same year t. To normalize this extremity, the style 
extremity measure is divided by the average absolute difference of the corresponding market segment 
in the respective year. This process gives three extremity values for each fund, corresponding to the 
three style factors (SMB, HML, and MOM). The style extremity measure is comparable across style, 
segments, and time after normalization (Bär, Kempf, & Ruenzi, 2010). We measure style extremity 














𝐹  is the style extremity of fund i in year t for each of the three style dimensions (F=1, 2, 3). 
Fund i’s factor loading for each of the style dimensions F in year t is denoted by 𝛽𝑖,𝑡
𝐹 , while the style 
benchmark is ?̅?𝑖,𝑡
𝐹 . j stands for the corresponding market segment, and n is the number of funds in this 




To get an aggregate measure for extremity for each fund, following Niessen and Ruenzi (2006), 
we average three individual extremity measures as follows: 







where 𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡 is the average extremity of fund i in year t, which is by definition equal to “1”, and any 
higher measure will show an extreme style. 
We expect that higher bets and a more extreme investment style by fund managers result in the 
funds’ divergence from the benchmark. We test this conjecture in the following model: 
 𝑇(𝑅𝑖,𝑡
2 ) =  𝛼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽1 𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑡 (13) 
where 𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡 is the aggregate style extremity measure of fund i in year t, which is aggregated for the 
three style dimensions. The other variables are as defined in Section 4.3. 
Table 4.9 displays the regression outcomes of Equation (13) and indicates that investment style 
extremity is negatively related to R2. This relation is significant at the 1% level after controlling for all 
fund specific characteristics. The goodness of fit of the model in Column (1) is 13.04%. The findings 
suggest that funds are less likely to track the benchmark if managers take larger bets on the size, value, 
or momentum factor. 
Niessen and Ruenzi (2006) report that female fund managers exhibit a less extreme investment 
style in comparison to their male counterparts. We present the results in Table C5 in the Appendix. Our 
results describe that the association between the fraction of female fund managers and style extremity 
is negative, however, the findings are not statistically significant. Therefore, our findings are not 
conclusive. Our study considers female fund managers in single as well as management teams, while 
Niessen, and Ruenzi (2006) analyze single managed funds. This might be one of the reasons for the 





Table 4.9. Style Extremity and Fund R
2
 
This table presents the findings of regression of fund’s R2 on investment style extremity, including fund level controls. 𝑅2 is 
retrieved from the annual time series regression of Carhart’s (1997) four factor model given in Equation (1) . The dependent 
variable is the transformed 𝑅2 explained in Equation (2). The independent variable is fund’s aggregated style extremity, which 
is measured in Equation (12). We winsorize the fund level control variables at 1% and 99%. The t-statistics based on clustered 
standard errors for time and fund are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote 99%, 95%, and 90% significance levels. 
See Table C1 in the appendix for the explanation of the variables. 
𝑇(𝑅𝑖,𝑡
2 ) =  𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑡 
 Fund R2 
 All Controls Fund Size Control Expense Control Flow Control 

































No. of Obs. 165,171 171,024 167,853 168,146 
Adj. R-squared 0.1304 0.0672 0.1268 0.0648 
 
 
4.5 Additional Investigation 
In this section, we describe some additional tests to support the relation between degree of active 
management of funds and the female proportion in their management team. 
4.5.1 Time-varying Fund Correlation and Market Model 
For the analysis, we retrieve annual R2 from the time series regression of Carhart’s (1997) four factors 
model and use this as a measure of activeness. As an alternate measure, we calculate the time varying 
conditional correlation of fund returns by applying the dynamic conditional correlation (DCC) model 
of Engle (2002). We replace the measure of activeness, i.e., R2, with monthly time varying conditional 




Table 4.10 presents the findings of regressions with time varying conditional correlation as the 
dependent variable. All fund specific characteristics are the same. Column (1) displays the findings of 
the model given in Equation (4), where female proportion is the independent variable. Column (2) 
presents the findings of the association between fund herding and fund correlation with the market. 
Columns (3) to (5) show the results of the impact of funds’ riskiness, trading activity, and style extremity 
on funds’ time-varying conditional correlation, respectively. All the results are consistent with the 
previously explained relations and are significant at the 1% level. We observe a significant 
improvement in the overall goodness of fit of each model. The goodness of fit of the main model, i.e., 
Column (1), improves from 9.26% (with R2) to 16.69% (with time varying correlation). We conclude 
that our results are robust even with an alternate measure of the dependent variable. 
 We again calculate the measures of fund risk level by using the Market model given below: 
 𝑅𝑖,𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑚,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑖,𝑀,𝑡  (𝑅𝑀,𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑚,𝑡) + 𝑖,𝑚,𝑡  (14) 
where (𝑅𝑖,𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑚,𝑡) is the excess return of fund i over the risk free return in month m of year t. 
(𝑅𝑀,𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑚,𝑡) is the excess return of market M in month m of year t. 𝛽𝑖,𝑀,𝑡 is the annual measure of 
systematic risk of fund i in year t, which describes the sensitivity of a fund’s excess returns to the 
volatility in market excess returns. 𝑖,𝑚,𝑡  is the return residual of fund i in month m of year t. 
 We run the model given in Equation (9). The dependent variable is the time varying conditional 
correlation of fund returns, and we calculate the three risk measures; unsystematic, systematic, and total 
risk; from the market model given in Equation (14). The results are robust and indicate that high 








Table 4.10. Female Proportion, Investment Behaviors, and Time-varying Conditional Correlation 
This table presents the findings of regression of fund returns correlation on female proportion, herding, risk level, trading 
activity, and style extremity of fund, including fund level controls. The dependent variable is 𝐷𝐶𝐶, which is the dynamic 
conditional correlation of fund returns measured by using the model of Engle (2002). In Column (1), the independent variable 
is 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 which is the number of female fund managers divided by the total number of managers managing the fund at time 
t. In Column (2), the independent variable is fund herding, which is measured as Sector Concentration Deviation, 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝐷𝑒𝑣, 
explained in Equation (6). In Column (3), the independent variable is fund’s risk level, which is measured as total risk, 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘, 
using Equation (1). In Column (4), the independent variable is fund’s trading activity, which is measured by turnover ratio, 
𝑇𝑂𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜. In Column (5), the independent variable is fund’s aggregated style extremity, which is measured in Equation (12). 
We winsorize the fund level control variables at 1% and 99%. The t-statistics based on clustered standard errors for time and 
fund are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote 99%, 95%, and 90% significance levels. See Table C1 in the appendix 
for the explanation of the variables. 
 Fund Time-varying Conditional Correlation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Female 0.3519*** 
(4.55) 




























































No. of Obs. 164,794 165,331 165,181 161,493 165,171 
Adj. R-squared 0.1669 0.2423 0.3383 0.1799 0.2570 
 
 
4.5.2 Manager and Time-varying Fund Level Characteristics, Team Size, and Fixed Effects 
In our analysis, endogeneity exists due to the possibility of unobserved omitted variables of manager or 
fund-specific characteristics. To deal with these concerns, we consider fund managers’ demographics 




We develop a model that controls for a manager’s characteristics like age, professional certification, 
education, and tenure. We also consider time-varying fund-specific characteristics and control for one-
month lagged fund size, net expense ratio, and fund flow. The literature about mutual funds suggests 
that team size affects the behaviors of team members and the resulting performance of fund managers 
(Bär, Kempf, & Ruenzi, 2010; Bär, Niessen-Ruenzi, & Ruenzi, 2009). Therefore, our study controls for 
the team size of sample funds. The model below includes the segment and time fixed effects of the 
funds: 
 
𝐷𝐶𝐶𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡  +  𝛽2 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡  + 𝛽3 𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡  + 𝛽4 𝑃ℎ𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5 𝐶𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽6 𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽8 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽9 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽10 𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑚_𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑡 
(15) 
where 𝐷𝐶𝐶𝑖,𝑡 is the time varying conditional correlation of fund i’s returns in time t. 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡  is the 
average age of all managers managing fund i in time t. Following Chevalier and Ellison (1999a), we 
assume that a manager is 21 years old at the time of completion of his/her undergraduate degree. 𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡  
is a dummy variable that takes the value “1” if the fund has a manager with a graduate degree, and “0” 
otherwise. 𝑃ℎ𝐷𝑖,𝑡 is a dummy variable that takes the value “1” if the fund has a manager with a Ph.D. 
degree, and “0” otherwise. 𝐶𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑡 is a dummy variable for professional certification that takes the value 
“1” if the fund has a manager with professional certification like CFA or CPA, and “0” otherwise. 
𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 is the average tenure of all the managers in fund i in time t. 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1, 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖,𝑡−1, and 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡−1 
are one month lagged fund-specific variables. 𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑚_𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 is the total number of managers in fund i’s 
management team in time t. We consider year and segment (Aggressive Growth, Growth, Growth and 
Income, and Income) fixed effects in the model. 
Table 4.11 presents the results of the model in Equation (15). Column (1) shows the relationship 
between female proportion and the correlation of fund returns with market returns, controlling for all 
manager level and lagged fund-level characteristics. The association is positive and significant at the 




that a high fraction of female managers in management team contributes to a higher correlation of fund 
returns, even after controlling for team size and lagged fund level variables. 
We analyze the relation between fund correlation and the measures of investment behaviors by 
considering team size and lagged fund specific characteristics. We develop the following model: 
 
𝐷𝐶𝐶𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡  +  𝛽2 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽5 𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑚_𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑡 
(16) 
where 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡  denotes to the measures of herding, risk, trading activity, and style extremity of 
fund i in time t. Other fund specific variables are already explained.  
Table 4.12, Column (1) shows the findings of the impact of herding on the correlation of fund 
returns. Columns (2) to (4) are the results of the associations between funds’ correlation and risk, the 
turnover ratio, and the investment extremity style. All the findings, except the measure of 
overconfidence, are consistent with our main results. Hence, we conclude that unobserved manager, or 






Table 4.11. Female Proportion and Fund Correlation 
This table presents the findings of regression of fund returns correlation on female proportion, including team size, manager 
level, and time lagged fund level controls. The dependent variable is 𝐷𝐶𝐶, which is the dynamic conditional correlation of 
fund returns measured by using the model of Engle (2002). The independent variable is 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 which is the number of female 
fund managers divided by the total number of managers managing the fund at time t. In Column (1), we control for fund level 
characteristics which are one month lagged, and manager level characteristics. 𝐴𝑔𝑒 is the average age of all managers 
managing a fund in time t, 𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑑 is a dummy variable and equal to 1 if the fund has a manager with graduate degree, and 0 
otherwise, 𝑃ℎ𝐷 is a dummy variable and equal to 1 if the fund has a manager with Ph.D. degree, and 0 otherwise, 𝐶𝑒𝑟𝑡 is a 
dummy variable and equal to 1 if the fund has a manager with professional certification, and 0 otherwise, 𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒 is the 
average tenure of all the managers in a fund in time t. In Column (2), we control for one month lagged fund level variables, 
and 𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑚_𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 which is equal to the total number of managers in fund management team in time t. We winsorize the fund 
level control variables at 1% and 99%. We include fixed effect at time and segment level. The t-statistics based on clustered 
standard errors for time and fund are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote 99%, 95%, and 90% significance levels. 
See Table C1 in the appendix for the explanation of the variables. 
𝐷𝐶𝐶𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡  + 𝛽2 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡  + 𝛽3 𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡  + 𝛽4 𝑃ℎ𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5 𝐶𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6 𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽8 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽9 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽10 𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑚_𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡  + 𝑖,𝑡 
 Fund Time-varying Conditional Correlation 




































Year-fixed Effect YES YES 
Segment-fixed Effect YES YES 
No. of Obs. 129,269 163,290 





Table 4.12. Investment Behaviors and Fund Correlation 
This table presents the findings of regression of fund returns correlation on herding, risk level, trading activity, and style 
extremity of fund, including team size and time lagged fund level controls. The dependent variable is 𝐷𝐶𝐶, which is the 
dynamic conditional correlation of fund returns measured by using the model of Engle (2002). In Column (1), the independent 
variable is fund herding, which is measured as Sector Concentration Deviation, 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝐷𝑒𝑣, explained in Equation (6). In Column 
(2), the independent variable is fund’s risk level, which is measured as total risk, 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘, using Equation (1). In Column (3), the 
independent variable is fund’s trading activity, which is measured by turnover ratio, 𝑇𝑂𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜. In Column (4), the independent 
variable is fund’s aggregated style extremity, which is measured in Equation (12). The control variable 𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑚_𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 is equal to 
the total number of managers in fund management team in time t. We winsorize the fund level control variables at 1% and 
99%. We include fixed effect at time and segment level. The t-statistics based on clustered standard errors for time and fund 
are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote 99%, 95%, and 90% significance levels. See Table C1 in the appendix for 
the explanation of the variables. 
𝐷𝐶𝐶𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽5 𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑚_𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡  + 𝑖,𝑡 
 Fund Time-varying Conditional Correlation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
SecDev -0.0007*** 
(-4.65) 















































Year-fixed Effect YES YES YES YES 
Segment-fixed Effect YES YES YES YES 
No. of Obs. 163,290 163,185 159,716 163,176 







4.5.3 Effect of Fund Size 
For the purpose of analyzing the possible impact of fund size on the association between female 
proportion and the correlation of fund returns with the benchmark, we categorize the sample funds 
according to their fund size. The quantiles are as follows: below 33.33%, between 33.33% and 66.66%, 
and above 66.66%. We classify funds into small, medium, and large sized groups. We use the model in 
Equation (4), with 𝐷𝐶𝐶𝑖,𝑡 as the dependent variable. Table 4.13 shows the findings of the regression for 
the three categories of fund size. The results support our main conjecture that funds managed by a high 
proportion of female managers have a higher correlation with the benchmark. The coefficients of female 
proportion are positive and significant in small, medium, and large sized funds. Moreover, we observe 
a persistent increase in the coefficient of female proportion, which indicates that the relationship among 
the main variables becomes stronger as fund size increases. 
 One of the possible explanations of this result is the fact that large funds tend to appoint more 
female managers. As described by Niessen and Ruenzi (2006), mainly large funds and well-established 
families employ female managers because they have reputational concerns, and they are more likely to 
be sued in anti-discrimination lawsuits. Moreover, large funds have big institutional investors who often 
appreciate work force diversity in the firms they do business with. Hence, large sized funds have more 





Table 4.13. Effect of Fund Size on Female Proportion and Fund Correlation 
This table presents the findings of regression of fund returns correlation on female proportion under three quantiles of fund 
size, including fund level controls. The dependent variable is 𝐷𝐶𝐶, which is the dynamic conditional correlation of fund returns 
measured by using the model of Engle (2002). The independent variable is 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 which is the number of female fund 
managers divided by the total number of managers managing the fund at time t. Q1 consists of funds with fund size below 
33.33%, Q2 includes funds with fund size between 33.33% - 66.66%, Q3 is based on funds with fund size above 66.66%. We 
winsorize the fund level control variables at 1% and 99%. The t-statistics based on clustered standard errors for time and fund 
are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote 99%, 95%, and 90% significance levels. See Table C1 in the appendix for 
the explanation of the variables.  
 Fund Time-varying Conditional Correlation 































No. of Obs. 43,164 57,706 63,195 




This study provides empirical evidence that female fund managers influence fund investing strategy. 
Although less than 10% of all mutual fund managers are women and the majority of them work in 
mixed gender teams, their collective self-construal plays an important role in the investment decisions. 
The findings report that funds with a higher proportion of female managers in the team closely track 
the benchmark. Hence, female fund managers follow less active investing strategies compared to their 
male counterparts. We apply the Sharpe optimization model of performance in the mean-variance 
spanning test. The results demonstrate that a marginal change in the risk-to-reward measure 
(diversification benefits) decreases with funds that are managed by more female than male managers. 
Hence, the collective self-construal of female managers possibly explains the reduction in funds’ 




To support the main findings, we analyze the impact of various investment behaviors of the 
gender of mutual fund managers on funds’ activity. Consistent with the collectivism argument, the 
results show that female fund managers herd more by concentrating investments in the most popular 
sectors. The funds which herd more have returns that closely track the returns of the multifactor 
benchmark. Consistent with the literature, we find that female fund managers are more risk averse and 
less overconfident than male managers. Risky investments increase the activity of funds because they 
generate higher returns and are likely to beat the benchmark. Therefore, less risk-taking behavior and 
less aggressive trading potentially explain a higher R2. We also find that a less extreme investment style 
tends to significantly decrease fund activity. The results are robust to various additional tests. We 
suggest a future research to investigate the impact of the collective self-construal of female directors 






This chapter concludes the thesis by providing a summary of the main results of the three essays in 







5.1 Major Findings and Conclusion 
Women are underrepresented at leadership positions and the gender gap persists globally. The existing 
literature regarding the advantages of female inclusion in investment decisions suggests that higher 
gender diversity is associated with positive outcomes for employers. However, several studies have 
documented no significant difference in the decision making or skills of male and female professional 
investors. Moreover, the literature on gender provides empirical evidence that gender stereotype market 
participants undermine the performance of professional females and encourage gender bias in 
investment industry. The gender gap exists in top positions and efforts are required to address this issue. 
This thesis explores investment behaviors of females who have reached to the top positions of 
investment industry or at the executive positions of corporations and possess strength in decision 
making. The three studies in the thesis examine whether females’ investment preferences and trading 
behaviors are different from those of their male counterparts, and also examine the role of various 
factors that possibly contribute to the disparities between male and female investment decisions. 
In the first essay, we observe that only 5.71% of top executives in our sample are female. 
Moreover, this percentage decreases further when we observe that female top executives are involved 
in only 2.56% of the insider trades. Using a sample of U.S. top executives’ insider trades, the findings 
show that female insiders carry biased trades based on prospect theory value and earn losses higher than 
their male counterparts. On average, the number of insider transactions, past 12-months’ cumulative 
returns, share turnover, the number of shares traded, and the dollar-value of male trades are greater than 
for female trades. We document that insiders earn lower returns in the subsequent month when they buy 
(sell) stock with a prospect theory value higher (lower) than other firms. This finding is consistent with 
the literature that trades based on prospect theory value negatively impact subsequent returns. 
We follow the literature that limited information contributes to higher behavioral biases, and 
that due to male dominance female insiders may have access to limited information, as compared to 
their male counterparts. Our results demonstrate that information disadvantage to female executives 




information within an executive category is expected to be equal for all executives, irrespective of their 
gender. However, we find that higher biased trade losses exist for female insiders with similar formal 
titles to their male counterparts. In a given trade size, where all inside traders are expected to be equally 
informed, we find higher losses for females from prospect theory value trades, compared to males. Our 
findings are consistent in the settings of routine and opportunistic/non-classified trades, and macro-
level market uncertainty factors; where the level of information is believed to be the same for all 
insiders. 
If female insiders’ access to poor quality information is a possible explanation of their higher 
biased trades, then we may observe a decrease in their losses for the trades based on superior 
information. We consider firms with a high proportion of female insider transactions. This serves as a 
proxy for a high proportion of female insiders, who would reduce the impact of situational factors that 
may lead to an informational disadvantage. In such a setting, the association between female insiders 
and biased trade losses is insignificant, demonstrating that informal networks may give an informational 
advantage to male insiders. Moreover, insiders’ buy transactions are based on superior internal 
information, and market participants are likely to mimic these trades. The results show that losses from 
prospect theory value bias trades are reduced for female insiders when they carry buy trades.  
The second essay uses a sample of single male and female managed active equity funds. We 
observe that the proportion of single female managed funds decreases over our sample period from the 
maximum of 11.15% in 2001 to the minimum of 7.68% in 2012. The total number of domestic actively 
managed equity funds in our sample is 1,932. We observe that 113 (5.85%) are female-only managed 
funds and 1,658 (85.82%) are male-only managed funds. Considering the importance of liquidity, essay 
two explores the liquidity preference of fund managers based on their gender. The results demonstrate 
that the preference of female fund managers for holding liquid portfolios is significantly higher than for 
male managers. On average, female managed funds are smaller in size, earn lower returns, receive lesser 




The factor which potentially explains the preference of female fund managers to hold more 
liquid stocks is their endorsement of information transparency. We provide empirical evidence that 
female fund managers are attracted to stocks whose prices incorporate the available information 
efficiently. Their tendency to invest in price efficient stocks may serve as a channel to higher portfolio 
liquidity. Additionally, to deal with endogeneity concerns, we apply propensity score matching, 
difference-in-differences, and instrumental variable approaches on the whole sample, as well as on a 
sub-sample of transition funds. All the results support our hypothesis that a preference for portfolio 
liquidity is higher among female than male fund managers, and it is evident that portfolio liquidity 
significantly improves after a transition from a male to a female fund manager. The study highlights the 
concerns regarding negatively affected fund performance due to the potential tradeoff between liquidity 
and returns. However, further detailed analysis is required to reach any conclusions in this regard. 
Essay three reports that the ratio of female to male managers has decreased over time from 
11.27% in 2004 to 9.51% in 2014. Teams of mixed gender manage 19.6% of the funds in our sample. 
We report that less than 10% of all mutual fund managers are women and the majority of them prefer 
to work in mixed gender teams. Our study explores whether investment style of these few female fund 
managers, either in management teams or single managed funds, influences their fund’s strategy and 
subsequent returns, or they follow the fund management style of their male counterparts. We use the 
measure of fund activeness, i.e., R2, presented by Amihud and Goyenko (2013), which is the deviation 
of fund returns from index returns. The regression results provide evidence that fund returns track 
benchmark returns closely with a higher fraction of female managers in the fund management team. 
The results signal that female fund managers design fund investment strategies and portfolio 
composition in accordance with the benchmark index. Moreover, the study argues that the 
interdependent construct of female managers reduces the economic benefits of diversification of the 
funds. 
Consistent with the hypothesis of the collective self-construal of women, the results 




sectors. A portion of their herding behavior can be explained by reputational concerns as they face strict 
scrutiny from market participants. However, we do not empirically explore the reputational aspects of 
herding. Furthermore, we analyze the investment behaviors of females, given in the literature, to test 
their impact on the less active investments of female managers. The findings are consistent with the 
literature that females are more risk averse and less overconfident than their male counterparts. 
Subsequently, these behaviors explain the close movement of fund returns with the benchmark returns. 
Combining the findings of all three studies, we conclude that female professionals in top 
positions exhibit investment behaviors and make decisions that are significantly different from that of 
their male counterparts. We report that gender differences in investment decisions exist, either when 
females perform their services in a mixed gender team, or they are the sole decision makers. In this 
thesis, we have also examined the likely channels that may explain why females behave differently. 
Making insider trading decisions induced by prospect theory value, managing a portfolio of liquid 
stocks that are price efficient, and managing funds less actively by following the market benchmark 
closely provide strong signals that females tend to exhibit safe and careful investment behavior 
compared to male professionals. 
The findings of this thesis have implications for investors, corporations, market participants, 
and policy makers. The literature suggests that traders and market participants receive signals from 
insider trades. Insider purchases indicate good news about firm fundamentals, and investors are highly 
likely to follow them for their trading decisions. Based on our findings, female insider trades may not 
always convey information, and likely to be based on heuristics. Therefore, market participants need to 
be cautious about the gender of executives who make insider trades in different timings. Although, 
female managed funds are less risky and satisfy liquidity needs of investors, especially during an event 
of crisis; they receive lower inflow as compared to male managed funds. It is not surprising if male fund 
managers attract fund flows by holding less-liquid stocks and reporting higher fund return performance. 




managed funds by analyzing the riskiness and percentage of asset allocation to illiquid stocks in their 
portfolio holdings. 
Our findings report a decrease in the number of single managed funds, whereas, most of the 
female managers are managing funds in gender diverse teams. Hence, companies must put in all 
possible efforts to narrow gender gap in investment industry, e.g., raising awareness of gender 
stereotypes, providing an equal opportunity to join informational networks, and eliminating 
discrepancies in compensations and promotion systems to counter the prejudices that female 
professionals face. As women reach the higher decision-making position, they become increasingly 
scarce, making them more visible and subject to greater scrutiny (Ely, Ibarra, & Kolb, 2011). As a 
result, they may refrain from making bold decisions and outperform the benchmark in fund industry. 
Companies must provide the necessary resources, support, and mentoring to address these concerns. 
The pessimistic attitude of market participants towards women prevents them from taking powerful 
positions. Hence, policymakers must design career planning programs and implement practices which 
reduce any misperception of women’s lower abilities and skills. Improved gender diversity and 
inclusion of more educated and skilled females in investment industry may contribute to achieving 
several macroeconomic goals through capitalizing on behavioral differences among the genders. 
 
5.2 Future Research 
We have conducted three research studies in detail. Specific time frame for completion of the degree 
and unavailability of some of the databases have placed limitations to our research work. Moreover, 
unobserved variables, and other possible channels contributing to our results are considered as 
limitation of this thesis. Consequently, there are some areas that could be addressed in possible future 
research. Our sample for the first study considers insider trading by only the A category of top 
executives of the U.S. firms. In future, inclusion of a wide range of executive classes will provide more 
insight into the risk preferences of insiders. Comparing information content of male and female insider 




anchoring bias, can be examined to document the tendency of biased trading among male and female 
insiders. 
Focusing on the findings of our second study, analyzing the pros and cons of higher liquidity 
preferences of female fund managers in volatile market situations will be an interesting topic for study. 
Moreover, trading motivations of female fund managers can also be compared with those of male 
managers by examining their buying and selling patterns of liquid stocks. Additionally, there are many 
variations of asset allocations other than just equity funds; hence, it would be of interest to test the 
liquidity preferences of female fund managers in other fund categories. 
In the third study, we use the activity measure of R2 to examine the degree of active investing 
strategy of female fund managers. It will be more insightful to use a fund’s holding-based measure, e.g., 
Active Share, to test whether fund stockholdings closely track benchmark holdings if there is a high 
proportion of female managers in the team. In our sample, most of the funds are team managed and the 
data does not provide information about the decision-making powers of each team member, or fund 
companies’ policies in this regard. If such information can be accessed in future, it would provide 
thought-provoking results regarding the impact of male and female decisions in a team. In our sample, 
there are few single male and single female managed equity funds. In future, analyzing the degree of 
active investment of single managed funds will be more useful in commenting on females’ investment 
style. Our study does not comment on the performance of less actively managed funds, hence, analyzing 
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APPENDIX A. CHAPTER 2 
The equations below follow Tversky and Kahneman (1992) who develop cumulative prospect theory 
to assign value to gains and losses by aggregating the product of value and probability weighting 
functions. Following Barberis, Mukherjee, and Wang (2016): 
 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = ∑ 𝜋𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=−𝑚
 𝜐(𝑥𝑖) (A1) 
where υ (.) is value function: 
 𝜐(𝑥) =  {
 𝑥𝛼               𝑓𝑜𝑟        𝑥 ≥ 0
−𝜆(−𝑥)𝛼       𝑓𝑜𝑟    𝑥 < 0
 (A2) 
whereas 𝜋𝑖 is probability weighting function: 
 𝜋𝑖 = {
𝑤+ (𝑝𝑖 + ⋯+ 𝑝𝑛) − 𝑤
+ (𝑝𝑖+1 + ⋯+ 𝑝𝑛)               𝑓𝑜𝑟        0 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛
𝑤− (𝑝−𝑚 + ⋯+ 𝑝𝑖) −  𝑤
− (𝑝−𝑚 + ⋯+ 𝑝𝑖−1)       𝑓𝑜𝑟      − 𝑚 ≤ 𝑖 < 0
 (A3) 
To obtain the probability weight for a loss (𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑖<0), Barberis, Mukherjee, and Wang (2016) 
take the total probabilities of all losses equal to or worse than 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑖, and the total probability of all 
losses strictly worse than 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑖. They then apply a weighting function to each of the sum of these 
probabilities, i.e., 𝑤−(.), and take the difference (Eq. A3). For a gain (𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑖≥0), take total probabilities 
of all gains equal to or greater than 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑖, and the total probability of all gains strictly greater than 
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑖. Then apply a weighting function to each of the sum of these probabilities, i.e. 𝑤
+(.), and take 
the difference (Eq. A3). The 𝑤+(.) and 𝑤−(.) are explained as below: 
 𝑤+(𝑃) =
𝑃𝛾
(𝑃𝛾 + (1 − 𝑃)𝛾)
1
𝛾⁄  
 ,     𝑤−(𝑃) =
𝑃𝛿




To measure PTV, probability weighting function of each outcome is as below: 
 𝜋𝑖 =  {
𝑤+ (
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Equation (1) is measured as follows: 
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Figure A1: Trend of Average Biased Trades and Average Female Insider Trades Over Time 
This figure shows a pattern of average prospect theory value biased trades and insider trades by female executives in our 
sample from year 2002 to the end of 2016. Avg_Biased_Trades and Avg_Female_Trades are cross-section averages of biased 







Table A1: Description of Variables 
This table defines all the main variables of this study. 
Variables Description 
𝐵𝑖𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑_𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒_𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 Measure of loss from prospect theory value biased trades. Equal to  
|𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑡+1 | if either of the two conditions mentioned in Equation (4) is met at time t, and 0 
otherwise. 
𝑃𝑇𝑉 Measure of prospect theory value. Equal to insider stock’s PTV, described in Equation (1). 
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑡+1  Measure of monthly return in excess to market return at time t+1.  
𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 Measure of trade by female insider. Equal to 1 if insider trading is carried by female at time t, and 
0 otherwise.  
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑥_𝑚 Past month return – Monthly return in excess to market return at time t-1. 
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑥_𝑦 Past year return – Cumulative past monthly returns in excess to market returns from t-12, t-2. We 
take log of compounded monthly excess returns and aggregate from t-12, t-2. 
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 Log of monthly market capitalization at time t-1. 
𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 Monthly volume turnover at time t-1. Equal to number of shares traded divided by number of shares 
outstanding. 
𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘_𝑀𝑘𝑡 Book to Market ratio at time t-1. Equal to (total assets - total liabilities) divided by (closing price 
× number of shares outstanding). Book to Market ratio for June of year t is the book equity for the 
last fiscal year end in t-1 divided by market equity for December of t-1.  
𝐴𝑔𝑒_𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟 Insider’s age at the time of transaction. 
𝑃ℎ𝐷 Equals 1 if insider has doctoral degree, and 0 otherwise. 
𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑑 Equals 1 if insider has graduate degree, and 0 otherwise. 
𝑀𝐵𝐴 Equals 1 if insider has MBA degree, and 0 otherwise. 
𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑑 Equals 1 if insider has undergraduate degree, and 0 otherwise. 




Table A2: Comparison of Biased Insider Trades by Executive Gender 
This table shows the total number of trades by male and female insiders, and the proportion of prospect theory value biased 
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2003 7,794 291 1,618 47 20.76 16.15 
2004 18,796 570 4,383 185 23.32 32.46 
2005 25,240 637 3,520 109 13.95 17.11 
2006 25,049 490 2,767 36 11.05 7.35 
2007 42,128 730 6,036 253 14.33 34.66 
2008 33,165 718 2,590 76 7.81 10.58 
2009 12,864 394 1,887 134 14.67 34.01 
2010 13,105 345 1,457 76 11.12 22.03 
2011 9,066 499 1,587 100 17.51 20.04 
2012 8,523 218 1,088 43 12.76 19.72 
2013 6,396 257 1,130 33 17.67 12.84 
2014 6,527 203 1,058 26 16.21 12.81 
2015 5,588 282 707 20 12.65 7.09 
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Table B1: Description of Variables 
This table defines all the main variables of this study. 
Variables Description 
𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡_𝐿𝑖𝑞_𝑃𝑆𝑇 Measure of monthly portfolio liquidity introduced by Pastor, Stambaugh, and Taylor (2020) and 
described in Equation (1). 
𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡_𝐿𝑖𝑞_𝐴𝑚ℎ𝑑 Measure of monthly portfolio liquidity which is the value weighted average of Amihud liquidity of 
all the stocks held by a fund at time t. The illiquidity measure of Amihud (2002) is the daily ratio of 
absolute stock return to dollar volume of the stock, described in Equation (2). 
𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡_𝐿𝑖𝑞_𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑑 Measure of monthly portfolio liquidity which is the value weighted average of Bid_Ask Spread of all 
the stocks held by a fund at time t. This illiquidity measure is the daily quoted bid-ask spread of a 
stock divided by its midpoint, described in Equation (3). 
𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 Dummy variable equals to 1 if fund is single female managed at time t, and 0 if it is single male 
managed. 
𝑅𝑒𝑡 Measure of monthly fund return. Equal to the value weighted average of returns of all the share classes 
of a fund at time t. 
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 Measure of monthly fund size. Equal to the natural log of total net assets of all the share classes of a 
fund in million dollars at time t. 
𝐸𝑥𝑝 Measure of monthly fund expense ratio. Equal to the value weighted average of net expense ratio of 
all the share classes of a fund at time t. 
𝑇𝑂𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 Measure of monthly fund turnover ratio. Equal to the minimum of the fund’s dollar buys and sells 
during the fiscal year, scaled by the fund’s average total net assets. The annual measure is divided by 
12 to converted to monthly frequency.  
𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤 Measure of monthly fund flow. Equal to the net growth in total net assets of a fund, as a percentage 
of its total net assets adjusted for returns at time t, described in Equation (4).  
𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑_𝐴𝑔𝑒 Measure of monthly fund age. Equal to the natural log of the difference between fund’s inception 
date and the date at time t. 
𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑 Dummy variable. Equal to 1 if the undergraduate degree is the highest that a fund manager has earned, 
and 0 otherwise. 
𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑑 Dummy variable. Equal to 1 if the graduate degree is the highest that a fund manager has earned, and 
0 otherwise. 
𝑃ℎ𝐷 Dummy variable. Equal to 1 if the PhD degree is the highest that a fund manager has earned, and 0 
otherwise. 
𝑀𝐵𝐴 Dummy variable. Equal to 1 if a fund manager has obtained a Master of Business Administration 
degree, and 0 otherwise. 
𝐶𝑒𝑟𝑡 Dummy variable. Equal to 1 if a fund manager has obtained a professional qualification (e.g. CFA or 
CPA), and 0 otherwise. 
𝑀𝑔𝑟_𝐴𝑔𝑒 Measure of monthly fund manager’s age. Equal to the natural log of the difference between 





Table B2: Distribution of Single Managed Funds by Gender 
This table shows the total number of single male and female managed funds and the proportion of female managed funds in 
percentage from January 2000 – December 2017. 
Year Total Funds No. of Male Funds No. of Female Funds 
Proportion of Female 
Funds (%) 
2000 802 714 88 10.97 
2001 933 829 104 11.15 
2002 971 870 101 10.40 
2003 985 883 102 10.36 
2004 934 835 99 10.60 
2005 908 814 94 10.35 
2006 797 716 81 10.16 
2007 778 711 67 8.61 
2008 840 764 76 9.05 
2009 773 706 67 8.67 
2010 664 605 59 8.89 
2011 601 545 56 9.32 
2012 534 493 41 7.68 
2013 509 467 42 8.25 
2014 491 445 46 9.37 
2015 463 427 36 7.78 
2016 431 393 38 8.82 







Table B3: Detailed Summary Statistics by Manager Gender 
This table provides descriptive statistics of fund and manager characteristics by grouping them based on the gender of mutual 
fund managers. 
Gender Variable Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. P1 P99 
Male Port_Liq_PST 112,982 0.0378 0.0174 0.0575 0.0003 0.2706 
Male Port_Liq_Amhd 112,982 -0.0110 -0.0005 0.0392 -0.2667 -0.00003 
Male Port_Liq_Sprd 112,982 -24.5800 -9.6100 36.3700 -178.9200 -1.8700 
Male Ret 112,982 0.0045 0.0093 0.0543 -0.1589 0.1310 
Male TNA (mil $) 112,982 1447.3415 188.5000 5172.5695 2.2000 23007.0000 
Male Exp 104,354 0.0011 0.0010 0.0005 0.0002 0.0027 
Male TOratio 103,456 0.0762 0.0517 0.0951 0.0025 0.4183 
Male Flow 112,982 0.7272 -0.0039 52.1456 -0.4217 1.4991 
Male Fund_Age 112,982 14.5159 11 13.6379 1 73 
Male N_Stocks 112,982 114.8560 69 236.7667 18 1255 
Male Undergrad 112,982 0.8301 1 0.3755 0 1 
Male Grad 112,982 0.1411 0 0.3481 0 1 
Male PhD 112,982 0.0276 0 0.1638 0 1 
Male MBA 112,982 0.5749 1 0.4944 0 1 
Male Cert 112,982 0.5747 1 0.4944 0 1 
Male Mgr_Age 54,308 47.8470 46 10.1299 29 73 
Female Port_Liq_PST 11,381 0.0407 0.0173 0.0538 0.0010 0.2751 
Female Port_Liq_Amhd 11,381 -0.0046 -0.0005 0.0179 -0.0875 -0.00004 
Female Port_Liq_Sprd 11,381 -24.5600 -10.1400 33.9100 -166.6200 -1.9100 
Female Ret 11,381 0.0032 0.0085 0.0537 -0.1597 0.1262 
Female TNA (mil $) 11,381 678.214 177.000 1673.642 2.200 8746.500 
Female Exp 10,482 0.0012 0.0011 0.0007 0.0004 0.0023 
Female TOratio 10,399 0.0774 0.0600 0.0629 0.0033 0.3108 
Female Flow 11,381 0.2751 -0.0051 10.0860 -0.4320 1.8819 
Female Fund_Age 11,381 14.6777 11 13.4503 1 68 
Female N_Stocks 11,381 86.9736 73 63.4785 23 294 
Female Undergrad 11,381 0.8597 1 0.3473 0 1 
Female Grad 11,381 0.1315 0 0.3380 0 1 
Female PhD 11,381 0.0066 0 0.0809 0 0 
Female MBA 11,381 0.5589 1 0.4965 0 1 
Female Cert 11,381 0.6409 1 0.4798 0 1 






Table B4: Fund Manager Gender and Preference for Portfolio Liquidity 
(Manager age as control variable) 
This table presents the findings of the regression of portfolio liquidity on the gender of single managed funds, including the 
control variable of 𝑀𝑔𝑟_𝐴𝑔𝑒. The baseline regression model is given in Equation (5). The dependent variable is portfolio 
liquidity, 𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡_𝐿𝑖𝑞. The independent variable is 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 which is equal to 1 if fund is single female managed at time t, and 0 
if it is single male managed. 𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡_𝐿𝑖𝑞_𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑑 and 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤 are measured in basis points. The results are presented with fund and 
year fixed effects. The t-statistics based on White robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote 
99%, 95%, and 90% significance levels. See Table B1 in the appendix for the explanation of the fund and manager level 
control variables. 
  Port_Liq_PST   Port_Liq_Amhd   Port_Liq_Sprd 
 All controls 
Manager 
controls 
 All controls 
Manager 
controls 
 All controls 
Manager 
controls 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6) 
Female 0.0050*** 0.0047***  0.0023*** 0.0010*  2.3774*** 1.1760 
 (3.89) (3.71)  (3.79) (1.69)  (3.00) (1.55) 
Ret -0.0057*** -  0.0038 -  12.0000*** - 
 (-3.05)   (1.42)   (5.09)  
Size 0.0067*** -  0.0076*** -  5.5560*** - 
 (28.48)   (22.02)   (23.15)  
Exp -2.6334*** -  0.3978 -  370.7000 - 
 (-4.12)   (0.40)   (0.48)  
TOratio -0.0093*** -  0.0260*** -  11.3000*** - 
 (-4.70)   (9.48)   (6.27)  
Flow 0.0129 -  0.0025 -  -0.0006 - 
 (0.38)   (0.58)   (-0.63)  
Fund_Age 0.0054*** -  -0.0051*** -  -8.1463*** - 
 (5.61)   (-6.19)   (-10.32)  
Undergrad 0.0140*** 0.0139***  0.0004 0.0047***  0.7830 4.4713** 
 (5.00) (5.08)  (0.36) (5.07)  (0.35) (2.03) 
Grad 0.0043* 0.0035  0.0000 0.0031***  1.6267 3.8876* 
 (1.68) (1.41)  (0.05) (4.15)  (0.78) (1.91) 
PhD 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 
 - -  -   -    -   -   
MBA -0.0023** -0.0032***  -0.0017*** -0.0016**  -0.8741 -0.8674 
 (-2.55) (-3.51)  (-2.58) (-2.35)  (-1.19) (-1.21) 
Cert 0.0109*** 0.0101***  0.0004 0.0015***  -0.4664 0.1629 
 (9.58) (8.97)  (0.92) (3.28)  (-0.75) (0.27) 
Mgr_Age 0.0170*** 0.0227***  0.0010 0.0053***  0.9949 3.6087* 
 (7.51) (10.18)  (0.70) (3.71)  (0.52) (1.95) 
Year-fixed 
Effect 
YES YES   YES YES   YES YES 
Fund-fixed 
Effect 
YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
No. of Obs. 55,253 60,052  55,253 60,052  55,253 60,052 
Adj. R-
squared 





Table B5: Fund Manager Gender and Preference for Portfolio Liquidity 
(Stock characteristics as control variables) 
This table presents the findings of the regression of portfolio liquidity on the gender of single managed funds, including stock 
level characteristics along-with the fund and manager level controls. The baseline regression model is given in Equation (5). 
The dependent variable is portfolio liquidity, 𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡_𝐿𝑖𝑞. The independent variable is 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 which is equal to 1 if fund is 
single female managed at time t, and 0 if it is single male managed. Port_Liq_PST_lag is a proxy of portfolio liquidity 
introduced by Pastor, Stambaugh, and Taylor (2020) and measured at time t-1. Port_Liq_Amhd_lag is a measure of portfolio 
liquidity which is the value weighted average of Amihud liquidity of all the stocks held by a fund at time t-1. 
Port_Liq_Sprd_lag is a measure of portfolio liquidity which is the value weighted average of Bid_Ask Spread of all the stocks 
held by a fund at time t-1. Port_Vlty is the value weighted average of the monthly percentile rank of volatility of all the stocks 
held by a fund at time t, where volatility is the standard deviation of daily stock returns. Port_Div is the value weighted average 
of the monthly percentile rank of dividend yield of all the stocks held by a fund at time t. Port_Size is the value weighted 
average of the monthly percentile rank of size of all the stocks held by a fund at time t, where size is the natural log of stock’s 
market capitalization. Port_Cumret is the value weighted average of the monthly percentile rank of cumulative return of all 
the stocks held by a fund at time t, where cumulative return is measured for t-12, t-1. 𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡_𝐿𝑖𝑞_𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑑 and 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤 are measured 
in basis points. The results are presented with fund and year fixed effects. The t-statistics based on White robust standard errors 
are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote 99%, 95%, and 90% significance levels. See Table B1 in the appendix for 
the explanation of the fund and manager level control variables. 
  Port_Liq_PST Port_Liq_Amhd Port_Liq_Sprd 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Female 0.0008*** 0.0005* 0.5336* 
 (3.36) (1.94) (1.89) 
Ret 0.0015*** 0.0143*** 18.5000*** 
 (3.31) (11.05) (23.27) 
Size 0.0002*** 0.0012*** 0.9083*** 
 (5.62) (10.32) (11.41) 
Exp 0.0701 1.1346*** -223.3000 
 (0.58) (2.70) (-0.78) 
TOratio -0.0014*** 0.0035** 0.7854 
 (-2.70) (2.19) (0.96) 
Flow 0.0125 -0.0006 -0.0005 
 (0.88) (-0.42) (-1.49) 
Fund_Age 0.0002 -0.0000 -0.8142*** 
 (1.52) (-0.04) (-2.61) 
Undergrad -0.0005 0.0011 -2.0490 
 (-0.63) (1.48) (-0.82) 
Grad -0.0006 0.0012* -1.8385 
 (-0.71) (1.68) (-0.73) 
PhD -0.0011 0.0028*** -3.4094 
 (-1.29) (3.19) (-1.33) 
MBA 0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0695 
 (0.90) (-1.33) (-0.37) 
Cert 0.0001 0.0005*** -0.0225 
 (0.44) (2.65) (-0.10) 
Port_Liq_PST_lag 0.9265*** - - 
 (120.71)   
Port_Liq_Amhd_lag - 0.6199*** - 





Table B5: (continued) 
 Port_Liq_PST Port_Liq_Amhd Port_Liq_Sprd 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Port_Liq_Sprd_lag - - 7589.8000*** 
   (107.61) 
Port_Vlty -0.0009** 0.0100*** -6.6277*** 
 (-1.99) (8.55) (-9.14) 
Port_Div -0.0034*** -0.0050*** 0.9423 
 (-7.84) (-5.85) (1.37) 
Port_Size 0.0191*** 0.0586*** 14.6000*** 
 (6.88) (13.86) (9.15) 
Port_Cumret -0.0009*** -0.0011 -1.5257** 
 (-2.91) (-1.39) (-2.44) 
Year-fixed Effect YES YES YES 
Fund-fixed Effect YES YES YES 
No. of Obs. 112,184 112,184 112,184 





Table B6: Female Fund Manager and Portfolio Risk and Return 
Table B6, Columns (1) and (2) report the findings of the regression of portfolio risk on the single female managed funds. The 
dependent variable is monthly portfolio risk, 𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡_𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘, which is the value weighted average of monthly volatility of all the 
stocks held by a fund at time t. Columns (3) and (4) present the findings of the regression of fund return on the single female 
managed funds. The dependent variable is monthly fund return, 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑_𝑅𝑒𝑡. The independent variable is 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 which is 
equal to 1 if fund is single female managed at time t, and 0 if it is single male managed. 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤 is measured in basis points. The 
results are presented with fund and year fixed effects. The t-statistics based on White robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * denote 99%, 95%, and 90% significance levels. See Table B1 in the appendix for the explanation 
of all the variables. 
𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡_𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡  + 𝑖,𝑡 
𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑_𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡  + 𝑖,𝑡 
  Port_Risk   Fund_Ret 
 All controls with 
manager age 
All controls without 
manager age 
 All controls with 
manager age 
All controls without 
manager age 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
Female -0.0005** -0.0003*  -0.0012 -0.0011 
 (-1.99) (-1.94)  (-0.66) (-1.00) 
Ret -0.0302*** -0.0324***  - - 
 (-31.05) (-46.38)    
Size -0.0005*** -0.0002***  0.0023*** 0.0015*** 
 (-7.70) (-5.12)  (4.84) (5.17) 
Exp -1.1324*** -0.7550***  3.1664 3.5626*** 
 (-4.76) (-5.06)  (1.46) (2.60) 
TOratio 0.0029*** 0.0038***  0.0066 0.0009 
 (2.81) (6.06)  (1.30) (0.25) 
Flow 0.0019 0.0036  -0.0169 -0.0200 
 (0.58) (1.34)  (-0.54) (-0.81) 
Fund_Age -0.0009*** -0.0009***  -0.0044*** -0.0039*** 
 (-4.39) (-6.25)  (-2.64) (-3.62) 
Undergrad 0.0007 -0.0022  -0.0046 0.0120 
 (1.44) (-1.36)  (-1.10) (0.84) 
Grad 0.0021*** -0.0014  -0.0062 0.0100 
 (4.47) (-0.87)  (-1.60) (0.70) 
PhD 0.0000 -0.0025  0.0000 0.0140 
 -   (-1.55)  -   (0.97) 
MBA 0.0005*** 0.0001  -0.0006 0.0005 
 (2.62) (0.62)  (-0.37) (0.69) 
Cert -0.0001 -0.0000  -0.0019 -0.0003 
 (-0.58) (-0.17)  (-1.16) (-0.38) 
Mgr_Age 0.0023*** -  -0.0108*** - 
 (4.34)   (-2.56)  
Year-fixed Effect YES YES   YES YES 
Fund-fixed 
Effect 
YES YES  YES YES 
No. of Obs. 55,253 113,855  55,253 113,855 


































































































APPENDIX C. CHAPTER 4 
 
Table C1: Description of Variables 
This table defines all the main variables of this study. 
Variables Description 
𝑅2  Measure of activity of fund introduced by Amihud, and Goyenko (2013), retrieved from an annual time 
series regression of Carhart’s (1997) four factor model given in Equation (1). It is the proportion of the 
variability in fund returns that is explained by the variation in these factors’ returns. 
𝑇(𝑅2 ) Logistic transformation of R2 for fund i at time t, explained in Equation (2). 
𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒  Measure of Female Proportion. Equal to number of female managers divided by the total number of 
managers in fund’s management team at time t. 
𝑆𝑒𝑐𝐷𝑒𝑣  Measure of Sector Concentration Deviation (%). Equal to the square root of the sum of squared 
differences between portfolio concentration of fund i in each of the three super sectors and the average 
concentration in each sector among all the funds in fund i’s investment segment in the same year t. 
𝑈𝑛𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘  Measure of Unsystematic Risk (%). Equal to the annual standard deviation of fund i’s return residuals 
obtained from Carhart’s (1997) four factor model. 
𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘  Measure of Systematic Risk (%). Equal to the annual beta retrieved from regressing fund i’s excess return 
on the excess return of market. 
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘  Measure of Total Risk (%). Equal to the sum of systematic and unsystematic risk of fund i at time t. 
𝑇𝑂𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜  Measure of Trading Activity (%). Equal to the lesser of annual purchases or sales (excluding all securities 
with maturities of less than one year) and dividing by average net assets in time t. 
𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑆𝐸  Measure of Aggregate Style Extremity (%). Equal to the mean of style extremity of three style dimensions 
i.e., size, value, and momentum in time t. 
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒  Measure of Fund Size. Equal to the natural log of total assets under management of fund i in time t. 
𝐸𝑥𝑝  Measure of Expense Ratio (%). Equal to the value weighted average of net expense ratio of all the share 
classes of a fund at time t. 
𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤  Measure of Fund Net Flow. Equal to the growth in fund i’s assets under management in time t, given in 
Equation (3) 
Note: For linear regressions, instead of taking annual average of the variables with monthly data frequency, the annual 





Table C2: Annual Distribution of Funds by Gender 
This table presents the number of funds, number of male and female managers, ratio of female to male managers, and 
proportion of female managers in management teams across all the sample funds from January 2004 – December 2014. 
Year No. of funds 
No. of female 
managers 
No. of male 
managers 
Ratio of female to 




2004 1,017 228 2,023 11.27 9.30 
2005 1,079 268 2,386 11.23 8.99 
2006 1,155 315 2,819 11.17 8.45 
2007 1,207 354 3,067 11.54 8.70 
2008 1,265 381 3,310 11.50 8.91 
2009 1,302 406 3,453 11.75 8.92 
2010 1,346 410 3,644 11.24 8.75 
2011 1,401 413 3,876 10.65 8.41 
2012 1,467 409 4,184 9.78 8.09 
2013 1,522 410 4,297 9.54 8.21 






Table C3: Female Proportion and Risk-taking Behavior 
This table presents the findings of regression of fund riskiness on female proportion, including fund level controls. The 
dependent variable is fund’s risk level, which is measured as 𝑈𝑛𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘, 𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘, and 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 using Equation (1). The 
independent variable is 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 which is the number of female fund managers divided by the total number of managers 
managing the fund at time t. We winsorize the fund level control variables at 1% and 99%. The t-statistics based on clustered 
standard errors for time and fund are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote 99%, 95%, and 90% significance levels. 
See Table C1 in the appendix for the explanation of the variables.  
𝑈𝑛𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑡 
𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑡 
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑡 
 Unsystematic Risk Systematic Risk Total Risk 































No. of Obs. 164,645 164,645 164,645 





Table C4: Female Proportion and Overconfidence 
This table presents the findings of regression of fund trading activity on female proportion, including fund level controls. The 
dependent variable is fund’s trading activity, which is measured by turnover ratio, 𝑇𝑂𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜. The independent variable is 
𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 which is the number of female fund managers divided by the total number of managers managing the fund at time t. 
We winsorize the fund level control variables at 1% and 99%. The t-statistics based on clustered standard errors for time and 
fund are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote 99%, 95%, and 90% significance levels. See Table C1 in the appendix 
for the explanation of the variables.  
𝑇𝑂𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑡 
 Turnover Ratio 
 All Controls Fund Size Control Expense Control Flow Control 

































No. of Obs. 161,004 164,822 163,469 162,303 





Table C5: Female Proportion and Style Extremity 
This table presents the findings of regression of investment style extremity on female proportion, including fund level controls. 
The dependent variable is fund’s aggregated style extremity, which is measured in Equation (12). The independent variable is 
𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 which is the number of female fund managers divided by the total number of managers managing the fund at time t. 
We winsorize the fund level control variables at 1% and 99%. The t-statistics based on clustered standard errors for time and 
fund are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote 99%, 95%, and 90% significance levels. See Table C1 in the appendix 
for the explanation of the variables.  
𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑡 
 
Aggregated Style Extremity 
 All Controls Fund Size Control Expense Control Flow Control 

































No. of Obs. 164,635 170,453 167,282 167,610 






Table C6: Time-varying Conditional Correlation and Fund Risk with Market Model 
This table presents the findings of regression of fund returns correlation on riskiness of fund, including fund level controls. 
The dependent variable is 𝐷𝐶𝐶, which is the dynamic conditional correlation of fund returns measured by using the model of 
Engle (2002). The independent variable is fund’s risk level, which is measured as 𝑈𝑛𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘, 𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘, and 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 using 
Equation (14). We winsorize the fund level control variables at 1% and 99%. The t-statistics based on clustered standard errors 
for time and fund are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote 99%, 95%, and 90% significance levels. See Table C1 in 
the appendix for the explanation of the variables.  
𝐷𝐶𝐶𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘_𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑡 
 
Time-varying Conditional Correlation 






































No. of Obs. 165,181 165,181 165,181 
Adj. R-squared 0.3578 0.1597 0.3111 
 
